TRUTH: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRECONDITION
Another important precondition of evangelical theology is the nature of truth. Up to modernity, orthodox theology has held that truth is what corresponds to the objects of its affirmations—this is called a correspondence view of truth. This paradigm, however, has been seriously challenged in more recent times. It is necessary, therefore, to discuss and defend the biblical and theological basis for the correspondence view of truth.1
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DEFINITION OF TRUTH
The Bible claims to be true. The psalmist declared, “Your law is truth” (Ps. 119:142 nkjv), and Jesus prayed, “Sanctify them by Your truth. Your word is truth” (John 17:17 nkjv). Yet Pilate’s question remains: “What is truth?”
The nature of truth is crucial to the Christian faith. Not only does Christianity claim there is absolute truth (which is true for everyone, everywhere, always) but it also insists that truth is that which corresponds to the way things really are. For example, the statement “God exists” means that there truly is a God outside the universe, an extra-cosmic Being. Likewise, the claim that “God raised Christ from the dead” means that the dead corpse of Jesus of Nazareth supernaturally vacated its tomb—alive—after its burial. Christian truth claims actually correspond to the state of affairs about which they claim to inform us.
The nature of truth will determine what is meant by the claim that the Bible is true. Also, it will seriously affect an important discussion about whether the Bible is without error and precisely what is meant by inerrancy (see part 2, chapter 27), for if truth is not what corresponds to the facts, but rather merely what the author intends, then the Bible can be wholly true and yet contain factual errors—as strange as this may seem.
THE DEFINITION OF TRUTH
Truth can be understood both from what it is and from what it is not. Before we can know what truth is, we must examine what truth is not.
What Truth Is Not
There are many inadequate views of the nature of truth. Most of these result from confusion between the nature (definition) of truth and a test (defense) of truth, or from not distinguishing the result from the rule. (This will be clarified below, in the examples of what truth isn’t.)
Truth Is Not “That Which Works”
One popular theory of truth is the pragmatism of William James (1842–1910) and his followers. According to the pragmatic view (see James, P), truth is what works; truth is found in the “cash value” of a statement. In William James’s own words, “Truth is the expedient in the way of knowing.” This means that a statement is known to be true if it brings the right results. It is present expedience as confirmed by future experience.
The inadequacy of this view of truth is evident from several considerations. First, the proponents of it do not expect us to understand their expression of their view of truth for pragmatism but for correspondence. That is, they do not want us to accept a pragmatic view of truth because it seems to be effective but because it corresponds with the way they believe things really are.
Second, the pragmatic view confuses cause and effect. If something is true it will work, at least in the long run. But that something works does not make it true. Lies often work, but their effectiveness doesn’t make them true; they remain false, regardless of their result.
Third, the concept of truth as “what works” is a narrow and restrictive view of truth. At best it refers only to practical truths, not to theoretical or mathematical truths (5+5=10 not because it works but because it is correct), or to metaphysical truths (see chapter 2).
Fourth, pragmatism’s presentation of “truth” is not how truth is understood in everyday life, or in court, where knowing and telling the truth can be a matter of life and death. No judge would accept the testimony of anyone who says, “I swear to tell the expedient, the whole expedient, and nothing but the expedient, so help me future experience.”
Fifth, results do not settle the question of truth, for even when the results are already in, one can still ask whether or not the initial statement corresponded to the facts. If it did not, then it isn’t true, no matter what the results were.
Truth Is Not “That Which Coheres”
Some thinkers have suggested that truth is what is internally consistent; what coheres within; what is self-consistent. However, this also is an inadequate definition of truth for two basic reasons:
First, the very statement “Truth is that which coheres” is offered by the coherentist as a statement that corresponds to reality. Hence, the coherence theory depends on the opposing correspondence view of truth even to express itself. No coherentist wants us to accept his view simply because he believes it coheres but because he believes it is true (i.e., because he says it correctly represents the state of affairs to which it refers).
Second, empty statements can cohere or stand together even though they are devoid of content (meaning that they do not refer to anything). For example, “All wives are married women” is internally consistent, but it’s empty—it tells us nothing about the real world. The statement would be true even if there were no wives; it really means, “If there is a wife, then she must be married,” but it does not inform us that there is a wife anywhere in the universe. Also, a set of false statements can be internally consistent; such is the case in a conspiracy to lie under oath. In addition, coherence is at best only a negative test of truth—that is, statements are wrong if they are inconsistent, but not necessarily true if they are consistent.
Truth Is Not “That Which Was Intended”
Others have suggested that truth is found in intentions, not necessarily in affirmations. That is, a statement is true if the author intends it to be true, and a statement is false if he does not intend it to be true (see Rogers, BAI). But there are likewise serious problems with this position.
First, as with coherence, a proponent of the intentionalist view of truth has to use a correspondence view of truth to express his view, for the very statement “The intentionalist view of truth is true” is true not because he intended to say it but only if it corresponds to its referent. The word true in that sentence means “correct” or “corresponds,” otherwise the claim makes no sense.
Second, many statements agree with the intention of the author, but they are mistaken nonetheless. Slips of the tongue do occur, and they are false. But if a statement was true because it was intended to be true, even if it was mistaken, then all such errors would be true.
Third, if something is true because someone intended it to be true, then all sincere statements ever uttered would be true—even those that were patently absurd. But many sincere people have been sincerely wrong. Hence, the intentionalist view of truth is inadequate.
Truth Is Not “That Which is Comprehensive”
Others claim that truth is found in what is most comprehensive. That is to say, the view that explains the most data is true, and those that are not as comprehensive are not true—at least not as true. This theory of truth falls far short of being a comprehensive definition of truth for several reasons.
First, as we have seen with the other examples, the claim that “the comprehensiveness view of truth is true” depends for its truth on the correspondence view of truth. The word true in that sentence means what corresponds to reality, to what is correct.
Second, comprehensiveness is at best only a test for truth, not the definition of truth. Certainly a good theory will explain all the relevant data, and a true worldview will be comprehensive. However, this is only a negative test of whether or not it is true—the affirmations of that view must still correspond with the alleged state of affairs in order to be true.
Third, if a view were true simply because it is more encyclopedic, then a comprehensive view of error would be true and a brief presentation of truth would be in error; automatically, long-winded presentations would be true and concise ones false. But this is plainly ridiculous—clearly one can have an exhaustive view of what is false and an incomplete view of what is true.
Truth Is Not “That Which Is Existentially Relevant”
Following Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), other existentialist philosophers have insisted that what is relevant to our existence or life is true, and what is not relevant to our existence or life is false. Truth is subjectivity, as Kierkegaard put it; truth is what is livable.2 As another existentialist (Martin Buber, 1878–1965) stated, truth is found in persons not in propositions (IAT). There are a number of problems with the existential definition of truth.
First, the very statement “Truth is not found in propositions” is itself a propositional truth claim. In other words, it is self-defeating.
Second, the existentialist confuses the nature of truth and the application of truth. Of course, all applicable truth should be applied to one’s life; that is, all objective truth should be appropriated subjectively where possible. But this does not mean that truth itself is subjective.
Third, existentialism presents too narrow a definition of all truth. Even if truth is existential in some sense, not all truth fits into this category—there are many other kinds of truth, including physical, mathematical, historical, and theoretical truths. If truth by its very nature were found only in existential relevance, then none of these could be true. Existential relevance fails as a complete definition of truth.
Fourth, what is true will always be relevant, but not everything that is relevant is true. A pen is relevant to an atheistic writer, and a gun is relevant to a murderer. But relevance makes neither the former true nor the latter good. A truth about life will be relevant to one’s life, but not everything relevant to one’s life will be true.
Fifth, many existentialists make a false dichotomy between fact and value, relegating religious truth to the nonfactual domain. This, however, is not possible because one cannot separate the spiritual significance of Christ’s death and resurrection from the objective facts of His literal death, empty tomb, and physical appearances (1 Cor. 15:1–19).
Truth Is Not “That Which Feels Good”
The popular subjectivist view is that truth is what provides a satisfying feeling, while error is what feels bad. Accordingly, truth is found in our subjective feelings. Many mystics and New Agers hold to versions of this model (Shirley MacLaine, Out On a Limb); however, this view is faulty for many reasons.
First, this view is self-defeating, for the claim that “What feels good is true” is so only if it corresponds to the way things are. Thus it depends on a correspondence view of truth to make sense out of its claim to be true in a factual or objective sense. Subjectivism is actually claiming that its view of truth is correct only if it corresponds to the facts of the matter, not simply because it feels good.
Second, it is evident that bad news (which makes us feel bad) can be true. But if what feels good is always true, then this would not be possible. Poor report cards do not make a student feel good, even though they are true. The truth is, the truth often hurts.
Third, feelings are relative to individuals, and thus what feels good to one may feel bad to another. If this were because of truth, then truth would be relative. But all truth cannot be relative, for the truth claim that “all truth is relative” is itself offered as an absolute statement and therefore as an absolute truth (see page 119, “A Response to Arguments for a Relative View of Truth”).
Fourth, even if truth makes us feel good, we cannot be convinced that what feels good is necessarily true—there is a confusion here of the cart and the horse. The nature of truth is not the same as the result of truth.
What Truth Is: Truth Is That Which Corresponds to Its Object
Now that the inadequate views of the nature of truth have been examined, it remains to state the positive view. Truth is found in correspondence. Truth is what corresponds to its object (referent), whether this object is abstract or concrete. As applied to the world, truth is the way things really are. Truth is “telling it like it is.”
Of course, there can be truth about abstract realities as well as tangible realities. For example, there are mathematical truths, and there are also truths about ideas, such as the ideas in one’s mind. Truth is what accurately expresses these states of affairs, whatever they may be.
By contrast, falsehood is that which does not correspond to its referent (object). Falsehood does not tell it like it is, but like it is not; it is a misrepresentation of the way things are. Statements are false if they are mistaken, even if the speaker intended to say the correct things.
Philosophical Arguments for a Correspondence View of Truth
There are many reasons that support a correspondence view of the nature of truth—the view that truth is what accurately describes its referent. Several are enumerated as follows:
First, noncorrespondence views of truth are self-defeating. As we have seen again and again, all noncorrespondence views of truth imply a correspondence view of truth in their very attempt to deny the correspondence model. For example, the claim that “the noncorrespondence view is true” implies that noncorrespondence corresponds to reality; therefore, the noncorrespondence view cannot even express itself without using the correspondence view of truth.
Second, even lies are impossible without a correspondence view of truth. If one’s statements need not correspond to the facts in order to be true, then any factually incorrect statement could be true. And if this is the case, then lies become impossible because any statement is compatible with any given state of affairs.
Third, without correspondence there could be no such thing as truth or falsity. In order to know that something is true as opposed to knowing that something is false, there must be a real difference between things and the statements about the things. But this real difference between thought and things is precisely what is entailed in a correspondence view of truth.
Fourth, factual communication would break down without a correspondence view of truth. Factual communication depends on informative statements, but informative statements must be factually true (that is, they must correspond to the facts) in order to inform one correctly. Further, all communication seems to depend ultimately on something being literally or factually true, for we cannot know something (like a metaphor) is not literally true unless we understand what is literal. This being the case, it follows that all communication depends in the final analysis on a correspondence view of truth.
Fifth, even the intentionalist theory depends on the correspondence view of truth. The intentionalist theory claims something is true only if the accomplishments correspond to the intentions. Consequently, within the intentionalist system, without correspondence of intentions and accomplished facts there is no truth.
Biblical Arguments for a Correspondence View of Truth
From a theological point of view, it is important to know whether the biblical authors employed a correspondence view of truth. There are many lines of evidence to confirm that they did (see Preus, IS, 24).
First, the ninth commandment is predicated on a correspondence view of truth. “You shall not give false testimony against your neighbor” (Ex. 20:16) depends for its very meaning and effectiveness on correspondence, implying that a statement is false if it does not correspond to reality.
Indeed, this is precisely how the term “lie” is used in Scripture. Satan is called a liar (John 8:44); his statement to Eve, “You will not surely die” (Gen. 3:4), did not correspond to what God really said, namely, “You will surely die” (Gen. 2:17). Ananias and Sapphira lied to the apostles by misrepresenting the factual state of affairs concerning their finances (Acts 5:1–4).
Second, the Bible gives numerous examples of the correspondence view of truth. Joseph said to his brothers, “Send one of your number to get your brother; the rest of you will be kept in prison, so that your words may be tested to see if you are telling the truth” (Gen. 42:16).
Moses commanded that false prophets be tested on the grounds that “if what a prophet proclaims … does not take place or come true, that is a message the Lord has not spoken” (Deut. 18:22).
Solomon prayed at the dedication of the temple, “And now, O God of Israel, let your word that you promised your servant David my father [that there would be a temple] come true” (1 Kings 8:26).
The prophecies of Micaiah were considered “true” and the false prophets’ false words “lies” because the former corresponded with the facts of reality (1 Kings 22:16–22).
Something was considered a “falsehood” if it did not correspond to God’s law—truth (Ps. 119:163).
Proverbs states, “A truthful witness saves lives, but a false witness is deceitful” (Prov. 14:25), which implies that truth is factually correct. In court, intentions alone will not save innocent lives when they have been accused. Only “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” will do it.
Nebuchadnezzar demanded of his wise men to know the facts; he considered anything else “misleading” (Dan. 2:9).
Jesus’ statement in John 5:33 entails a correspondence view of truth: “You have sent to John and he has testified to the truth.”
In Acts 24 there is an unmistakable usage of the correspondence view. The Jews said to the governor about Paul, “By examining him yourself you will be able to learn the truth about all these charges we are bringing, against him” (v. 8). They continued, “You can easily verify [the facts]” (v. 11).
Paul clearly implied a correspondence view of truth when he wrote, “Each of you must put off falsehood and speak truthfully to his neighbor” (Eph. 4:25).
Third, the biblical use of the word err does not support the intentionalist theory of truth, since it is used of unintentional “errors” (cf. Lev. 4:2, 27, etc.). Certain acts were wrong, whether the trespassers intended to commit them or not, and hence a guilt offering was called for to atone for their error. Of the five times shagag (“to err”) is used in the Old Testament (Gen. 6:3; Lev. 5:18; Num. 15:28; Job 12:16; Ps. 119:67), the Leviticus and Numbers references plainly refer to erring unintentionally.
Further, the noun shegagah (“error”) is used nineteen times, and all but two are of unintentional errors (Lev. 4:2, 22, 27; 5:15, 18; 22:14; Num. 15:25 [twice], 26, 27, 28, 29 [twice]; 35:11 [twice]; Josh. 20:3, 9.) Only Ecclesiastes 5:6 and 10:5 could be understood as using shegagah to refer to intentional errors.
To summarize, the Bible consistently employs a correspondence view of truth. A statement is true if it corresponds to the facts and false if it does not. Rarely are there even apparent exceptions to this usage. John 5:31 appears to be an exception. Jesus said, “If I testify about myself, my testimony is not valid.” This would seem to imply that Jesus’ factually correct statements about Himself were not “true.”
However, this would not make sense even by an intentionalist’s definition of truth, for surely Jesus intended truth about Himself. What is meant here is that a self-testimony was not established as true. Or, as the NIV puts it, such “testimony of two or three [other] witnesses” is needed, that every word might be established (Matt. 18:16; cf. John 8:17) and not by one’s own word. Elsewhere Jesus clearly said, “Even if I testify on my own behalf, my testimony is valid” (John 8:14), meaning that it is factually correct, even if they did not accept it.
If the biblical arguments are this strong for a correspondence view of truth, why is it that many Christians—even some who believe in inerrancy—claim to hold a noncorrespondence (intentionalist) view of truth? Actually the reason is often quite simple: There is a confusion between theory of truth and test of truth. That is, often both parties hold the correspondence theory of truth but differ in their claims as to how truth is tested. In short, truth should be defined as correspondence but may be defended in some other way.
Answering Objections to Truth as Correspondence
Objections to the correspondence view of truth come from within as well as without; they emanate from both Christian and non-Christian sources. The major objections from both sides include the following:
Objection One
When Jesus said “I am the truth” (John 14:6), He demonstrated that truth is personal, not propositional. This falsifies the correspondence view of truth in which truth is a characteristic of propositions (or expressions) about reality.
Reply One
What Jesus said does not refute the correspondence view of truth. A person can be “true” in the sense that he is the reality of which true statements are made. Further, a person can correspond to reality as well as a proposition can. As the “exact image” of the invisible God (Heb. 1:3), Jesus perfectly corresponds to the Father (John 1:18); He said to Philip, “Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father” (John 14:9). So a person can correspond to another in his character and actions, and in this sense, persons can be said to be true, or express the truth.
Objection Two
God is truth, yet there is nothing outside of Himself to which He corresponds. But according to the correspondence view, all truth is that which correctly represents reality. And since there is nothing outside God to which He can correspond, it would follow that He is not true as the Bible says He is (Rom. 3:4).
Reply Two
Truth as correspondence relates to God in several ways. First, God’s words correspond to His thoughts, so God is said to be true in the sense that His Word can be trusted.
Second, God’s thoughts are identical to themselves, which is a kind of perfect “correspondence.” In this sense, God is “true” to Himself.
Third, if truth is understood as what corresponds to another, then in this sense God would not be true; he would simply be the ultimate reality to which something else corresponds.
Fourth, the basic fallacy in this objection is an equivocal use of the definition. If correspondence means to something outside oneself, then of course God cannot be truth but only that ultimate reality to which all truth must correspond. If, on the other hand, correspondence can also be inside, then God can correspond to Himself in the most perfect way. In this sense, God is truth in a perfect way by self-identity.
Consider the following fallacious thinking:
(1) All who submit to the authority of the Pope are Roman Catholic.
(2) The Pope cannot submit to himself.
(3) Therefore, the Pope is not Roman Catholic.
The mistake is in the second premise. Contrary to the claim, the Pope can submit to himself; he simply has to follow the standards he lays down for every Roman Catholic, including himself. Likewise, God can and does live in accord with His own authority, and in this sense He is true to Himself and, thus, cannot lie (Heb. 6:18).
SUMMARY OF TRUTH’S DEFINITION
Truth may be tested in many ways, but it should be understood in only one way, namely, as correspondence. There may be many different ways to defend different truth claims, but there is only one proper way to define truth. The confusion between the nature of truth and the verification of truth is at the heart of the rejection of a correspondence view of truth.
Likewise, there is a difference between what truth is and what truth does. Truth is correspondence, but truth has certain consequences. Truth itself should not be confused with its results or with its application. The failure to make this distinction leads to wrong views of the nature of truth. Truth is that which corresponds to its referent, i.e., to the state of affairs it purports to describe. Falsehood is what does not correspond.
THE NATURE OF TRUTH AS ABSOLUTE
Not only is truth correspondence, truth is also absolute. Evangelical theology is predicated on the premise that the Bible is the truth (John 17:17), not just a truth; it is God’s Word (John 10:34–35), and God cannot lie (Heb. 6:18; Titus 1:2). Thus Christianity is not just true for me, it is true for everyone (see chapter 8). It is not only true subjectively, but it is also true objectively.
This view, of course, runs headlong into the mainstream of our present relativistic culture. Hence, it calls for a discussion and defense of the absolute nature of truth.
The Relative View of Truth
By “relative” is meant any one of several things. For one, some things are true only for some people but not for all. For another, some things are true only for some times but not for all times. Or maybe some things are only true in some places but not in all places. By an absolute truth, then, is meant something that would be true for all people, at all times, and in all places.
A Response to Arguments for a Relative View of Truth
Contemporarily, the idea of the relativity of truth is popular. However, truth is not determined by majority vote. Let’s take a look at the reasons people give for the belief that truth is relative.
Are Some Things True Only at Some Times?
First, relativists argue that some things are true at some times and not at others. For example, people once believed the world was square; now we know this is wrong. It would seem that this truth changed with the times. Or did it? Did the truth change, or did beliefs about what is true change? Certainly the world did not morph from a box to a sphere. What was altered is our belief, not our earth. The change was from a false affirmation to a true one.
Are Some Things True Only for Some People?
Second, other things appear to be true only for some people but not for others. For example, “I feel warm” may be true for me but not for you; you may feel cold. Isn’t this an example of a relative truth? Not really. Actually, the statement “I (Norman Geisler) feel warm” (said May 1, 2001) is true for everyone in the universe. Why? Because it is not true for anyone that Norman Geisler did not feel warm on May 1, 2001. In fact, it is not only true for every one but it is also true every where that Norman Geisler felt warm on May 1, 2001. And it will be true in all places—in Moscow, Peking, Washington, and even in outer space—that Norman Geisler felt warm on May 1, 2001. But if it is true for all people in all places for all time, then it is an absolute truth. So what at first looked relative turned out to be unchanging.
Let’s take another example of a supposed relative truth. If a teacher, facing her class, says, “The door to this room is on my right,” when it is on the left for the class, then this truth would seem to be relative to the teacher since it is false for the class. However, this is not so, since the referent in the statement is the place from where the professor stands, not from where the class sits. That the door is on the professor’s right is really an absolute truth, for it will never be true for anyone, anywhere, at any time, that the door was on the professor’s left. It will always, everywhere, and for everyone be true that the door was on her right. Likewise, the other truth—that the door was on the students’ left—will always be true for everyone everywhere.
Are Some Things True Only in Some Places?
Third, it seems obvious enough that it is hot in Mexico but cold at the North Pole. So some things appear to be true for some places but not for other places. This is true, but it misses the point, since those are two different statements (both of which are true) about two different places. It is not affirming that it is both cool and hot at the North Pole (or Mexico) at the same time.
Each statement is absolutely true with regard to its referent. The statement “It is cold at the North Pole” is true in Mexico, even in the summertime. It is true everywhere that “It is cold at the North Pole.” Likewise, the statement “It is hot in Mexico” is true at the North Pole and everywhere else. Truth is what corresponds to the facts, and the fact is that it is cold at the North Pole. And this truth (that it is cold at the North Pole) is true everywhere, for there is nowhere that this statement does not correspond to the facts at the North Pole.
The truth of the matter is that all truth is absolute—there are no relative truths. If something really is true, then it really is true everywhere and for everyone. After all, 7+3=10, and it’s not just true for mathematics majors. It’s true everywhere, not just in math class but in your workplace and at home as well.
Like an old apple, relativism may look good on the surface but it is rotten at the core. Let’s take a look at some of the problems.
Relativism Is Self-Defeating
Most relativists really believe relativism is true for everybody, not just for them. But that is the one thing they cannot believe if they are truly relativists, for a relative truth is true for me but not necessarily for everyone. So if the relativist thinks relativism is true for everyone, then he really believes that it is an absolute truth. Of course, this being the case, he is no longer truly a relativist, since he believes in at least one absolute truth.
Here is the dilemma: A consistent relativist cannot say, “It is an absolute truth for everyone that truth is only relatively true for me.” If he says it is absolutely true that relativism is true, then he is not a relativist but an absolutist. If, on the other hand, he says, “It is only relatively true that relativism is true,” then we cannot know if relativism is really true, for if it is only relatively true for him (but not for all), then relativism may be false for me. Why then should it be accepted as true?
Furthermore, for the relativist it can only be relatively true that it is relatively true for him, and so on infinitely. Either the claim that truth is relative is an absolute claim, which would falsify the relativist position, or it is an assertion that can never be made, because every time you make it you have to add another “relatively.” It is just the beginning of an infinite regress that will never pay off in a real statement.
The only way the relativist can avoid the painful dilemma of relativism is to admit that there is absolute truth. Indeed, as already noted, most relativists really believe that relativism is absolutely true, for they really believe that everyone should be a relativist. Therein is the basic self-destructive nature of the relativist: He stands on the pinnacle of his own absolute truth to relativize everything else. But as the mythological Hercules understood, one needs a firm place to put a fulcrum before he can move the world. The sinking sand of relativism is not a firm place to set anything.
Relativism Entails a World Filled With Contradictions
If relativism were true, then the world would be full of contradictory conditions, for if something is true for one but false for another, then opposite conditions exist. If one person says, “There is milk in the refrigerator,” and another insists, “There is no milk in the refrigerator”—and they are both right—then there must both be and not be milk in the refrigerator at the same time and in the same sense. This is impossible, since it violates the law of noncontradiction (see chapter 5). So if truth were relative, the impossible would be actual. But that is not possible.
In the religious realm it would mean that Billy Graham was telling the truth when he said “God exists,” and Madalyn Murray O’Hair was also right when she claimed “God does not exist.” But, as even a child knows, these two statements cannot both be true. If one is true, then the other is false. And since they exhaust the only possibilities, one of them must be true.
Relativism Means No One Has Ever Been Wrong About Anything
If truth is relative, then no one is ever wrong—even when he is. As long as something is true to him, then he is right even when he is wrong. The drawback to this is that I could never learn anything, either, because learning is moving from a false belief to a true one—that is, from an absolutely false belief to an absolutely true one.
Answering Some Objections to a View of Truth As Absolute
Relativists have leveled several objections to the view of truth as absolute. The following are the most important ones:
Objection One: Absolute Knowledge Is Not Possible
It is objected that truth cannot be absolute since we do not have an absolute knowledge of truth. Even most absolutists admit that most things are known only in terms of degrees of probability. How then can all truth be absolute?
Reply One
This objection is misdirected, for absolute certainty is possible of some things. One can be absolutely sure that he exists. In fact, one’s own existence is undeniable, for one would have to exist in order to make the statement “I do not exist.” One can also be absolutely sure that he cannot both exist and not exist at the same time. Just as he can be certain, for example, that there are no square circles.
Of course, there are many more things of which absolute certainty is not possible. But even here relativists miss the mark in rejecting absolute truth simply because of the lack of absolute evidence that some things are true, for they fail to recognize that the truth can be absolute no matter what our grounds for believing it are. For instance, if it is true that Sydney, Australia, is next to the ocean, then it is absolutely true no matter what my evidence or lack of evidence may be. An absolute truth is absolutely true in and of itself no matter what evidence there is for it. Evidence (or the lack thereof) does not change the facts. And truth is what corresponds to the facts. The truth doesn’t change simply because we learn something more about it.
Objection Two: Some Things Are In Between
Another objection is that many things are in between—like relative sizes, such as shorter and taller. As such, they cannot be absolute truths, since they change depending on the object to which they are relative. For example, some people behave nicely compared to Hitler but poorly compared to Mother Teresa.
Reply Two
Contrary to the claim of relativists, in between things do not disprove absolutism. For the facts that “John is short in relation to most NBA players” and “John is tall compared to most jockeys” are absolutely true for all times and all people. John is in between in size, and determining whether he is short or tall depends on to whom he is being compared. Nonetheless, it is absolutely true that John (being 5’10”) is short compared to Shaquille O’Neal and tall compared to a Pygmy. The same thing is true of other in between things, such as warmer or colder, and better or worse.
Objection Three: New Truth (or Progress) Is Not Possible
Relativists claim that if truth never changes, then there can’t be any new truth. This would mean that no progress is possible.
Reply Three
In response to this, “new truth” can be understood in two ways. It might mean “new to us,” like a new discovery in science. But that is only a matter of our discovering an “old” truth. After all, the law of gravity was there long before Newton discovered it. Many truths have always been there, but we are just finding out about them. In this sense we do come to know new truths—that’s what scientific discovery is all about.
The other way we might understand “new truth” is that something new has come into existence that makes it possible to make a new statement about it that is only then true for the first time. This is not a problem. When January 1, 2020, arrives, a new truth will be born, because it will not be true until that day to say, “This is January 1, 2020.” But when that happens, it will be true for all people and places forever more that that day was January 1, 2020. So “old” truths don’t change and neither do “new” truths when they come to pass. Once it is true, it is always true—for everyone.
Objection Four: Truth Changes With Our Growth in Knowledge
It is also objected that knowledge of truth is not absolute, since we grow in truth. What is true today may be false tomorrow. The progress of science is proof that truth is constantly changing.
Reply Four
This objection fails to note that it is not the truth that is changing but our understanding of what is true. When science truly progresses it does not move from an old truth to a new truth but from error to truth. When Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) argued that the earth moves around the sun and not the reverse, truth did not change. What changed was the scientific understanding about what moves around what.
Objection Five: Absolute Truth Is Too Narrow
Relativists often complain that absolute truth is narrow.
Reply Five
This objection is common but without substantive basis. Of course truth is narrow. There is only one answer for what is 4+4. It is not 1. It is not 2. It is not 3. It is not 4, 5, 6, 7, or any other number from 9 on to infinity. It is only 8 and nothing else. That’s narrow! But it’s correct. Non-Christians often claim that Christians are narrow-minded because Christians claim that Christianity is true and all non-Christian systems are false (see chapter 8). However, the same is true of non-Christians, who claim that their view is true and all opposing beliefs are false.
The truth of the matter is that if C (Christianity) is true, then it follows that all non-C is false. Likewise, if H (Humanism) were true, then all non-H would be false. Both views are equally narrow. That’s the way truth is. Whenever anyone makes a truth claim, he has thereby claimed that whatever opposes it is false. Christianity is not narrower than anything else that claims to be true, whether it is atheism, agnosticism, skepticism, or pantheism.
Objection Six: Belief in Absolute Truth Is Dogmatic
Relativists also claim that those who believe in absolute truth are dogmatic. And, besides being untenable, dogmatism is obnoxious.
Reply Six
This objection misses the point. All truth is absolute, for, as we have seen, if something is really true, then it is true for all people, times, and places. So in this sense everyone who claims anything is true is “dogmatic.” (And, as has been demonstrated, there isn’t anyone who doesn’t claim that something is true.)
Even the relativist who claims that relativism is true is dogmatic. Indeed, the relativist who claims that relativism is absolutely true is particularly dogmatic, for he is claiming that he has the only absolute truth that can be uttered, namely, that everything else is relative.
Further, something important is overlooked in this charge of dogmatism. There is a big difference between the pejorative charge that belief in absolute truth is dogmatic and the manner in which someone may hold to this belief. No doubt the way many absolutists have held to and conveyed their belief in what truth is has been less than humble. However, no agnostic would consider it a telling argument against agnosticism that some agnostics have held to and communicated their agnosticism in a very dogmatic manner. What we have here is an entirely different issue, and while it is one that certainly is worthy of our examination, it has nothing to do with truth being absolute.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Expressed truth is what corresponds to its object. To deny this is self-defeating, since to deny assumes that one’s denial corresponds to the facts.
Likewise, the noncorrespondence view, like the relative view of truth, is self-defeating. The relativism of truth cannot be affirmed as truth unless relativism is false; it is absurd to affirm that it is objectively true for all that truth is not objectively true for all. Absolute truth is literally undeniable, and therefore it is not illegitimate to make absolute truth claims about the Bible or Christianity, such as evangelical theology does.
There is an important distinction to keep in mind, nonetheless: Truth is absolute, but our grasp of it is not; that there is absolute truth does not mean our understanding of it is absolute. This fact in itself should cause absolutists to temper their convictions with humility. As finite creatures, we grow in our understanding of truth; indeed, our knowledge of divine truth is not univocal but analogical (see chapter 9). In the words of Scripture, “For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face” (1 Cor. 13:12).
SOURCES
Adler, Mortimer J. Truth in Religion.
Anselm. Truth, Freedom, and Evil.
Aristotle. Posterior Analytics.
Augustine. Against the Academics.
Buber, Martin. I and Thou.
Bultmann, Rudolph. “Aleithia” [Truth] in The Theological Dictionary of the New Testament.
Childs, Brevard. Introduction to the Old Testament As Scripture.
Copan, Paul. True for You, But Not for Me.
Geisler, Norman L. Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal.
———. “Truth, Nature of” in Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics.
James, William. Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking.
MacLaine, Shirley. Out On a Limb.
Plato. Theaetetus.
Preus, Robert. The Inspiration of Scripture.
Rogers, Jack. Biblical Authority and Interpretation.
Thiselton, A. C. “Truth” in The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology.
Thomas Aquinas. On Truth.
1 Epistemology is “the study of the methods and the grounds of knowledge, especially with reference to its limits and validity; broadly, [epistemology is] the theory of knowledge” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).
2 Kierkegaard did not deny factual truth, but he affirmed that in religious matters it had to be subjectively appropriated to be true.
Geisler, N. L. 2002. Systematic theology, volume one: Introduction, Bible (109). Bethany House Publishers: Minneapolis, MN
