MIRACLES: THE SUPERNATURAL PRECONDITION – Geisler, N. L
INTRODUCTION TO MIRACLES
Evangelical theology is built on the supernatural. Christ’s virgin birth, His miracle-filled ministry, His physical resurrection from the dead, and His bodily ascension into heaven are only some of the numerous miracles essential to biblical Christianity. So much is the supernatural a precondition of orthodox theology that without it historical Christianity would collapse. To quote the apostle Paul, “If Christ has not been raised, our preaching is useless and so is your faith. More than that, we are then found to be false witnesses about God.… And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ are lost” (1 Cor. 15:14–18).
Before a miracle can be identified, to say nothing of verified, it must be defined; there is no way to find a miracle unless we know what we’re looking for. Theologians have defined miracles in two different ways.
TWO DEFINITIONS OF MIRACLES
Historically, miracles have been defined in either a weak sense or a strong sense. Following Augustine (354–430), some describe a miracle as “a portent [that] is not contrary to nature, but contrary to our knowledge of nature” (CG, 21.8).
The problem with this weak view of miracles is that the event might not be supernatural at all; it could simply be a natural event for which the observer, as yet, has no natural explanation. This would mean that all natural anomalies, including meteors, earthquakes, volcanoes, and eclipses, were at one time miracles to everyone—and still are to many people. Certainly, these kinds of so-called miracles would have no apologetic value such as those in the Bible claim to have (Matt. 12:39–40; Mark 2:10–11; John 3:2; Acts 2:22; Heb. 2:3–4; 2 Cor. 12:12).
Others, following Thomas Aquinas, define a miracle in the strong sense of an event that is beyond nature’s power to produce and that only a supernatural power (God) can do (SCG, Book 3). Again, only in this strong view can miracles be identifiable as acts of God, since in the weak sense they are indistinguishable from unusual natural events. Further, only in the strong sense do miracles have apologetic value, since they occur with direct supernatural intervention. In this sense, a miracle is a divine intervention into the natural world. As atheist Antony Flew put it, “A miracle is something which would never have happened had nature, as it were, been left to its own devices” (Flew, “M,” in Edwards, ed., EP, 346). Natural law describes naturally caused regularities; a miracle is a supernaturally caused singularity.
DISTINGUISHING MIRACLES FROM NATURAL LAW
In order to explain what is meant by a supernatural act, we need an initial understanding of what is meant by natural law. Natural law is understood as the usual, orderly, and general way that the world operates. By contrast, a miracle is minimally an unusual, irregular, and specific way in which God acts within the world.
Miracles are supernatural but not anti-natural. As the famous physicist Sir George Stokes said, “It may be that the event which we call a miracle was brought about not by the suspension of the laws in ordinary operation, but by the super-addition of something not ordinarily in operation” (ISBE, 2063). In other words, if a miracle occurs, it is not a violation or contradiction of the ordinary laws of cause and effect, but rather a new effect produced by the introduction of a supernatural cause.
At this point, what we need is a biblical description of miracles. The Bible uses three basic words to describe them: sign, wonder, and power. A study of the usage of each will help in understanding what is meant by “miracle.”
OLD TESTAMENT USAGE OF THE WORDS SIGN, WONDER, AND POWER
Each of the words for “miracle” carries with it a connotation of its own. When the meanings of all three are combined, we gain a complete picture of biblical miracles.
Old Testament Usage of the Word Sign
Although the Hebrew word for “sign” (oth) is sometimes used to refer to natural things, such as stars (Gen. 1:14) or the Sabbath (Ex. 31:13), it usually carries a supernatural significance, namely, as something appointed by God with special assigned meaning.
The first usage of the word sign is in the divine prediction given to Moses that Israel would be delivered from Egypt and serve God at Horeb. God promised, “I will be with you. And this will be the sign to you that it is I who have sent you” (Ex. 3:12). When Moses asked God, “What if they do not believe me or listen to me?” (Ex. 4:1) the Lord gave Moses two “signs”: His rod turned into a serpent (Ex. 4:3), and his hand became leprous (Ex. 4:6–7). These were given “that they may believe that the Lord, the God of their fathers … has appeared to you” (Ex. 4:5).
God said, “If they do not believe you or pay attention to the first miraculous sign, they may believe the second” (Ex. 4:8). Moses “performed the signs before the people, and they believed. And … they bowed down and worshiped” (Ex. 4:30–31). In fact, God assured Moses, “I will harden [strengthen] Pharaoh’s heart, and … multiply my miraculous signs and wonders in Egypt.… And the Egyptians will know that I am the Lord when I stretch out my hand against Egypt and bring the Israelites out of it” (Ex. 7:3, 5; cf. 11:9).
Again and again it is repeated that the purpose of these signs is twofold: “By this you will know that I am the Lord” (Ex. 7:17; cf. 9:29–30; 10:1–2) and that these are “my people” (Ex. 3:10; cf. 5:1; 6:7; 11:7). The more the Lord multiplied the signs, the harder Pharaoh’s heart became (Ex. 7:3, 9:35; cf. 11:9). But even through this stubborn unbelief God received “glory” (Num. 14:22).
Throughout the rest of the Old Testament there are repeated references to the miraculous “signs” God performed in delivering His people from Egypt. He complained to Moses in the wilderness, saying, “How long will they refuse to believe in me, in spite of all the miraculous signs I have performed among them?” (Num. 14:11; cf. v. 22). Moses challenged Israel, “Has any god ever tried to take for himself one nation out of another nation, by testings, by miraculous signs and wonders?” (Deut. 4:34). Later Moses reminded the people, “Before our eyes the Lord sent miraculous signs and wonders—great and terrible—upon Egypt and Pharaoh and his whole household” (Deut. 6:22). “So the Lord brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm, with great terror and with miraculous signs and wonders” (Deut. 26:8; cf. Deut. 29:2–3; Josh. 24:17; Neh. 9:10; Ps. 105:27; Jer. 32:20–21).
Many times in the biblical record “signs” are given to prophets as confirmation of their divine call. Moses’ miraculous credentials have already been mentioned (Ex. 3 and 4). Gideon asked of God, “Give me a sign that it is really you talking to me” (Judg. 6:17). God responded with miraculous fire that consumed Gideon’s offering (v. 5:21). God confirmed Himself to Eli by miraculous predictions about his sons’ deaths (1 Sam. 2:34). Likewise, predictive “signs” were made to confirm God’s appointment of King Saul (1 Sam. 10:7, 9). Isaiah offered predictions as “signs” of his divine message (Isa. 7:14; 38:7–8).
Although the word sign is not used in these cases, God’s miraculous confirmations of Moses over Korah (Num. 16) and Elijah over the false prophets of Baal (1 Kings 18) illustrate the same point. In short, miracles were used as signs to accredit the true prophet. Likewise, the lack of predictive powers (false prophecy) was an indication that the prophet was not of God (Deut. 18:22).
Other events in the Old Testament are called “signs” or “miracles” as well. These include the plagues on Egypt (Ex. 7:3), the provisions in the wilderness (spoken of in John 6:30–31), fire from a rock (Judg. 6:17–21), victory over enemies (1 Sam. 14:10), confirmation of healing (Isa. 38:7, 22), and judgments from the Lord (Jer. 44:29).
Old Testament Usage of the Word Wonder
Often the words sign and wonder are used of the same event(s) in the same verse (Ex. 7:3; cf. Deut. 4:34; 7:19; 13:1–2; 26:8; 28:46; 29:3; 34:11; Neh. 9:10; Ps. 135:9; Jer. 32:20–21). At other times the Bible describes as “wonders” (Heb: mopheth) the same events that are elsewhere called “signs” (Ex. 4:21; 11:9–10; Ps. 78:43; 105:27; Joel 2:30). Of course, sometimes the word sign is used of a natural “wonder,” as of a prophet (Ezek. 24:24) or a unique thing a prophet did to get his message across (Isa. 20:3). But even here the word wonder has a special, supernatural (divine) significance.
Old Testament Usage of the Word Power
One Hebrew word for “power” (koak) is sometimes used of human power in the Old Testament (Gen. 31:6; Deut. 8:17; Nah. 2:1). However, very often it is used of divine power, sometimes of God’s power to create: “God made the earth by his power; he founded the world by his wisdom and stretched out the heavens by his understanding” (Jer. 10:12; cf. Jer. 27:5; 32:17; 51:15). In other places the “power” of God overthrows His enemies (Ex. 15:6–7), delivers His people from Egypt (Num. 14:17; cf. v. 14:13), rules the universe (1 Chron. 29:12), gives the people of Israel their land (Ps. 111:6), and inspires His prophets to speak His Word (Mic. 3:8). “Power” is often in direct connection with events called “signs” or “wonders” or both (see Ex. 9:16; 32:11; Deut. 4:37; 2 Kings 17:36; Neh. 1:10). Sometimes other Hebrew words for “power” are used in the same verse with “signs and wonders”; Moses speaks of the deliverance of Israel “by miraculous signs and wonders … [and] by a mighty [chazaq] hand” (Deut. 4:34; cf. Deut. 7:19; 26:8; 34:12).
NEW TESTAMENT USAGE OF THE WORDS SIGN, WONDER, AND POWER
The New Testament usage of the three basic words for miracles is directly parallel to that of the Old Testament.
New Testament Usage of the Word Sign
In the New Testament, “sign” (Gk: semeion) is used seventy-seven times (forty-eight times in the Gospels). It is occasionally used of ordinary events, such as circumcision (Rom. 4:11) or a baby wrapped in swaddling clothes (Luke 2:12). Here again these signs have special divine significance, but most often the word is reserved for what we would call a miracle. Many times it is used of Jesus’ miracles, such as healing (John 6:2; 9:16), turning the water to wine (John 2:11), and raising the dead (John 11:43–44). Likewise, the apostles performed miracles of healing (Acts 4:16, 30), “great signs and miracles” (Acts 8:13), and “miraculous signs and wonders” (Acts 14:3; 15:12); “many wonders and miraculous signs were done by the apostles” (Acts 2:43). Even the Jewish authorities said, “What are we going to do with these men? … Everybody living in Jerusalem knows they have done an outstanding miracle, and we cannot deny it” (Acts 4:16).
The word sign is also used of the most significant miracle in the New Testament, the raising of Jesus Christ from the grave. Not only was the Resurrection a miracle, but it was also a miracle that Jesus predicted (John 2:19; Matt. 12:40; 16:21; 20:19). Jesus said to His unbelieving generation, “But none [no sign] will be given it except the sign of the prophet Jonah.… [T]he Son of Man will be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth” (Matt. 12:39–40). Jesus was also asked for a sign in Matthew 16, at which time He repeated this assurance of His resurrection.
New Testament Usage of the Word Wonder
The word wonder (Gk: teras) is used sixteen times in the New Testament and almost always refers to a miracle. In fact, in every occurrence it is used in combination with the word sign. It is used of the supernatural events before the second coming of Christ (Matt. 24:24; Mark 13:22; Acts 2:19), of Jesus’ miracles (John 4:48; Acts 2:22), of the apostles’ miracles (Acts 2:43; cf. Acts 4:30; 5:12; Heb. 2:3–4), of Stephen’s miracles (Acts 6:8), of Moses’ miracles in Egypt (Acts 7:36), and of Paul’s miracles (Acts 14:3; 15:12; Rom. 15:19). Teras means “a miraculous sign, prodigy, portent, omen, wonder” (Brown, DNTH, 2:633). It carries with it the idea of that which is amazing or astonishing (ibid., 623–25).
New Testament Usage of the Word Power
The word power (Gk: dunamis) is used on numerous occasions in the New Testament. It is occasionally used of human power (2 Cor. 1:8) or abilities (Matt. 25:15), and sometimes it is used of spiritual (satanic) powers (Luke 10:19; Rom. 8:38). Like its Old Testament parallel, the New Testament term for “power” is often translated “miracles.” Dunamis is used in combination with “signs and wonders” (Heb. 2:4), of Christ’s miracles (Matt. 13:58), of the power to raise the dead (Phil. 3:10), of the virgin birth of Christ (Luke 1:35), of the special gift of miracles (1 Cor. 12:10), of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost (Acts 1:8), and of the “power” of the gospel to save sinful people (Rom. 1:16). The emphasis of the word is on the divine energizing aspect of a miraculous event.
THE THEOLOGICAL NATURE OF A MIRACLE
Each of the three words for supernatural events (sign, wonder, power) delineates an aspect of a miracle. A miracle is an unusual event (wonder) that conveys and confirms an unusual message (sign) by means of unusual ability (power). From the divine vantage point a miracle is an act of God (power) that attracts the attention of the people of God (wonder) to the Word of God (by a sign). Respectively, these words designate the “source” (God’s power), the “nature” (wonderful, unusual), and the “purpose” (to signify something beyond itself) of a miracle. They are often used as a sign to confirm a sermon; a wonder to verify the prophet’s words; a miracle to help establish his message (John 3:2; Acts 2:22; Heb. 2:3–4).
A miracle, then, is a divine intervention into, or an interruption of, the regular course of the world that produces a purposeful but unusual event that would not (or could not) have occurred otherwise. By this definition, natural laws are understood to be the normal, regular, and general way the world operates. But a miracle occurs as an unusual, irregular, and specific act of a God who is beyond the universe.
This does not mean that miracles are against natural laws; it simply means they find their source beyond nature. In other words, miracles don’t violate natural laws of cause and effect, they simply have a cause that transcends nature.
THE PURPOSE OF MIRACLES
The Bible states at least three purposes of a miracle:
(1) to glorify the nature of God (John 2:11; 11:40);
(2) to accredit certain persons as the spokespeople for God (Acts 2:22; Heb. 2:3–4); and
(3) to provide evidence for belief in God (John 6:2, 14; 20:30–31).
Of course, not all people believe that the event is an act of God, even when they witness a miracle. But in this event, says the New Testament, the miracle is a witness against them. John grieved, “Even after Jesus had done all these miraculous signs in their presence, they still would not believe in him” (John 12:37). Jesus Himself said of some, “They will not be convinced even if someone rises from the dead” (Luke 16:31). So in this sense the result (not the purpose) of disbelieving in miracles is condemnation of the unbeliever (cf. John 12:31, 37).
THE VARIOUS DIMENSIONS OF MIRACLES
Miracles Have an Unusual Character
First, miracles have an unusual character. A miracle is an out-of-the-ordinary event in contrast to the regular pattern of events in the natural world. It is a “wonder” that attracts attention by its uniqueness. Fire from heaven, walking on water, and a burning bush that is not consumed are not normal occurrences. Hence, they will by their unusual character draw the interest of observers.
Miracles Have a Theological Context
Second, supernatural events have a theological context. A miracle is an act of God (Gk: theos); therefore, a miracle presupposes that there is a God who can act. The view that there is a God beyond the universe who created it, controls it, and can interfere in it is called theism. Miracles, then, imply a theistic view of the universe.
Miracles Have a Moral Dimension
Third, miracles have a moral dimension. They bring glory to God; that is, they manifest His moral character. Miracles are visible acts that reflect the invisible nature of God. Technically, there are no evil miracles, then, because God is good. All miracles by nature aim to produce and/or promote good.
Miracles Have Doctrinal Content
Fourth, miracles have doctrinal content. Miracles in the Bible are connected directly or indirectly with “truth claims,” meaning that there is a message in the miracle. They are ways to tell a true prophet from a false prophet (Deut. 18:22); they confirm the truth of God through the servant of God (Heb. 2:3–4). A miracle is the sign that confirms the sermon; new revelation and divine confirmation go hand-in-hand (cf. John 3:2).
Miracles Have a Teleological Aspect
Finally, biblical miracles have a teleological aspect. Unlike magic, they are never performed to entertain (see Luke 23:8). Miracles have a distinctive purpose: To glorify the Creator and to provide evidence for people to believe by accrediting the message of God through the prophet of God. These five facets of a miracle form a theistic context for identifying a miracle.
There are two basic ways to know whether miracles are possible:
(1) to show that a supernatural God exists (which has already been done in chapter 2);
(2) to answer objections raised against the possibility and/or plausibility of miracles.
THEISM MAKES MIRACLES POSSIBLE
- S. Lewis aptly put it,
If we admit God, must we admit Miracles? Indeed, indeed, you have no security against it. That is the bargain.… Theology says to you in effect, “Admit God and with Him the risk of a few miracles, and I in return will ratify your faith in uniformity as regards the overwhelming majority of events” (Lewis, M, 109).
Miracles, in the strictest sense of the word, are possible only in a theistic world, for no other worldview admits there is an infinite, supernatural, personal Power beyond the natural world except deism, which denies that God can (or does) perform miracles. So not only does theism make miracles possible, but only theism does this.
Furthermore, theism demonstrates that the miraculous is actual, since theism affirms the Creation of the universe (see chapter 2), which is the greatest supernatural event of all. Some deists may admit that miracles are possible but not actual. Yet this is inconsistent, since they already admit that the biggest miracle—Creation—has actually happened.
If theism is true, not only are miracles possible, but the most astounding one has already occurred. The only question that remains is whether more have happened and how we can identify them. In short, philosophy can show that miracles are possible (by providing evidence that there was a Creator of the universe), but only history can demonstrate that subsequent miracles have actually taken place. But if miracles do happen, then they can happen; the actual proves the possible (not the reverse).
ANSWERING OBJECTIONS AGAINST MIRACLES
Few philosophers have attempted to demonstrate that miracles are impossible. The pantheist Benedict Spinoza, the agnostic David Hume, and the atheist Antony Flew are notable exceptions.
Spinoza’s Argument That Miracles Are Impossible
Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) argued from a now-outdated closed view of the universe. He insisted on the universal, exceptionless essence of natural law, and from this he concluded that miracles are not possible.
A Statement of Spinoza’s Argument
Spinoza declared that “nothing … comes to pass in nature in contravention to her universal laws, nay, everything agrees with them and follows from them, for … she keeps a fixed and immutable order.” He insisted that “a miracle, whether in contravention to, or beyond, nature, is a mere absurdity.” He was nothing short of dogmatic about the impossibility of miracles, unabashedly proclaiming, “We may, then, be absolutely certain that every event which is truly described in Scripture necessarily happened, like everything else, according to natural laws” (Spinoza, T-PT, 83, 87, 92).
When one reduces Spinoza’s argument against miracles to its basic premises it goes something like this:
(1) Miracles are violations of natural laws.
(2) Natural laws are immutable.
(3) It is impossible to violate immutable laws.
(4) Therefore, miracles are impossible.
The second premise is the key to Spinoza’s argument: Nature “keeps a fixed and immutable order.” Everything “necessarily happened … according to natural laws.” If it were true that nothing comes to pass in nature in contravention to nature’s universal laws, then Spinoza would be right; to believe otherwise would be “a mere absurdity.”
In order to appreciate what Spinoza meant, one must be aware that he was a rationalist who tried to construct his philosophy on the model of Euclid’s geometry (Spinoza, E, Part One); that is, he believed that one should accept as true only what is self-evident or what is deducible from the self-evident. Like his French contemporary René Descartes, Spinoza argued in a geometric way from axioms to the conclusions contained in these axioms.1 Spinoza lived in an age increasingly impressed with the orderliness of a physical universe, an era in which it was believed Newton’s recently discovered law of gravitation was without exception. Because of this it seemed axiomatic to Spinoza that natural laws are immutable.
A Response to Spinoza’s Argument
There are several serious problems with Spinoza’s antisupernaturalism, all springing from his Euclidian (deductive) rationalism.
First of all, Spinoza’s philosophy suffers from an acute case of petitio principii (Lat: “begging the question”),2 for, as David Hume later noted, anything validly deducible from premises must have been present in those premises from the beginning. But if the antisupernatural is already presupposed in Spinoza’s rationalistic premises, then it is no surprise to discover him denying all miracles, including those in the Bible. In other words, once one defines natural laws as “fixed,” “immutable,” and “unchangeable,” then of course it is irrational to say a miracle occurred. How can anything break the unbreakable?
Further, Spinoza’s concept of natural law views nature as a “closed system” and, hence, law describes the way things must behave. For most contemporary scientists, however, the universe is an “open system” in which natural laws are merely statistical averages or probabilities of the way things do behave. If so, then there is always, from the scientific perspective, the possibility that there may be exceptions to these “normal” patterns. In this way a miraculous event would only be viewed as an anomaly, not a violation of natural law. Consequently, in contemporary scientific discussion, miracles are not dismissed, like they were by Spinoza, as impossible by definition.
What is more, Spinoza’s view of God is pantheistic—he believed that God and the universe were one and the same. Spinoza maintained that God is coterminous with nature; hence, a miracle as an act of a God beyond nature cannot occur, since nature is the whole show. (As we already noted, miracles as supernatural interventions are only possible in a theistic universe. Therefore, scientists will want good reason to believe that a theistic God exists before they are likely to believe there is any evidence for miracles. In Spinoza’s monistically airtight concept of nature [as absolutely one], then, there is simply no room for the supernatural.)
Finally, the evidence has mounted for a unique beginning of the space-time universe (see chapter 2). If this is so, then the beginning of the universe would be a prime example of a miracle, for what else should we call something coming into existence from nothing? Additionally, concluding that the universe had a beginning provides a devastating blow to Spinoza’s concept of God, calling into question the naturalistic view that no God exists beyond the world. So rather than arguing against miracles, science may be coming back (however reluctantly) to the supernatural. In any event, Spinoza’s argument by no means demonstrated the impossibility of miraculous events; rather, it demonstrated the circularity of his mental processes.
Hume’s Argument That Miracles Are Incredible
In Part X of his famous Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume (1711–1776) introduces his argument with these words: “I flatter myself that I have discovered an argument … which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently will be useful as long as the world endures” (Hume, ECHU, 10.1.18).
A Statement of Hume’s Argument
Just what is this alleged argument of finality against miracles? In Hume’s own words, the reasoning goes like this:
(1) “A wise man … proportions his belief to the evidence.
(2) “If such conclusions are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last [i.e., highest] degree of assurance and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event.
(3) “As the evidence derived from witnesses and human testimony is founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience and is regarded either as a proof or a probability, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to be constant or variable (ibid., 10.1.18–20).
(4) “There are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgments of this kind; and the ultimate standard by which we determine all disputes that may arise concerning them is always derived from experience and observation.
(5) “Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments and with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every other kind of evidence.
(6) “We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact when the witnesses contradict each other, when they are but few or of a doubtful character, when they have an interest in what they affirm, when they deliver their testimony with hesitation or … with too violent asseverations.
(7) “But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains.
(8) “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and … firm and unalterable experience has established these laws.…
(9) “[Therefore,] the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.
(10) “[Since] a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle” (ibid., 10.1.121–123).
Again using his own words, Hume’s argument can be abbreviated in the following way:
(1) “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; firm and unalterable experience has established these laws.
(2) “A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence.
(3) “[Therefore,] the proof against a miracle … is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.”
Hume concludes, “There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event. Otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. [Consequently,] nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever happened in the common course of nature” (ibid.).
The Two Interpretations of Hume’s Argument
Hume’s argument against miracles can be understood in two ways: hard and soft. According to the hard interpretation, Hume would be claiming that
(1) Miracles by definition are a violation of natural law.
(2) Natural laws are unalterably uniform.
(3) Therefore, miracles cannot occur.
Now, despite the fact that Hume’s argument sometimes sounds like this, it isn’t necessarily what he had in mind. If this is his argument, then it clearly begs the question by simply defining miracles as impossible, for if miracles are a violation of what cannot be altered, then miracles are ipso facto impossible—impossible by the facts themselves, as a result of their very nature. But a supernaturalist could easily avoid this dilemma by refusing to define a miracle as a “violation” of fixed law and simply call it an “exception” to a general rule. That is, he could define natural law as the regular (normal) pattern of events but not as a universal or unalterable pattern.
Actually, Hume’s position contains an argument that is much more difficult to answer, one that utilizes a soft interpretation of natural law. It is not an argument for the impossibility of miracles, but for the incredibility of miracles. It can be stated this way:
(1) A miracle is by definition a rare occurrence.
(2) Natural law is by definition a description of regular occurrence.
(3) The evidence for the regular is always greater than that for the rare.
(4) A wise man always bases his belief on the greater evidence.
(5) Therefore, a wise man should never believe in miracles.
Notice that on this soft form of Hume’s argument miracles are not ruled out entirely; they are simply held to be always incredible by the very nature of the evidence. The wise person does not claim that miracles cannot occur; he simply never believes they happen, because he never has enough evidence for that belief. One indication that Hume is stressing credibility (or believability) rather than viability (or possibility) is found in his use of such terms as “belief,” “is esteemed,” etc.
However, even in this soft interpretation of the argument, miracles are still eliminated, since by the very nature of the case no thoughtful person should ever hold that a miracle has indeed occurred. If this is so, Hume has seemingly avoided logical fallacy and yet has successfully eliminated the possibility of reasonable belief in miracles.
An Evaluation of Hume’s Argument
Since the hard form of Hume’s argument is easily answered by redefining the terms, we will concentrate primarily on the soft form.
First, a word of evaluation about Hume’s claim for “uniform experience.” On the one hand, it is begging the question if Hume presumes to know the experience is uniform in advance of looking at the evidence, for how can he know that all possible experience will confirm his naturalism unless he has access to all possible experiences, including those in the future? On the other hand, it is special pleading if by “uniform experience” Hume simply means the select experiences of some persons, namely, those who claim not to have encountered miracles, for there are other persons who do claim to have experienced miracles. As Stanley Jaki recognizes, “Insofar as [Hume] was a sensationist or empiricist philosopher he had to grant equal credibility to the recognition of any fact, usual or unusual” (Jaki, MP, 23).
In the final analysis, then, the debate over miracles cannot be settled by supposed “uniform experience,” for this either begs the question in advance or else opens the door for a factual analysis of whether indeed there is sufficient evidence to believe that a miracle has occurred. As C. S. Lewis observed,
Now, of course we must agree with Hume that if there absolutely is “uniform experience” against miracles, if in other words they have never happened, why then, they never have. Unfortunately we know the experience against them to be uniform only if we know that all the reports of them are false. And we can know all the reports to be false only if we know already that miracles have never occurred. In fact, we are arguing in a circle. (Lewis, M, 105.)
The alternative to circular arguing on the question of the existence of miracles is to he open to the possibility that miracles have occurred.
Second, Hume does not truly weigh evidence for miracles; he really adds evidence against them. Since death occurs over and over and over again, and since resurrection occurs only on rare occasions (if ever), Hume simply adds up all the deaths against the very few alleged resurrections and then rejects the latter. In his own words,
It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden, because such a kind of death has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. [Hence,] it is more probable that all men must die. (Hume, ECHU, 10.1.122.)
But Hume is not weighing evidence as to whether or not a given person, say, Jesus of Nazareth (see volume 3), has been raised from the dead; on what evidence is it postulated that resurrection has never been observed? Instead, Hume is simply adding the evidence of all other people who have died and have not been raised.
There is another problem with Hume’s concept of adding up events to determine truth. Even if a few resurrections have actually occurred, according to Hume’s principles one should not believe them, since the number of deaths will always outweigh them. However, truth is not determined by majority vote. Hume seems to commit a kind of consensus gentium here, which is an informal logical fallacy arguing that something is true because it is believed by most people.
This argument actually equates evidence and probability. It says in effect that one should always believe what is most probable, what has the highest odds. On these grounds I should never believe the three dice I just rolled show three sixes on the first try, since the odds against it are 216 to 1. Or, you should never believe it if you’re dealt a perfect bridge hand (which has happened), since the odds against it are 1,635,013,559,600 to 1. What Hume seems to overlook is that wise people base their beliefs on facts, not on odds. Sometimes the odds against an event are very high, but the evidence for that event is very good.
Finally, Hume’s concept of adding evidence would eliminate any unusual or unique event from the past, to say nothing of miracles. Richard Whateley satirized Hume’s thesis in his famous pamphlet Historical Doubts Concerning the Existence of Napoleon Bonaparte. Since Napoleon’s exploits were so fantastic, so extraordinary, so unprecedented, no intelligent person should believe that these events ever actually took place. After recounting the French leader’s amazing and unparalleled military feats, Whateley wrote,
Does anyone believe all this and yet refuse to believe a miracle? Or rather, what is this but a miracle? Is not this a violation of the laws of nature? … [If skeptics do not deny the existence of Napoleon, they] must at least acknowledge that they do not apply to that question the same plan of reasoning which they have made use of in others. (Whateley, HDCENB, 274, 290.)
Third, Hume’s argument seems to prove too much; it appears to demonstrate that a person should not believe in a miracle even if it happens! However, there is something patently absurd about claiming that an event should be disbelieved even if one knows it has occurred.
Fourth, it would seem that Hume wants the “wise” person always to believe in advance that miracles will never occur. Even before one examines the evidence for a miracle, he should come pre-armed with the “uniform” and “unalterable” testimony of the past against it being a miracle. Remember the second premise of Hume’s argument:
If such conclusions are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last [i.e., highest] degree of assurance and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. (Hume, ECHU, 10.1.118.)
But here again Hume’s uniformitarian prejudice is evident. Only if one approaches the world with a kind of invincible bias that is believed in accordance with what has been supposedly perceived in the past, can he discount all claims for the miraculous. There are two important objections to this reasoning.
For one thing, Hume is inconsistent with his own epistemology.3 Hume himself recognized the fallacy of this kind of reasoning when he argued that, based on past uniformity, we cannot even know for sure that the sun will rise tomorrow morning (Hume, THN, 14–16). Hence, for Hume to deny future miracles based on past experience is inconsistent with his own principles and is a violation of his own ideological system.
For another thing, if it were true that no present exception can overthrow laws that are based on our uniform experience in the past, then there would be no true progress in our scientific understanding of the world, for established or repeatable exceptions to past patterns are precisely what prompt a change in scientific belief. When an observed exception to a past law is established, that law (L1) is revised, with a new law (L2) replacing and/or amending it. This is what happened when certain outer-spatial exceptions to Newton’s law of gravitation were found, and Einstein’s relativity was considered broader and more adequate. In short, Hume’s objections to miracles seem to be unscientific.
Exceptions to laws have a heuristic (discovery) value; they are goads to progress in our understanding of the universe. This does not necessarily mean that all exceptions to a known law call for another natural law to explain them. Since scientific understanding is based on regular and repeated events, one must be able to show how the exception is repeatable before he can claim it has a natural cause rather than a supernatural one. No single exception to a known scientific law calls for another broader natural law to explain it; only repeatable exceptions call for natural causes. An unrepeated exception may have a supernatural cause; indeed, if it has the earmarks of intelligent intervention from beyond the natural world (see chapter 2), then it may be held to have a supernatural cause, not a natural one.
Before leaving this point another observation is in order. Even though a rational or scientific understanding of the world is based on the observation of regular recurring events, it does not follow that the subject of this understanding must be a regular event. For instance, our general understanding of the paintings on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel is based on the experience of seeing other painters do similar things over and over. Yet the particular object of this understanding (the Creation scene) on the Sistine Chapel ceiling is an unrepeated singularity.
In the same way, SETI4 scientists will accept a single message from outer space via radio telescope as indication that there are intelligent beings out there, only because these scientists have repeatedly observed intelligent beings produce similar messages. The basis for believing that an event has a supernatural cause is the observation of certain kinds of events being regularly connected with intelligent, not natural, causes. Nevertheless, the object of this understanding can be an unrepeated singularity—namely, a miracle. After all, an archaeologist need only find one piece of pottery to know there was an intelligent cause of it, even though he no doubt must have seen many potters make pottery (or the like) in order to know that only intelligent beings make these kinds of things. To restate the point, the basis of our understanding of whether an event has an intelligent supernatural cause is observing that intelligent beings regularly produce similar events within the natural world. However, the object of this understanding may be a singular event, such as the resurrection of Christ.
Indeed, as we have suggested, if scientists, based on their observation of regular causal conjunctions in the present (as Hume himself argued), can conclude that the weight of the cosmological evidence points to a Big-Bang singularity, billions of years ago, in which the material space-time universe exploded into being out of nothing, then not only are miracles possible but the biggest one has already happened. It remains, then, only to look at human history to see if other singularities have also occurred. What is seldom appreciated is that the very basis of this argument for the possibility (and even actuality) of miracles is David Hume’s principle of “constant conjunction” (the “repeatability principle”).5 So rather than eliminating miracles, Hume’s own maxim is actually the grounds for identifying them.
Antony Flew’s Restatement of Hume’s Argument Against Miracles
Variations of Hume’s argument against miracles are still held to be valid by some widely respected contemporary philosophers. In his article titled “Miracles” in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Antony Flew argues against miracles on the grounds that they are unrepeatable. As he sees it, Hume’s argument really amounts to something like this.
(1) Every miracle is a violation of a law of nature.
(2) The evidence against any violation of nature is the strongest possible evidence.
(3) Therefore, the evidence against miracles is the strongest possible evidence (Edwards, EP, 346–53).
Flew insists that “Hume was primarily concerned not with the question of fact, but with that of evidence. The problem was how the occurrence of a miracle could be proved rather than whether any such events had ever occurred.” However, adds Flew, “our sole ground for characterizing the reported occurrence as miraculous is at the same time a sufficient reason for calling it physically impossible.” Why, we may ask, is this so? Because “the critical historian, confronted with some story of a miracle, will usually dismiss it out of hand” (ibid.).
On what grounds are miracles dismissed by the critical historian? Flew answers,
To justify his procedure he will have to appeal to precisely the principle which Hume advanced: the “absolute impossibility or miraculous nature” of the events attested must, “in the eyes of all reasonable people … alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation” (ibid.).
In short, even though miracles are not logically impossible, they are scientifically impossible:
For it is only and precisely by presuming that the laws that hold today held in the past … that we can rationally interpret the detritus [fragments] of the past as evidence and from it construct our account of what actually happened (ibid.).
As to the charge that this uniformitarian approach to history is “irrationally dogmatic,” Flew answers with what is really the heart of his amplification of Hume’s argument. For one thing, “as Hume was insisting from first to last, the possibility of miracles is a matter of evidence and not of dogmatism.” Further, “the proposition reporting the [alleged] occurrence of the miracle will be singular, particular, and in the past tense.” Propositions of this sort “cannot any longer be tested directly. It is this that gives propositions of the first sort [i.e., the general and repeatable] the vastly greater logical strength” (ibid.). In view of this, Flew’s argument can now be stated as follows:
(1) Miracles are by nature particular and unrepeatable.
(2) Natural events are by nature general and repeatable.
(3) Now, in practice, the evidence for the general and repeatable is always greater than that for the particular and unrepeatable.
(4) Therefore, in practice, the evidence will always be greater against miracles than for them.
With these statements it becomes clear that for Flew generality and repeatability (in the present) are what give natural events greater evidential value than miracles. And since, of course, it will continue to be this way in the future, the evidence against miracles will always be greater than the evidence for them.
An Evaluation of Flew’s Restatement of Hume’s Argument Against Miracles
There is a central thread to the Hume/Flew argument: Both are based on what may be called the repeatability principle, which posits that the evidence for what occurs over and over is always greater than for what does not. Since miracles by their very nature are singularities, the evidence against them is always greater. However, as there are some distinctive features in the two presentations, our evaluation of Flew’s will be separate.
First, like Flew, most modern naturalists accept some unrepeated singularities of their own. Many contemporary astronomers believe in the singular origin of the universe by a Big Bang, and nearly all scientists believe that the origin of life on this planet is a singular event that has never been repeated here. Indeed, all naturalistic scientists believe that life arose from nonlife as a singularity, which is not now being repeated. But if Flew’s argument against miracles is correct, then it is also wrong for scientists to believe in these singularities that many of them consider natural events. Thus Flew’s argument against supernaturalism would eliminate some elemental naturalistic beliefs.
Second, Flew’s view is subject to his own criticism of theists, namely, that it is an unfalsifiable position. No matter what state of affairs actually occurs (even a resurrection), Flew (contrary even to Hume’s claims) would be obliged to believe it was not a miracle, for Flew argued,
It often seems to people who are not religious as if there was no conceivable event or series of events the occurrence of which would be admitted by sophisticated religious people to be a sufficient reason for conceding “there wasn’t a God after all” (Flew, “TF,” in NEPT, 98).
In short, his accusation is that the belief of religious people is in actuality unfalsifiable. But in like manner we may ask Flew (rephrasing his own words), “What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of … your antisupernaturalism?” Flew’s answer would be that no event in the world could falsify his naturalism, for he would respond that the evidence is always greater against miracles than for them.
Nor does it help for Flew to claim that his antisupernaturalism is falsifiable in principle but never in practice, on the grounds that in practice the evidence will always be greater for the repeatable. Surely he would then have to allow the theist to claim that, in principle, the existence of God is falsifiable but that, in practice, no event could disconfirm God’s existence. The fact that Flew and other non-theists busy themselves to disprove God by arguing from the fact of evil in the world reveals their true interest; falsification in practice is what really concerns them.
It would appear that one cannot have it both ways. If naturalism is unfalsifiable in practice, then belief in God (or in miracles) can also be unfalsifiable in practice. On the other hand, if supernaturalism can never be established in practice, then neither can naturalism be so established. It is always possible for the theist to claim of every alleged natural event that “God is the ultimate cause of it.” The theist may insist that all “natural” events (i.e., naturally repeatable ones) are the way God normally operates and that “miraculous” events are the way He works on special occasions. Now, on Flew’s own grounds, there is no way, in practice, to falsify this theistic belief. Again, just as Flew claimed that naturalism is unfalsifiable in practice, so too the theist could claim the same for theism, for no matter what events (repeatable or unrepeatable) are produced in the natural world, the theist can still claim “God is the ultimate cause of it,” and, on Flew’s own grounds, no naturalist can disprove it.
Third, Flew’s assumption that the repeatable always evidentially outweighs the unrepeatable is subject to serious challenge. If this were so, then, as Richard Whateley pointed out (see earlier comments on Napoleon), one could not believe in the historicity of any unusual events from the past (none of which are repeatable). In fact, if repeatability in practice is the true test of superior evidence, then one should not believe that observed births or deaths occurred, for a person’s birth and death are both unrepeatable in practice. Likewise, even historical geology is unrepeatable in practice, as is the history of our planet. Hence, if Flew were correct, the science of geology should be eliminated.
The truth is, as noted professor Stanley Jaki has observed, scientists do not reject unrepeated singularities out of hand:
Luckily for science, scientists relatively rarely brush aside reports about a really new case with the remark: “It cannot be really different from the thousand other cases we have already investigated.” The brave reply of the young assistant, “But, Sir, what if this is the thousand and first case?” which … is precisely the rejoinder that is to be offered in connection with facts that fall under suspicion because of their miraculous character. (MP, 100.)
Plainly, then, if the naturalist pushes his arguments far enough to eliminate miracles, by implication he thereby eliminates the grounds for his own beliefs. If he qualifies them so as to include all the natural and scientific data he wishes, then he reopens the door for miracles.
However, that an event is unusual does not mean it is supernatural. It simply means that a miracle cannot be eliminated because it is unusual. As discussed above, in order for an unusual event to qualify as a supernatural act of God there must be
(1) a theistic God (see chapter 2);
(2) some supernatural earmarks of God on this event (such as of moral, theological, or teleological dimensions).
One cannot identify the fingerprints of God on an event unless he first knows what God’s fingerprints are.
OTHER OBJECTIONS TO MIRACLES ARE UNSUCCESSFUL
There are, of course, other objections to miracles (see Geisler, “M, AA” in BECA). However, none of them is successful in eliminating the possibility of miracles. In point of fact, the only way to really disprove miracles is to disprove the existence of God—something anti-theists have found notoriously difficult. Indeed, each attempted argument is based on unjustified, unproven, or self-defeating premises (see Geisler, “G, AD” in BECA). But if a theistic God cannot be disproved, then miracles are possible. Consider the following logic:
(1) Theism makes miracles possible.
(2) Theism has not been shown to be impossible (it actually has been shown [in chapter 2] to be credible).
(3) Hence, miracles have not been shown to be impossible.
This being the case, the supernatural precondition of evangelical theology is secure.
SOURCES
Augustine. City of God.
Brown, Colin, ed. Dictionary of New Testament Theology.
Flew, Antony. “Miracles” in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
———. “Theology and Falsification” in New Essays in Philosophical Theology.
Geisler, Norman. “God, Alleged Disproofs of” in Baker Encylopedia of Christian Apologetics
———. Miracles and the Modern Mind.
———. “Miracles, Arguments Against” in Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics.
Geivett, Douglas, and Gary Habermas. In Defense of Miracles.
Greenleaf, Simon. The Testimony of the Evangelists.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
———. A Treatise of Human Nature.
Jaki, Stanley. Miracles and Physics.
Jastrow, Robert. God and the Astronomers.
Lewis, C. S. Miracles.
Spinoza, Benedict. Ethics.
———. Theologico-Political Treatise and a Political Treatise.
Stokes, George. International Standard Bible Encyclopedia.
Swinburne, Richard. Miracles.
Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles (Book 3).
Whateley, Richard. Historical Doubts Concerning the Existence of Napoleon Bonaparte.
1 For Spinoza, an axiom is a self-evident principle, proposition, or maxim from which other truths can be deduced. Hence, all truth is either self-evident or deducible from it.
2 “Begging the question” occurs when an argument assumes what is to be proven.
3 Epistemology is “the study of the methods and the grounds of knowledge, especially with reference to its limits and validity; broadly, the theory of knowledge” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).
4 Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence.
5 This is the principle stating that the evidence for what occurs over and over is always greater than for what does not.
Geisler, N. L. 2002. Systematic theology, volume one: Introduction, Bible (43). Bethany House Publishers: Minneapolis, MN
