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Theology

METHOD: THE METHODOLOGICAL PRECONDITION

METHOD: THE METHODOLOGICAL PRECONDITION

METHOD: THE METHODOLOGICAL PRECONDITION
METHOD: THE METHODOLOGICAL PRECONDITION

Like other theological topics, the method of doing theology is widely debated. Nonetheless, methodology is of vital importance, because in a very real sense methodology determines theology. That is to say, how theology is done will determine what the theological conclusion will be. For example, if theology is done with a naturalistic method, inevitably the conclusions will be naturalistic. Likewise, if one begins with a theistic God (see chapter 2) and a method open to the supernatural (see chapter 3), the conclusions will not be unfavorable to the supernatural.

THE NATURE AND KINDS OF METHODS

There are many kinds of methods, the most widely known being the scientific method as set forth by Francis Bacon (see page 207 on the inductive method). This, of course, was the inductive and experimental logic (method) of modern science, as opposed to the deductive logic formulated by Aristotle (see page 206 on the deductive method).

In actual practice there are many methods that have been employed in the discipline of theology, including the inductive, deductive, abductive, retroductive, systematic, and pragmatic methods, as well as several others. First, each method will be defined; then, the question will be asked whether and how it is applicable to the construction of a systematic theology. One particular doctrine—the doctrine of Scripture—will be used as an example. This will serve as an introduction to part 2.

VARIOUS KINDS OF THEOLOGICAL METHODS

Since theological methods have been borrowed from other disciplines, it will be helpful to survey the major methods of discovering truth from the earliest times to the present. While not all these methods will make a positive contribution to the theological enterprise, still they are illuminating.

The Reductio Absurdum Method

The presocratic philosopher Zeno (c. 495–c. 430 b.c.) was a disciple of Parmenides (b. 515 b.c.), the monist who argued that nothing existed except one solitary Being (see chapter 2). In order to demonstrate this thesis, Zeno, the disciple, would reduce the opposing view to the absurd by showing how it ended in paradox. For example, assume that time, space, or motion is composed of real parts (as pluralism does); Zeno insisted that consequently we would end up in hopeless contradictions. Nothing, he argued, could move from point A to point B, since there are an infinite number of points between them, and it is impossible to traverse the infinite. Therefore, by reducing pluralism of being to the absurd, he believed he had proven monism (that all is one).

Even though Zeno’s application of the Reductio Absurdum argument is rejected by theists (see chapter 2), nonetheless, the method itself does not necessitate any view contrary to Christian belief. Indeed, it is simply an application of a valid disjunctive syllogism later developed by Aristotle (see chapter 5).

The Socratic Method

This method, named after its fourth century b.c. founder, could better be called the dialogical method or the method of interrogation, for it is based on the simple technique of discovering truth by asking the right questions. Socrates (c. 470–399 b.c.) illustrates this method in his dialogue, Meno (recorded by Plato), a text about an untutored slave boy who is taught geometry by Socrates’ thoughtful, logical, and systematic questioning of him.

Of course, in the socratic context the method was based on the belief in reincarnation, where allegedly Meno had known these geometric truths in their pure form in a previous life. However, others have abstracted this methodology from the belief in reincarnation and used it to lead a mind down the path of truth by asking the right questions.

The Deductive Method

Aristotle (384–322 b.c.) is credited with being the first to record the canons of deductive logic (Prior Analytics), whereby a person can validly infer one truth from other truths. These deductions are done by way of logical syllogisms, which take on either a categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive form (see chapter 5). An illustration of each will suffice to sketch the method.

A categorical (unconditional) deduction (syllogism) is as follows:

(1)     If the whole Bible is true, then so is John 14:6.

(2)     The whole Bible is true.

(3)     Consequently, John 14:6 is true—Jesus is the only way to God.

If the first two premises are true, then the conclusion must be true, since it follows necessarily from them. The seven rules of the categorical syllogism and all valid forms resulting from them are spelled out elsewhere (see chapter 5).

A hypothetical (conditional) deduction (syllogism) is:

(1)     If all men are sinners, then John is a sinner.

(2)     John is a man.

(3)     Hence, John is a sinner.

In this case the second premise has met the condition stated in the first premise, and thus if the conditional is correct, the conclusion must be true. In this logical form the conclusion follows validly only if the second premise either affirms the antecedent (the “if” part of the first premise) or else denies the consequent (the “then” part of the first premise).

A disjunctive syllogism is an either/or reasoning process. For example:

(1)     Either a person is saved or else he is lost (not saved).

(2)     John is not lost.

(3)     Therefore, John is saved.

A conclusion follows logically from a disjunctive syllogism only if one of the two disjuncts (statements on either side of the “or”) is negated.

Although Aristotle also spoke of inductions, his deductive method of logic dominated major philosophies of the ancient, medieval, and even more recent times.

The Inductive Method

The monopolistic spell of deductive logic was broken when Francis Bacon (1561–1626) published his new logic, The Novum Organum (“The New Organ”). In it he developed inductive logic and experimental logic, known popularly as the scientific method. Later, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) put these into their current form.

There are two broad categories of induction: imperfect and perfect. Most inductions fall into the former, since it is practically impossible to examine every particular thing in its class to see if they all have the same characteristics that the observed ones have. For high probability, it is sufficient to examine a large number of them.

On the other hand, a perfect induction is where every one of the particulars in that class can be and has been examined. For instance, I can easily examine every object in the bag and affirm with certainty that (for instance) all are apples. Perfect inductions are also possible with regard to biblical teaching, since the Bible contains a finite and manageable amount of material. Hence, a high degree of certainty is obtainable in a perfect induction.

The Cartesian Method

The French philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650) developed a method for discovering truth that began in systematic and methodical doubt. Its steps include the following:

(1)     I doubt, therefore, I think.

(2)     I think, therefore, I am.

(3)     I am, therefore, God is (because I am an imperfect being—namely, a doubter), and the imperfect implies the Perfect (God) by which I know that

(4)     God is, and therefore the world is (for a perfect God would not deceive me about the strong, steady impression I am getting of an external world outside myself).

(5)     Consequently, I exist, God exists, and the world exists (see Descartes, M).

If there is doubt about any of these conclusions, Descartes outlined a method by which one could obtain certainty. The steps are as follows:

(1)     The rule of certainty: Only indubitably clear and distinct ideas should be accepted as true.

(2)     The rule of division: All problems should be reduced to their simplest parts.

(3)     The rule of order: All reasoning should proceed from simple to complex.

(4)     The rule of enumeration: One should review and recheck each step of the argument (see Descartes, DM).

In this way Descartes believed we could not only arrive at truth but that we could know it with certainty. While we need not accept all of Descartes’ conclusions, his method of using self-refuting statements and his rules for being more certain are helpful to the theologian.

The Euclidian Method

Euclid (fl. 300 b.c.) developed a system of geometry that began with certain basic definitions and axioms held to be self-evident (e.g., parallel lines never meet). From these all other postulates and theorems were deduced logically and systematically; for example, the Pythagorean theorem—the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides (A2+B2=C2). This can be deduced by noting that an example of a right triangle, having two sides of 3 and 4 inches and a third side (hypotenuse) of five inches, would yield 3×3=9 + 4×4=16 (which added together equals 25) and a hypotenuse of 5×5=25. This ability to deduce such things not only provided certainty but also invaluable knowledge for architecture and engineering.

This Euclidian deductive method was used in modern times by the great rationalist and philosopher Benedict Spinoza. Spinoza developed an entire philosophical system, including proofs for God as well as descriptions of the creation and nature of human beings, free will, and ethics (see Spinoza, E).

From deductive rationalism Spinoza also deduced the impossibility of miracles, and he began the first systematic effort at negative higher criticism of the Bible (TPT). This method applied to Scripture dramatically illustrates that not all methods can be fruitfully utilized in evangelical theology, particularly those with antisupernatural implications (see chapter 3). Nonetheless, once one has universal premises from either general or special revelation (see chapter 4), deductive logic is helpful in coming to other conclusions.

The Transcendental Method

The agnostic philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is credited with the development of a transcendental method (Kant, CPR). A transcendental argument is neither deductive nor inductive; it is more reductive, arguing back to the necessary preconditions of something being the case. The transcendental method seeks for necessary conditions of a given state of affairs, not an actual cause of them.

Evangelical thinkers have used this methodology in both minimal and maximal ways. In the maximal category, it has been utilized by Cornelius Van Til and his followers as an apologetic method (IDF, 100–101). As such they affirm that in order to make sense out of the world, it is necessary to postulate the existence of the triune God as revealed in the Bible as the necessary (though not sufficient) condition to make sense out of our world.1

Some Christian apologists have also made minimal usage of a transcendental argument. John Carnell, for example, used it to defend the principle of noncontradiction, insisting that one had to posit it as an absolute condition for all thought, otherwise, no thought would be possible (Carnell, ICA, 159).

The Abductive Method

Charles Sanders Pierce (1839–1914) is credited with developing the abductive method (see PSM). It is neither deductive (which argues from general to particular) nor inductive (which argues from particular to general). Rather, an abduction is more like an insight or intuitive flash that provides one with a model for doing science or theology, as the case may be.

Sometimes this abduction comes as an intelligent guess and other times in a dream or vision. The father of modern rational philosophy, René Descartes, received his insight from dreams of a man selling watermelons. The scientist Nikola Tesla (1856–1943) got his idea for the internal workings of an alternating current motor from a vision he had while reading the poet Goethe. Friedrich August Kekulé (1829–1896) received the idea for the scientific model of the benzine molecule while having a vision of a snake biting its tail. Often, an abduction comes from applying the model derived from one discipline of study to another (see Ramsey, MM). Sometimes the model is abduced from concentrating on the particular problem at hand.

Whatever the source of the model, it is neither deduced from prior premises nor induced from previous data; it is simply intelligent insight into the situation. Theology, like other disciplines, fruitfully uses abductions to derive models by which Scripture can be correctly interpreted.

The Retroductive Method

The retroductive method is the method of enrichment. As a snowball gathers more snow on each turn downhill, so a retroduction in theology is where additional insight is gained from further knowledge. In this way, the more one knows, the more one knows what he knows better. For example, each time one reads through the Bible, it enables him to understand more clearly what he already knew about the Bible. Likewise, the more one learns, the better one comprehends what he already comprehends, no matter what the subject.

Sometimes this movement is described as a circle. But it is considered a benign circle, not a vicious circle;2 in the discipline of interpretation it is called “the hermeneutical circle.” This is the process by which one understands the whole in the light of the parts and the parts in the light of the whole. Of course, each time one goes through the parts, he experiences a retroductive increase in his knowledge of the whole.

The Analogical Method

Joseph Butler (1692–1752) is best known for his famous Analogy of Religion (c. 1736), in which he defends Christianity against deism, particularly that of Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671–1713), third Earl of Shaftesbury, who wrote Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711), and Matthew Tindal (c. 1655–1733), who penned Christianity As Old As the Creation (1730).

Butler was influenced by an older contemporary, Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), who was a disciple of Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727) and a defender of the Christian faith. Butler’s famous Analogy of Religion is a presentation of the plausibility of Christianity in terms of the analogy between revealed and natural religion.

The Use of Probability

In accordance with the empirical basis of our knowledge and the limited nature of science, Butler argued that our knowledge of nature is only probable. From this he concluded two things in the defense of Christianity. First, since this is the case, “one is always in the position of a potential learner, and so one never can posit what one knows of nature as the standard to judge what is natural” (Rurak, “BA” in the ATR). Second, probability, which is the guide to life, supports the belief in a supernatural revelation from God in the Bible and the miracles of Christ.

The Objection to Deism

Butler directed his attack against the deist Tindal, who argued, “There’s a religion of nature and reason written in the hearts of every one of us from the first creation by which mankind must judge the truth of any instituted religion whatever …” that may come after it (AR, 50).

For deists who reject Scripture as a supernatural revelation because of its difficulties, Butler responds,

He who believes the Scriptures to have proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of nature. [Hence,] he who denies Scripture to have been from God, upon account of these difficulties, may for the very same reason deny the world to have been formed by him. (AR, 9–10.)

Since deists admit the latter, they should not deny the former. As James Rurak notes, “Both natural and revealed religion will be assessed by the same standard, the constitution and course of nature. Natural religion cannot be used as a standard to judge revelation” (“BA” in ATR, 367). There is analogy between them.

A Religion Should Be Judged As a Whole

Another result of Butler’s analogous argument is that a system of religion must be judged as a whole, not simply from attacks leveled against specific parts, as the deists were prone to do. When this standard was applied to Christianity, Butler believed it revealed that there is an “Intelligent Author and Governor of nature, [and] mankind is appointed to live in a future state; that everyone shall be rewarded or punished” (AR, 16–17).

The Relation of Natural and Supernatural Revelation

With the deists Butler agrees that God is the Author of nature and that Christianity contains a republication of this original revelation in creation. However, Christianity, while being a supernatural revelation, is also more. Butler explains,

[T]he essence of natural religion may be said to consist in the religious regards to “God the Father Almighty”: and the essence of revealed religion, as distinguished from natural, to consist in religious regard to “the Son,” and to “the Holy Ghost.”

The Defense of Miracles

Butler devoted his second chapter to the subject “of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation, considered as miraculous.” In his own summary of the argument (in the margin) he insists that there is

  1. No presumption, from analogy, against the general Christian Scheme; for (1) although undiscoverable by reason or experience, we only know a small part of a vast whole; (2) even if it be unlike the known course of nature, (a) the unknown may not everywhere resemble the known; (b) we observe unlikeness sometimes in nature; (c) the alleged unlikeness is not complete. Thus no presumption lies against the general Christian scheme, whether we call it miraculous or not.

Further,

  1. [There is] no presumption against a primitive revelation, for (1) miracle is relative to a course of nature. (2) Revelation may well have followed Creation, which is an admitted fact. (3) The further miracle [is] no additional difficulty. (4) Tradition declares that religion was revealed at the first. III. [There is] no presumption from analogy against miracles in historical times, for (1) we have no parallel case of a second fallen world; (2) in particular, (a) there is a presumption against all alleged facts before testimony, not after testimony. [And] (b) reasons for miraculous intervention may have arisen in 5,000 years. (c) Man’s need of supernatural guidance is such a reason. (d) Miracles [are] comparable to extraordinary events, against which some presumption always lies. Thus (i) miracles [are] not incredible. [In fact,] (ii) in some cases, [they are] a priori probable. (iii) In no case is there a peculiar presumption against them. (AR, 155–61.)

Butler adds,

Upon all this I conclude; that there certainly is no such presumption against miracles, as to render them in any way incredible; that on the contrary, our being able to discern reasons for them, gives a positive credibility to the history of them, in cases where those reasons hold; and that is by no means certain, that there is any peculiar presumption at all, from analogy, even in the lowest degree, against miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary [natural] phenomena. (AR)

In short, by analogy with nature, miracles are both credible and even a priori probable.

An Evaluation of Butler’s View of Miracles

Space does not permit a complete evaluation of Butler’s apologetic; however, a few things call for comment.

On the positive side, given the context, Butler made a significant defense of Christianity against deism. Arguing from deistic premises of natural revelation, he showed that there was no probable presumption against Christianity. Further, by reducing the test for truth from absolute certainty to reasonable probability, he made the apologetic task easier. Regardless of how one evaluates his results, Butler should be commended for his rational attempt to defend Christianity against the attacks of its naturalistic critics.

On the negative side, Butler has been criticized from both the left and the right. From the standpoint of a classical apologist, Butler unnecessarily weakened the stronger cosmological argument (see chapter 2) in favor of a weaker probability argument from analogy.

Further, some naturalists insist that Butler’s argument for miracles is based on a false analogy for two reasons. First, “The presumption against miracles is not merely a presumption against a specific event, but against that kind of event taking place.” Second, the comparison with extraordinary events in nature is said not to be valid, “for in the case of these forces, given the same physical antecedents, the same consequents will always follow; and the truth of this can be verified by experiment” (Mossner, BBAR, 161–162).

While this critique appears sound for some of the illustrations that Butler provides (e.g., electricity and magnetism), it does not work with all singularities in nature. In particular, it would not apply to the Big Bang theory (see chapter 2) held by many naturalistic scientists, since the antecedent conditions (conditions before the Big Bang) were nothing or nonbeing, from which no prediction can be made or be verified by further experiment. Further, Butler appears to be correct in the negative side of his argument that there is no a priori probability against miracles; indeed, he makes a prima facie case for their a priori probability (in chapter 3).

Finally, it should be noted that some who have used an analogical method (like John Stuart Mill) concluded that God must be finite (TER). This is directly contrary to the evangelical claim that God is infinite in power and perfection (see volume 2, part 1). So analogical have been used to conclude opposing systems, and, hence, as helpful as it may be as a defense or illustration of truth, analogy does not appear to be a definitive method as a sole test for the truth of a worldview. Even so, analogies are helpful supportive arguments that assist in illustrating truths grounded elsewhere.

The Dialectical Method

The dialectical method was developed by Karl Marx (1818–1883) out of what was believed to be the dialectic of his professor G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831); as noted previously, it was actually that of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), Hegel’s contemporary (see Meuller, “HLTAS” in JHI, 19). The dialectical method consists in opposing a thesis with an antithesis and making a synthesis of them. For example, Marx held that the thesis of capitalism is opposed by the antithesis of socialism and will eventually emerge into the Utopian synthesis of communism.

Following Hegel’s time, there was an attempt to use a version of this method on Christianity by F. C. Baur (1792–1860) and his Tubingen school, which claimed that the first century’s supposed tension between Peter’s Judaistic form of Christianity (thesis) and Paul’s anti-Judaistic form of Christianity (antithesis) found its reconciliation (synthesis) in John’s second-century gospel. The tragedy has been that this dialectic tended to determine the facts rather than discover them, and it has led to an overlooking if not rejecting of the evidence that points to a much earlier date for John (see part 2).

Others, like Karl Barth (1886–1968), have employed a dialectical method in their theology. In Barth’s case it was the thesis of orthodoxy opposed by the antithesis of liberalism that he synthesized into neo-orthodoxy. Here again the dialectical method had significantly less than biblical and evangelical results, for while Barth accepted an orthodox view of the Virgin Birth, Trinity, and Resurrection (bodily), he retained a liberal view of universalism and a denial of the infallibility and inerrancy of Scripture.

The Pragmatic Method

Although Charles Sanders Pierce used the term “pragmatic” for the clarification of ideas, William James (1842–1910) is credited with developing a pragmatic methodology for discovering truth. James said,

Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events.… “The true,” to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as “the right” is only the expedient in the way of our believing. (P, 201–202.)

In brief, according to pragmatism, we know what is true by whether or not it works.

Although few acknowledge the pragmatic method to be their test for theological truth, on a popular level it is widely used. The same is true of the next method, that of experimentation.

The Experimental Method

Along with James, the “instrumentalism” of John Dewey (1859–1952), more popularly known as experimentalism, is an American contribution to the discipline of methodology. From Dewey’s perspective one discovers the truth by doing, and the final vote is cast by whether or not our experimentation produces progress. In this sense it is a melioristic methodology in that progress determines whether or not our beliefs are true, that is, whether they have heuristic value in prompting further achievement (LTI).

Stated in popular language, Dewey was asking us to “try before you buy”—something that can have devastating effects in one’s life (as manifested in our culture’s subsequent sexual and chemical experimentation). The result can be no less devastating when applied to theology, as Dewey’s humanistic and antisupernatural religiosity showed (CF).

THE LIMITATION AND NEGATION OF CERTAIN METHODOLOGIES

It has become apparent from even the brief survey of various methods of discovering truth that not all of them are compatible with evangelical theology. A few related observations are in order.

Methodological Category Mistakes:

One of the greatest books ever written on philosophical methodology, much of which applies to theological method, is The Unity of Philosophical Experience by Étienne Gilson (1884–1978). In it he demonstrates with penetrating insight the fruitless cul-de-sacs caused in the history of philosophy by thinkers taking a methodology appropriate to one discipline and mistakenly applying it to another. This is a classic methodological category mistake.

Perhaps the most pervasive of all such errors in our time is that of evolutionism. Now, it’s well established that microevolution occurs—survival of the fittest is a fact. Specific types of animals can and do adapt to their changing environment in order to survive—these small (micro) changes are observable in nature.

However, all naturalistic evolutionists and many others take a big leap from there to macroevolution—the hypothesis of common ancestry. That evolution works on a small scale within specific kinds of animals does not mean that this method can be imposed on large-scale changes between different kinds of animals.3

What’s worse is taking the evolutionary method, which is based on small-scale biological changes, and imposing this method of understanding on entirely different disciplines, such as ethics and religion. Sir James George Frazer’s flawed but widely touted The Golden Bough is an example of this serious methodological error. Frazer (1854–1941) assumed that religions evolved from animism through polytheism and henotheism to monotheism. This assumption, however, has careless disregard for the evidence that monotheism is earlier than these other forms (see Mbiti, ARP; Schmidt, HGNA).

Antisupernaturalistic Methods

Clearly, any method that necessitates a naturalistic conclusion should not be used in evangelical theology. Benedict Spinoza is a classic example. His form of deductive rationalism entailed naturalism (see chapter 3), but evangelical theology is based on theism (see chapter 2), and it goes without saying that if natural law is defined as unbreakable, and a miracle as what breaks a natural law, then miracles are impossible.

However, since theism entails supernaturalism, and since the theistic belief in the creation of the universe from nothing is the biggest supernatural event of all, then miracles are automatically possible.

Some forms of antisupernaturalism are more subtle than Spinoza’s question-begging definition of natural law as unbreakable. Ernst Troeltsch’s historiography is a case in point (see chapter 11); his principle of analogy is a much more hidden and implicit form of naturalism. As we saw previously, he argued,

(1)     The past can only be reconstructed based on the analogy of events known to us in the present.

(2)     Present historical events do not provide us with any miraculous events.

(3)     Hence, miraculous events cannot be part of any reconstruction (history) of past events.

In response, it need only be pointed out that Troeltsch’s understanding of the principle of historical analogy is a form of historical uniformitarianism. It assumes that all history must be understood without miraculous events. Further, since it admittedly is not an argument against the possibility of miracles (but only against their being part of legitimate reconstruction of the past we call “history”), it entails a counterintuitive claim. Like David Hume, historical uniformitarianism assumes that we should disbelieve in miracles even if they occur. But it’s clearly absurd to lay down a method that refuses to believe in an event even if it occurs (see chapter 3). Such methods must be soundly rejected by a biblically based theology.

Incompatible Methods

Other methodologies, while not being antisupernatural, are still incompatible with evangelical beliefs. For example, pragmatism and experimentalism are incompatible with belief in absolute truth; according to pragmatism and experimentalism, one and the same thing can work for one person but not for another. If so, then truth would be relative, but truth is not relative. Whatever is true is true for all persons, at all times, and in all places, which is what is meant by absolute truth (see chapter 7). Any pragmatic-type method that implies the relativity of truth should not be employed in evangelical theology.

This does not mean, of course, that theological truth is not practical and does not apply to one’s life; it simply means that the pragmatic method is not a legitimate means of obtaining truth. If something is true, it will be practical, but simply that it is practical (workable) does not make it true.

Inappropriate Methods

Other methods must be rejected because they are inappropriate to the subject at hand, even if they are not antisupernatual or incompatible with evangelical belief. This point is made evident by Gilson’s analysis (UPE). Taking, for example, a mathematical method and trying to do metaphysics with it (as Spinoza did), is clearly wrongheaded. Math is perfectly capable of dealing with abstract entities but not necessarily with all concrete ones.

For example, mathematically there are an infinite number of abstract points between the two ends of my bookshelf. However, I cannot get an infinite number of books on it, no matter how small they are. Nor can one get an infinite number of sheets of paper between them, no matter how thinly the paper is sliced. A mathematical series of points (that are abstract and dimensionless) does not equate with actual, concrete objects.

Traditional logic is another case in point (see chapter 5)—it is a perfectly appropriate tool for discovering truth when dealing with known truths from which it can derive others. But as a method of discovering truth on its own, it is useless. It is not geared to inform us about reality; it can deal with only the reality that is provided to it. Failing to recognize this is the basic flaw of the ontological argument (see chapter 2). No reality, not even divine reality, can be proven by logic alone. To make the argument work one must start with something that exists; then it is no longer an ontological argument but a form of the cosmological argument (see chapter 2). A triangle is a good example: Logically, a triangle must have three sides, three angles, and they must total 180°. However, mere logic does not demand that any triangular thing actually exists. Only if an actual triangular shaped object exists does logic inform us that it must have three sides, etc.

Likewise, modern symbolic logic is not designed to handle what questions but only how questions; unlike traditional logic, it cannot deal with substances but only relationships (see Veath, TL).

TOWARD DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE THEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY

Two things should be apparent from the foregoing discussion:

(1)     The method should fit its object.

(2)     The method should not be contrary to the results it is supposed to produce.

A third can be added:

(3)     No one method can suffice for the many steps involved in developing an evangelical theology. (This will become obvious from the following discussion.)

Step 1: An Inductive Basis in Scripture

Evangelical theology is based on a belief that the Bible and the Bible alone is the only written, infallible and inerrant revelation from God (general revelation is not written); as a result, any adequate methodology must be based on a sound exposition of Scripture. Broadly speaking, an inductive approach to understanding the text must be taken; that is, all the particular parts of the text of Scripture must be examined carefully in context before one can safely assume he has the proper interpretation (see chapter 10). Each part must be seen as a part of the whole. Likewise, the whole must be viewed as what makes sense of each part.

The socratic method of interrogation can be used effectively in discovering the meaning of the text, for one of the best ways to derive the meaning from a piece of literature is to ask questions like:

(1)     Who wrote it?

(2)     When did he write it?

(3)     Where were they located?

(4)     To whom was he speaking?

(5)     What was said (or done) according to the text?4

By asking these crucial inductive questions, one may more effectively assess the author’s expressed meaning in the text.

This broadly inductive method involves an abductive, step, for once all the parts are studied, one may receive intuitive insight into how they all fit together to make up that whole. This is true whether we speak of a sentence (the smallest unit of meaning), a paragraph, a whole book, or even the Bible as a whole (since evangelicals believe there is one Mind behind all of Scripture).

Of course, there is more to systematic theology than exegesis of the biblical text. For one thing, the teaching of each text must be correlated with that of every other teaching in the Bible. For another thing, all the teachings of Scripture must be correlated with all the teachings of God’s other revelation (general revelation), with all this entails, including the systematic correlation of all human knowledge (see step 7 on page 223). This is not only a massive but also a progressive and always less-than-perfect process. Nonetheless, it is the task systematic theology has staked out for itself and to which the four volumes of this work are dedicated.

Step 2: A Deduction of Truths From Scripture

One thing systematic theology does that isn’t done by exegesis alone is to draw certain logical conclusions from the premises provided by a biblical analysis. For example, the Bible teaches,

(1)     God is one.

(2)     There are three Persons who are God—the Father, the Son (Jesus), and the Holy Spirit.

From this it follows by logical deduction that

(3)     There are three persons in the one God (God is a Tri-unity or Trinity) (see volume 2).

Also, the Bible teaches,

(1)     God cannot err (Heb. 6:18).

(2)     The Bible is the Word of God (2 Tim. 3:16–17; John 10:34–35).

From this we can deduce:

(3)     Therefore, the Bible cannot err.

Many other teachings of Scripture can also be derived by logical deduction.

Step 3: The Use of Analogies

In addition to an induction of the biblical text and also deductions from it, the method of analogy can be used to derive and refine an understanding of God’s revealed truth. Since God has revealed Himself in both special and general revelation, systematic theology can make use of analogies from either to help explain and expound truth.

One good analogy can be used to explain how the Bible can be both the Word of God and yet the words of men. A parallel theological truth is found in the two natures of Christ found in one Person, called the hypostatic union (see volume 2, part 1). Jesus had both a divine and a human nature in one person who was without sin (Heb. 4:15). Likewise, the Bible has both a divine and human nature in one book, yet without error (Matt. 22:39; John 17:17; John 10:35). In other words, the Bible is a theanthropic book just as Christ is a theanthropic person.5

Of course, no analogy is perfect, and there are differences here too. For instance, Christ, the theanthropic person, can be worshiped, since He is God. However, even though the Bible is a theanthropic book, it is not God and should not be worshiped.

Sometimes analogies can come from nature. Jesus and other biblical writers used them, and theology can avail itself of them as well. Read again these words from Joseph Butler:

He who believes the Scriptures to have proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of nature. [Hence,] he who denies Scripture to have been from God, upon account of these difficulties, may for the very same reason deny the world to have been formed by him. (AR, 9–10.)

Analogies for other doctrines are also helpful. For instance, there are tri-unities in nature that are illustrative of the Tri-unity in God. Love has a “threeness” within its oneness, for love involves a Lover (the Father), a loved One (the Son), and a Spirit of love between them (the Holy Spirit). Likewise, our mind, our ideas, and our words are one, yet all three are distinctly different. Even though these are not perfect illustrations, the two illustrations of the Trinity (love and mind) are three and one at the same time.

Of course, not all analogies from nature are helpful, even if they involve a distinction involving three and one. For example, water has three states: liquid, solid, and gas. But normally these three states do not exist in the same water at the same time. Thus, the illustration lends to a heresy about God called modalism.6

It should be remembered that analogies do not prove a doctrine. Doctrine must be taught scripturally and only illustrated or supported by good analogies.

Step 4: The Use of General Revelation

Another important step in the overall theological method is the use of general revelation. God has revealed Himself in all of nature (Ps. 19:1; Acts 14:17), including human nature (Rom. 2:12–15). Indeed, every perfection in creation, wherever it is found, is similar (analogous) to God, since He cannot produce what He does not possess; He cannot give to creation what He does not have to give (see chapters 4, and 9).

Now, there are many things known from general revelation that are not found in Scripture, but that do cast light on what is found in Scripture. For example, as we have noted, the Bible speaks of the “four corners of the earth” (Rev. 7:1; Rev. 20:8), which, were it not for His general revelation that the earth is round, could lead one to conclude that Scripture teaches that the earth is square. Thus, the clear teaching of general revelation can be used to correct any possible misinterpretation in special revelation. Another example, though disputable, is whether the earth moves around the sun or the sun around the earth. As we stated earlier, without the knowledge gained by modern astronomy since the work of Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), it wasn’t difficult to interpret Joshua 10:13 (“the sun stood still”) as supporting a geocentric (earth-centered) solar system. Since that time, however, it seems wiser to take Joshua’s reference as an observational comment no different than “the sunrise” (cf. Josh. 1:15), that is, as a statement made from the biblical writer’s geographical perspective.

Sometimes the reverse is true. A widely held scientific misinterpretation of general revelation says that macroevolution is true. However, the clear teaching of special revelation affirms that God supernaturally created certain specific kinds of life that did not evolve from each other by natural processes (Gen. 1:1–27). Thus, the plain meaning of special revelation can be used to correct a misinterpretation of general revelation. Included in “general revelation” are also facts yielded by observation and the various sciences. These would include archaeological, chronological, historical, and other factual materials. For instance, with regard to the doctrine of Scripture it is relevant to know:

(1)     We do not possess the original manuscripts of Scripture.

(2)     There are some errors in the manuscript copies.

(3)     We must include as a part of the facts known from outside the Bible the so-called data (or phenomena) of Scripture.

The above list of things known from outside of what the Bible teaches is important because any nuanced and sophisticated doctrine of Scripture must take these concepts into consideration, as will be done in our next step, retroduction.

It is also worth noting that the information derived from general revelation comes via the normal scientific method, which broadly includes induction (see above). Of course, science can also involve experimentation, intuition, and even deductions.

Step 5: The Retroductive Method

The next step in an adequate theological method involves the use of all the information gained in step 4 in order to help refine, nuance, and fill out our understanding of what is meant in the teachings of steps 1 through 3. To be specific, let’s use the doctrine of Scripture as the illustration. Here is what we learn about the full theological doctrine of the inerrancy of Scripture in each step:

  1. The Inductive Basis:

(a)     God cannot err.

(b)     The Bible is God’s Word.

  1. The Deductive Conclusion:

(c)     The Bible cannot err.

  1. The Use of Analogies:

(d)     Just as Christ was divine and human yet without sin, even so the Bible is divine and human yet without error.

(e)     Just as nature (God’s general revelation) presents difficulties with possessing errors, so does the Bible (God’s special revelation).

  1. The Use of General Revelation:

(f)     The earth is not square.

(g)     The sun does not move around the earth.

  1. The Retroductive Method:

(h)     The biblical teaching is fleshed out in view of facts known from general revelation and the data (phenomena) of Scripture.

(i)     There are errors in the manuscript copies.

(j)     The Bible uses figures of speech and other literary devices, round numbers, everyday (nontechnical) language, paraphrases, etc.

(k)     The deductive conclusion (point c) is understood in the light of the retroductive enhancement. For example:

(1)     The Bible is without error only in the original text, not in all the copies.

(2)     Round numbers, observational language, figures of speech, and paraphrased citations are not errors.

Step 6: Systematic Correlation (of all information into a fully orbed doctrine through use of the laws of logic that insist all truth must be noncontradictory)

The Bible is the infallible and inerrant Word of God in the original text (not in all copies). In accord with a good analogy, it is like Christ (the Word of God) in that both have a divine and human dimension, yet without error. However, the Bible should be understood in terms of the literary forms in which it is expressed, its own phenomena (data), and in accord with other revelation from God in nature.

It is important to point out that when step 2 affirms, “The Bible cannot err,” we have the logically deduced and formal doctrine of inerrancy, but only in step 5 do we know specifically what this means—what the Bible says (steps 1 and 2) in the light of what it shows. The doctrine of Scripture must be understood in view of the data of Scripture.

Step 7: Each Doctrine Is Correlated With All Other Doctrines

The word systematic in systematic theology implies that all the teachings of both general and special revelation are comprehensive and consistent. This entails the use of another methodology—logic. Remember, the fundamental law of all thought is the law of noncontradiction, which affirms that A is not non-A. No two or more truths can be contradictory, which is why all biblical and extrabiblical truth can and must be brought into a consistent whole.

Consistency must be both internal and external. Internally, each biblical teaching must be logically consistent with every other biblical teaching. Externally, no teaching of Scripture can be inconsistent with any truth from general revelation. God is the author of both revelations, and He cannot contradict Himself. Hence, all contradictions must be between our interpretation of one revelation or the other. In principle, all conflicts between the two are resolvable, and the systematic theologian must attempt to harmonize them.

Step 8: Each Doctrine Is Expressed in View of the Orthodox Teachings of the Church Fathers.

Systematic theology is a fallible discipline; only the Bible is an infallible guide for faith and practice. However, theology should not be done in a vacuum—just as we can see farther spatially if we stand on the shoulders of giants, we likewise can see further theologically if we stand on the shoulders of the church fathers. One ignores the works of these great teachers at his own peril. As with other disciplines, he who ignores the past is condemned to repeat its errors.

Considering seriously the enduring teachings of the orthodox Fathers of the past is essential in constructing a viable evangelical systematic theology for the present. The church has struggled long and hard with understanding God’s revelations to us, and as a result the historic orthodox expressions of Christian truth have stood the test of time. To summarize, an adequate evangelical theology must be molded in the context of the ecumenical truth of the historic orthodox Christian church.

While not everything that every orthodox Father said on every theological topic is binding on contemporary evangelical theology, nonetheless, no one has any right to claim orthodoxy for any teaching that has been condemned by any of the ecumenical creeds, confessions, or councils of the church. Likewise, any teaching not addressed in the ecumenical creeds and councils that is contrary to the universal consent of the Fathers should be considered highly suspect. The burden of proof rests on anyone who wishes to hold to any such precepts; he must have overwhelmingly clear and convincing evidence from infallible Scripture.

These tests for orthodoxy can be summarized as follows: (1) What is contrary to ecumenical creeds, councils, and confessions is certainly unorthodox; (2) What is not addressed in the ecumenical creeds, councils, and confessions but is contrary to the universal consent of the Fathers is almost certainly unorthodox; and (3) What is contrary to the general consent of the Fathers is highly suspect. It is within these parameters that we employ the use of the teachings of the great theologians of the historic Christian church.

Step 9: Livability Is the Final Test for Systematic Theology

True Christianity is not merely metaphysics; it is also ethics. It is not simply theoretical; it is practical. Its goal is not only to satisfy the mind but also to shape the life. Therefore, it must be livable; its truths must be effective in a pragmatic way. Of course, not all that works is true, but what is true will work. Systematic theology must lead to practical theology; as it does, a proper view of God and the relation of His creation to Him will change one’s life (see volume 2).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Methodology is crucial to theology. An unorthodox method leads logically to unorthodox conclusions. An inadequate methodology will lead to an inadequate theology. Many of the methods developed to study other disciplines are not suited for theology—at least not an evangelical theology. Those that are adaptable must be stripped of their antisupernatural and unorthodox presuppositions.

An adequate method for evangelical theology includes many steps that employ various parts of other methodologies. This is not an eclectic method; rather, it is a comprehensive methodology consistent with the corpus of evangelical theology. Used as individual methods they are inadequate, but employed as part of a total methodology, they serve an important function. For example, assuming that all truth comes from the inductive method is fruitless; nevertheless, induction (step 1) is an important element in discovering the truth of God’s revelation both in nature and in Scripture.

SOURCES

Aristotle. Posterior Analytics.

———. Prior Analytics.

———. Topics.

Behe, Michael. Darwin’s Black Box.

Butler, Joseph. Analogy in Religion.

Carnell, Edward J. An Introduction to Christian Apologetics.

Dewey, John. A Common Faith.

———. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.

Descartes, René. Discourse on Method.

———. Meditations.

Frazer, James. The Golden Bough.

Geisler, Norman, and Peter Bocchino. Unshakable Foundations.

Gilson, Étienne. The Unity of Philosophical Experience.

James, William. Pragmatism.

Johnson, Philip. Darwin on Trial.

Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason.

Mbiti, J. S. African Religion and Philosophy.

Meuller, G. E. “The Hegel Legend of Thesis, Antithesis-Synthesis” in Journal of History of Ideas 19, no. 3 (1958).

Mill, John Stuart. Three Essays on Religion.

Mossner, E. C. Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason.

Pierce, Charles Sanders. Popular Science Monthly (1878).

Plato. Meno.

Ramsey, Ian. Models and Metaphors.

Rurak, James. “Butler’s Analogy: A Still Interesting Synthesis of Reason and Revelation” in Anglican Theological Review (October 1980).

Schmidt, W. High Gods in North America.

Spinoza, Benedict. Ethics.

———. A Theological-Political Treatise.

Van Til, Cornelius. In Defense of the Faith.

Veath, Henry. Two Logics.

1 As an illustration, the necessary condition for leaves burning is that they be dry, but the sufficient condition is a fire that can ignite them.

2 A vicious circle is the fallacy of begging the question. A benign circle is more of a spiral by which one’s understanding is continually enriched by subsequent understanding.

3 See Norman Geisler and Peter Bocchino, Unshakable Foundations; Michael Behe, Darwin’s Black Box; and Philip Johnson, Darwin on Trial.

4 Some would add: (6) What were the purposes for which it was said (or done)? While especially stated (not surmised), purpose is illustrative of meaning; it is not determinative of meaning (see chapter 10).

5 Theanthropic means “partaking of the natures of God and man” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).

6 Modalism is “the theological doctrine that the members of the Trinity are not three distinct persons but rather three modes or forms of activity (the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) under which God manifests himself” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).

Geisler, N. L. 2002. Systematic theology, volume one: Introduction, Bible (205). Bethany House Publishers: Minneapolis, MN

METHOD: THE METHODOLOGICAL PRECONDITION

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