LANGUAGE: THE LINGUISTIC PRECONDITION
Evangelicals believe that the Bible is God’s Word in human words; therefore, another precondition for doing evangelical theology is the belief that finite human language is capable of meaningfully expressing the nature of the infinite God of Christian theism, which is displayed in both general and special revelation.
THREE BASIC ALTERNATIVES
Evangelicals reject any alternative that denies it is possible to speak meaningfully about God. This includes views such as are embraced by many atheists, agnostics, skeptics, and even religious mystics and existentialists.
Logically, there are only three possible views with regard to God-talk:
(1) It is equivocal (totally different from the way God actually is).
(2) It is univocal (totally the same as God actually is).
(3) It is analogous (similar to the way God actually is).
Evangelicals have defended versions of both univocal and analogical religious language; some have combined the two views. But, as we shall see, both equivocal and univocal God-talk have serious problems: the former leads to self-defeating skepticism, and the latter to an unacceptable dogmatism. We are left, then, with some form of analogy by which God communicates with us.
Equivocal God-Talk
Equivocal God-talk leaves us in total ignorance about God. At best, one can only feel, intuit, or sense God in some experiential way, but no human expressions can describe what it is that is being experienced. Evangelical theology rejects this alternative for several reasons.
First, it is self-defeating, since it affirms with human language about God that we cannot affirm anything about God. Religious mystics certainly write books about God. In brief, any attempt to express the equivocal view about God implies that some non-equivocal language about God is possible.
Second, the Bible declares that God can be described in human language. Indeed, Scripture as a whole is an attempt to inform us about God and to evoke a response from us. Even the colorful, figurative, and metaphorical language of the Bible implies a literal understanding beneath the nonliteral expressions, for one cannot even understand that a figure of speech (e.g., God has arms) is not literal unless he knows what is literally true (viz., that He is pure Spirit [John 4:24]).
Third, there is a continual and consistent tradition in orthodox theology from the earliest centuries to the present that assumes human language can express truth about the transcendent God. This is manifest in the great confessions, creeds, and councils of the Christian church (see Schaff, CC), to say nothing of all the theological treatises of the great Fathers of the church from the second century to the present.
Univocal God-Talk
Some Christian thinkers like John Duns Scotus (1266–1308), following Plato and Augustine, have argued that God-talk is univocal. While there is an important element of truth in this view (see below), it was severely criticized by Thomas Aquinas and has come in for hard times in contemporary thought—with good reason.
A more detailed discussion is found later, but here the two most basic problems are noted. First, how can our understanding of God be entirely the same as God’s (i.e., univocal)? Our understanding and expressions are finite, and God’s are infinite, and there is an infinite gulf between finite and infinite. As transcendent, God is not only beyond our limited understanding, but He is also beyond our finite expressions.
Second, the Bible makes it clear that God is far above our thoughts and words. As the prophet Isaiah aptly put it, “’For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways,’ ” declares the Lord. “’As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts’ ” (Isa. 55:8–9). For a mortal human being to know as God knows, he would have to be God, since only God knows infinitely.
Analogous God-Talk
It appears, then, that the only viable alternative to avoid self-defeating skepticism on the one hand and self-deifying dogmatism on the other is to demonstrate that legitimate God-talk is analogous to the way God actually is. That is to say, language about God is neither equivocal (totally different) nor univocal (totally the same), but is similar (analogous) to the way God truly exists.
TWO ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP A POSITIVE GOD-TALK
There are two basic attempts to develop a positive God-talk. One is by way of univocal language and the other by way of analogical language. The former was expounded by John Duns Scotus, and the latter by Thomas Aquinas. Although the positions seem to be mutually exclusive, their complementarity provides a crucial insight into the nature of religious language.
The Scotistic Insistence on Univocal Concepts
John Duns Scotus made one point unmistakably clear: There can be no meaningful positive talk about God unless at the basis of it univocal concepts are involved, for equivocal or analogical concepts leave one in skepticism. Scotus’s argument may be summarized in two parts: first, the impossibility of analogous concepts; and second, the necessity of univocal concepts.
The Impossibility of Analogous Concepts of God
Henry of Ghent (c.1217–1293), a contemporary of Scotus, defended what he called an “analogous concept of being.” According to Henry, God is known in terms of a universal concept, which while conceived of as though it were only one notion (because of its close resemblance to the concepts within it), in reality the concepts (of God and humans) are diverse. Therefore, the concept of being common to both God and creatures is really not one concept but two, yet because of the similarities in these two concepts, the mind fails to distinguish between them, as two distant objects tend to fuse before the eye. This dual concept is what Henry calls analogous (Scotus, PW, 20–21, 180–81).
Scotus strongly objected to Henry’s analogous concept. First, Scotus reminded Henry that if God and creatures are distinguished only by a negation (that is, by what we don’t know about God), then there is no distinction at all, for “there is no need to make the distinction that we cannot know what God is; we can only know what He is not. For every denial is intelligible only in terms of some affirmation.”
Second, Scotus noted that since an analogous concept is really two different concepts, it is actually equivocal, for either there is at the base of these two concepts one univocal concept from which they draw their common meaning or else they are two entirely different concepts. If the former, then there must be a univocal concept at the basis of the so-called analogous concept, as whatever is predicated of God and creatures by way of an equivocal concept must mean two entirely different things. Therefore, if concepts of God truly were analogous, they would be equivocal (ibid., 18, 22–23). If the latter, then they are equivocal, at any rate. According to Scotus, in either event, then, an analogous concept tells us nothing about God.
The Necessity of Univocal Concepts of God
In the outlook of Scotus, language about God is not equivocal or analogical; it is univocal, and hence it evades the alternative of skepticism. By univocal Scotus means that which “possesses sufficient unity in itself, so that to affirm and deny it of one and the same thing would be a contradiction. It also has sufficient unity to serve as the middle terms of a syllogism.” Scotus gives four arguments to support his contention that concepts must be univocally understood of both God and man (ibid., 23).
First, “every intellect that is certain about one concept, but dubious about others, has … another concept of which it is certain.” Scotus offered proof of this premise as follows: “One and the same concept cannot be both certain and dubious, or [else] there is no concept at all, and consequently no certitude about any concept.” The other premise is this: “Every philosopher was certain that what he postulated as a first principle was a being.… Yet he was not certain whether it was created or an uncreated being, whether it was first or not first.” The reason for this is, “Someone perceiving the disagreement among philosophers can still be certain that any of the things that they have acclaimed as the first principle has being [e.g., fire, water].”
Scotus dismissed the possibility that the different philosophers had different concepts of being. He said,
By such an evasion all possibility of proving the unity of any concept would be destroyed. The fact of great similarity plus the irreducible simplicity of all the concepts argue that ultimately they are one. Further, if there were two different formal concepts, one would have to conclude that there were two formally opposed first principles of being (ibid., 23–25).
In summation, if the intellect can be certain about the concept of being without knowing whether it refers to created or uncreated being, and if it is necessary to have a univocal concept in order to be certain about anything, then we must have a univocal concept of God’s being. Otherwise, we would have no knowledge at all of God, which is contrary to both faith and philosophy.
Second, the concepts used of God must be univocally understood because:
No object will produce a simple and proper concept of itself and a simple and proper concept of another object, unless it contains this second object essentially or virtually. No created object, however, contains Uncreated essentially or virtually.… Therefore, it produces no simple and proper concept of the “uncreated” at all. But no concept could arise in virtue of the active intellect and the sense image [which are the way all created objects are understood in this life] that is not univocal but only analogous with, or wholly other than, what is revealed in the sense image. Hence, it would be impossible to have any natural knowledge of God unless it is known via univocal concepts. But we do have natural knowledge of God. Therefore, this knowledge must come by way of univocal concepts (ibid., 25–26).
Third, our concept of God must be univocal, since it is wrong to argue as follows.
The proper concept of any subject provides sufficient ground for concluding to everything conceivable which necessarily inheres in that subject. But we have no concept of God … that enables us to know every necessary attribute which we conceive of Him, as is evident from the fact of the Trinity, and other necessary attributes that we know by faith.
Therefore, we have no proper concept of God.
Scotus insists that this is patently false, as revelation teaches us much about God. Hence, we must have at least some concept that is properly (i.e., univocally) applicable to Him (ibid., 26).
Fourth,
Either some pure perfection has a common meaning as applied to God and creatures or not. If not, it is either because its meaning does not apply formally to God at all (which is inadmissible), or else it has a meaning that is wholly proper to God [and not to creatures].… But this latter alternative is contrary to the truth affirmed by Anselm that “we first know something to be a pure perfection and secondly we attribute this perfection to God” (Anselm, M, appendix).
Furthermore, if pure perfections were found only in God, there would be no such perfections among creatures. The proper metaphysical approach is to begin with a concept (such as will or intellect) and, finding that it contains no imperfection, “attribute [it] to God—but in a most perfect degree.” Finally,
If you maintain that this is not true, but that the formal concept of what pertains to God is another notion of anything found in creatures, nothing at all can be inferred about God, for the notion of what is in each is wholly different (ibid., 27–28).
Beneath these four arguments for univocity is one fundamental contention: If there is no univocity in our concepts about God, then there is no certainty in our knowledge about God, for again, “one and the same concept cannot be both certain and dubious. Therefore, either there is another concept [which is certain], or there is no concept at all, and consequently no certitude about any concept.” In other words, if there is no univocal basis for meaning, then one is forced to an infinite regress of non-univocal concepts in search for the one elusive univocal concept by which the non-univocal ambiguity can be resolved. “For every intellect that is certain about one concept, but dubious about others has, in addition to the concept about which it is in doubt, another concept about which it is certain.” Hence, Scotus concluded, “I say that God is conceived … in some concept univocal to Himself and to a creature” (ibid., 23).
In summation, there are only three alternatives in our concepts about God. Either the concepts of God are understood equivocally (i.e., in a totally different sense), in which case we know nothing about God; or they are understood analogically (i.e., with partly the same but partly different meaning), in which case, at any rate, we must have some univocal concept of God enabling us to know which part of the analogous concept applies to God and which does not apply to Him; or they are understood univocally (i.e., having totally the same meaning) in the first place. Therefore, either there are univocal concepts about God or else we know nothing about God. There must be either univocity or skepticism.
It would appear that Scotus made his point. Equivocal God-talk says nothing about God, and analogical God-talk seems to work only if there is in the analogy an identifiable univocal element. If there is no such identifiable univocal element, the concept is at best ambiguous and at worst equivocal. If it is ambiguous, it can be clarified only in terms of a non-ambiguous univocal concept. But if there is an identifiable univocal element in the analogy, then analogy is actually a form of univocal understanding of God, for it involves an identifiable univocal concept that can be applied to Him without change, along with the other elements of the combined analogous statement that cannot be applied to God. In brief, analogy either has a univocal element in it or it does not. If it does not, it is ultimately equivocal talk, which leaves us in skepticism about God. On the other hand, if analogy does have a univocal element in it, then it really contains a univocal concept after all, which proves some true knowledge about God.
This same argument for the necessity of a univocal concept has been repeated by many evangelicals. See, for example, W. G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology (1:89ff.), and Stuart Hackett, The Resurrection of Theism (127–30).
The Thomistic Defense of Analogous Predication (Affirmation)
Thomas Aquinas was familiar with and flatly rejected the insistence on univocal God-talk. He wrote, “It is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and a creature” (Aquinas, OPG, 7.7, body).
Rejection of Univocal Predication
Aquinas’s rejection of univocal predication of God involves two important facts: First, there cannot be a one-to-one understanding between the finite minds of humanity and the infinite Mind of God. Second, it is necessary to admit that there is a negative element in our knowledge of God—that is, we know what God is not (e.g., He is not finite).
Arguments Against Univocal Predication
In the Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas offered six arguments against univocal predication of God and creatures. Several crucial ones are noted (SCG, 1.32).
First, only those effects that receive from their cause the specific form of that cause can receive a univocal predication of that form of them and of God. But “the forms of the things God has made do not measure up to a specific likeness of the divine power.” All creatures are “in a divided and particular way that which in Him is found in a simple and universal way.” So “it is evident that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things.” [Arguments 2 and 3 are omitted here.]
Fourth, “What is predicated of many things univocally is simpler than both of them, at least in concept. Now, there can be nothing simpler than God either in reality or in concept. Nothing, therefore, is predicated univocally of God and other things.” Since the one thing in common is always simpler than the many things having it in common, any univocal predication of God and others would have to be simpler than God, which is impossible.
Fifth, “Everything that is predicated univocally of many things belongs through participation to each of the things of which it is predicated.… But nothing is said of God by participation.… Nothing, therefore, can be predicated of God and other things” in a univocal way. In short, God does not participate in anything; rather, all things participate in Him. If there were a common univocal predication in which God participated, then this something would be more ultimate than God.
Sixth, “Nothing is predicated of God and creatures as though they were in the same order, but rather, according to priority and posteriority.” This is true because God is Being essentially, and all other things have being only by participation in God. However, “what is predicated of some things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated univocally,” for the prior possesses the characteristic essentially and the posterior possesses it only by participation in the prior. “It is impossible, therefore, that anything be predicated univocally of God and other things.”
In the Summa Theologica (1.13.5) Aquinas rests his case against univocal predication on the first argument from Summa Contra Gentiles: “All perfections existing in creatures dividedly and multiply preexist in God unitedly.” Therefore, any perfection applied to God signifies God’s very essence; for example, creatures have wisdom but God is wisdom. “Hence it is evident that the term wise is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same applies to other terms. Hence, no name is predicated univocally of God and other creatures.”
Implied in Aquinas’s objection to univocal predication is another argument, one with which he did agree:
God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the difference of some creatures [from each other makes any univocal predication of them impossible], as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore, much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures.
In essence, then, the argument for analogous God-talk is this: Between an infinitely perfect Being and finitely perfect beings there is an infinite difference in perfection (certainly an infinite differs from a finite in more than a finite way). Also, where there is an infinite difference in perfection there cannot be a univocal predication. A given perfection cannot mean totally the same thing as applied to God and creatures, for God and creatures are separated by an infinite degree of perfection. As Aquinas put it elsewhere, “Every effect of a univocal agent is adequate to the agent’s power: and no creature being finite, can be adequate to the power of the first agent which is infinite” (OPG, 7.7).
What is true of power is likewise true of any other perfection. An infinitely perfect Cause produced finitely perfect effects, and the perfections found in these effects cannot be predicated in exactly the same manner (i.e., univocally) as God.
The Need for the Via Negativa
At this point the need for the via negativa (the way of negation) becomes apparent. As Plotinus correctly observed, God cannot possess perfections the way created things possess them; in this sense God does “produce what he does not possess” (see Plotinus, E, 5.3.14–15), because God doesn’t really possess the finite characteristics found in His creation. God does not have being and wisdom; God is being and wisdom. Hence, whatever limitations are found in creaturely perfections must be completely negated of God, since He is unlimited (infinite) in His being.
It is for this reason that univocal predication must be rejected, for it destroys the distance between God and creatures necessitated by the different kinds of beings that they are. God is an infinitely perfect Being, and all other beings are only finitely perfect. If any attribute were predicated in the same way (i.e., univocally) of both God and creatures, then it would either imply the finitude of God or else the infinitude of creatures. As long as God is viewed as infinitely perfect, nothing that is finitely perfect can be applied to God without qualifications. The proponents of negative theology appreciated the necessity for these qualifications in order to preserve God’s transcendence. When a perfection taken from the finite world is applied to God, it must be applied to God infinitely, since He is an infinite Being. Unless the finite conditions of perfection can be negated, there is no way it can be appropriately applied to an infinite Being.
The Rejection of Equivocal Predication
However, the via negativa alone will not suffice, for if all meaning is negated when one removes the finite connotations of a term, he is speaking mere equivocations. Unless there is some common meaning that applies to both God and creatures, the meaning it has as applied to creatures is totally different from the meaning it has as applied to God. And a totally different meaning is an equivocation that leaves us in a state of skepticism about God.
Aquinas agrees with Scotus that equivocal language deprives one of any knowledge of God. Although Aquinas refers to God as an “equivocal Cause” (i.e., of a different order than finite causes), he offers several arguments against equivocal prediction of that Cause (SCG, 1.33).
First, in equivocals, “it is entirely accidental that one name is applied to diverse things: The application of the name to one of them does not signify that it has an order to the other.” But “this is not the situation with names said of God and creatures, since we note in the community of such names the order of cause and effect.… It is not, therefore, in the manner of pure equivocation that something is predicated of God and other things.” That is, terms with the same spelling but different meaning [as we have seen with “bark,” of a tree or a dog] are equivocals by chance. Yet where one thing is the cause of the other, there is no mere chance connection between the terms expressing these things, but there is an order of reference that signifies that one is related to the other.
Second, “Where there is pure equivocation, there is not likeness in things themselves; there is only a unity of a name. But … there is a certain mode of likeness of things to God. It remains, then, that names are not said of God in a purely equivocal way.” The minor premise was supported by a preceding article (SCG 1.29), where Aquinas argued, “Some likeness must be found between them [cause and effect], since it belongs to the nature of action that an agent produce its like, since each thing acts according as it is in act.” The similarity of Creator and creature is supported, too, by Holy Scripture, which says that God made man in His image and likeness (Gen. 1:27).
Third, “When one name is predicated of several things in a purely equivocal way, we cannot from one of them be led to the knowledge of another.…” But “from what we find in other things, we do arrive at a knowledge of divine things, as is evident from what we have said.” Therefore, “such names are not said of God and other things in a purely equivocal way.” That is to say, unless there is some likeness between creatures and God, we could never rise, as we do, from a knowledge of created things to a knowledge of God.
Fourth, “Equivocation in a name impedes the progress of reasoning,” and “if nothing was said of God and creatures except in a purely equivocal way, no reasoning proceeding from creatures to God would take place. But the contrary is evident from all those who have spoken about God.” That is to say, not only would equivocation make knowledge of God impossible (as the third argument contends) but it would also impede any reasoning about God built on knowledge gained from the world, in which reasoning all theologians engage.
Fifth, “It is also a fact that a name is predicated of some being uselessly, unless through that name we understand something of the being. But if names are said of God and creatures in a purely equivocal way, we understand nothing of God through those names,” for “the meanings of those names are known to us solely to the extent that they are said of creatures. In vain, therefore, would it be said or proved of God that He is a being, good, or the like.”
Sixth, even if non-equivocal names tell us only what God is not, at least they agree in what they deny of God. A totally equivocal denial of God would be the same as affirming the same thing that is being denied of God. Hence, even negations of God cannot be equivocal.
In a later work, Aquinas rests the case against equivocal predication on one central argument: Equivocal predication is impossible “because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing at all could be known or demonstrated about God” (ST, 1.13.5). It is patently false that we know nothing about God; hence, there must be some non-equivocal predications about God. For instance, we know things about Him from both special revelation in the Bible and general revelation in nature (Rom. 1:19–20).
Analogical Predication: The Only Alternative
If terms can be applied to God neither univocally nor equivocally, then they must be predicated of Him analogically. In Aquinas’s own words,
This name God … is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason—univocal names have absolutely the same meaning, while equivocal names have absolutely diverse meanings; whereas analogical, a name taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same name taken in other significations. (ST, 1.13.10.)
Therefore, terms denoting perfections taken from creatures can be applied to God only in an analogous way:
We can name God only from creatures. Hence, whatever is said of God and creatures is said according as there is some relation of the creature to God as to its principal cause, wherein all the perfections preexist excellently.
Further,
This mode of communication [i.e., analogy] is a means between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as in univocals, one and the same [in its application]; yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but the name which is used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing. (ST, 1.13.5.)
For example, God is named Good because He is the Cause of goodness. The Cause is Good and hence when it causes goodness in something else it communicates of what it is to what its creature has by created participation. The causal connection between Creator and creature cannot be totally unlike its Creator, since every perfection it possesses it has acquired from Him.
There is another fundamental argument for analogy that takes us back to the dilemma of Parmenides the monist1 (see chapter 2): If there is more than one being in the universe, these beings must differ by either being or nonbeing. But they cannot differ by nonbeing for that is nothing, and to differ by nothing is not to differ at all. Neither can things differ by being, for that is the very respect in which they are identical, and they cannot differ in the very respect in which they are identical. Hence, there cannot be more than one being in the universe. Thus there is only one being—that is, monism. Now there are only two horns to this dilemma.
Either one’s principle of differentiation is inside of being or it is outside of being. If outside, then things do not differ in being; they are identical in being, and monism is true. The only way to maintain a pluralism essential to theism is to insist that things differ in their very being. Yet how can they differ by what they have in common? The answer is that they cannot, if being is univocal. But it isn’t.
Since being is used analogously between God and creatures, being can be predicated of God and creatures only in an analogous way. Otherwise, we end in monism. In short, analogy of being (and predication) is the only salvation from monism and from skepticism. It is the only alternative to monism, since if beings cannot differ there can be only one being. It is the salvation from skepticism, because unless there is a similarity in being, there can be no knowledge of infinite Being derived from finite beings.
A POSITIVE SYNTHESIS OF UNIVOCAL CONCEPTS AND ANALOGICAL PREDICATION
One apparent contradiction has not yet been resolved. Scotus demonstrated that analogous concepts would not save one from skepticism; only univocal concepts can guarantee knowledge of God. But if Aquinas rejects univocal predication, how then can he avoid skepticism, for God possesses the common perfection infinitely, and creatures possess it only finitely.
Univocal Concepts But Analogical Predication
The answer and reconciliation between scotism and thomism lies in the distinction between a concept and a predication. Scotus was right that the concept applied to both God and man must be univocally understood, but Aquinas was correct in arguing that this concept must be analogically affirmed of God and creatures.2 That is, the definition of the attribute applicable to both God and creatures must be the same, but the application of it differs, for in the one case (God’s) it is applied without limits, while in the other (humankind’s) it is predicated with limitations.
God, for instance, is good infinitely; man is good only finitely. Good may be defined in the same way for both, for example, as “that which is desired for its own sake.” But God is to be desired for His own sake absolutely, whereas creatures are to be desired for their own sakes only relatively. Likewise, being may be defined univocally as “that which is,” but this univocal concept is predicated of God and creatures in an analogous way. God is “that which is” infinitely; a creature is “that which is” only finitely. Or, more properly, God is Existence and creatures merely have existence.
This distinction has not always been fully appreciated by thomists, but in more recent works on analogy they have come to recognize its validity. Armand Maurer stated the difference clearly: “It is not generally realized that St. Thomas’s doctrine of analogy is above all a doctrine of the judgment of analogy, and not of the analogy of concept.…” (“STAG” in NS, 143). Generic concepts are univocal when abstracted, but analogical when asserted of different things, as man and dog are equally animal but are not equal animals. Animal is defined the same way (say, as “a sentient being”), but animality is predicated differently of Fido and of Socrates (c. 470–399 b.c.). (Socrates possesses animality in a higher sense than Fido does.) Likewise, both the flower and God are said to be beautiful, but God is beautiful in an infinitely higher sense than flowers are.3
While this tells us nothing directly about the similarity between God and creation, it does inform us about the difference between an infinite being and a finite being. For if beauty means “that which, being seen, pleases,” then the pleasure of the beatific vision of God is infinitely greater than the pleasure of viewing a flower. In brief, Scotus was correct in insisting that our concepts must be univocally understood and defined. But Aquinas was right in insisting that any concept drawn from the finite world must be predicated of God in an analogous way.
Finite Concepts and Predication About the Infinite
Aquinas recognized that all concepts are finite; they are limited by the very finite circumstances in which they arise (ST, 1.84.1–8). People never derive infinite concepts from sensory experience:
Since God infinitely exceeds the power of our intellect, any form we conceive cannot completely represent the divine essence, but merely has in some small measure an imitation of it. (OT, 2.1, body.)
This is why Aquinas said God “is one in reality and many things logically” (OPG, 7.6, body), for the simple essence of God is not known by any concept of it but only by way of many predications about it.
No concept taken from creation is adequate to express the essence of divinity, yet many things can be affirmed of the essence of God. We cannot know the substance of God, but we can predicate many substantive things about God (ST, 1.12.4; 1.13.2).
The Mode of Signification Differs From What Is Signified
How can univocally understood finite concepts be predicated analogously of God without losing their meaning? Does not a limited concept lose all of its meaning when it is applied without limits to an infinite Being? Aquinas answered this question by making a distinction between the (unlimited) thing signified and the (limited) mode of signification. The mode in which concepts are conceived is always finite for human beings, but what these concepts signify is not necessarily finite (Aquinas, SCG, 1.29).
In fact,
Since every perfection of creatures is to be found in God, albeit in another and more eminent way, whatever terms denote perfections absolutely and without any defect whatever, are predicated of God and other things; for instance, goodness, wisdom, and so forth.
On the other hand,
Any term that denotes such like perfections together with a mode proper to creatures, cannot be said of God except by similitude and metaphor (ibid., 1.29).
Some terms by their very denotation cannot be applied to an unlimited Being. Other terms, however, do not necessarily denote what is limited, even though they are conceived in finite concepts. For instance, there is nothing essentially limited about the term “being” (that which is) or “goodness” (that which is desired for its own sake) or “beauty” (that which, being seen, pleases). Hence, these terms may be predicated of God metaphysically (i.e., actually) and not merely metaphorically (i.e., symbolically). Such terms do not lose their content, because they retain the same univocal definition. Neither do these terms carry with them the necessary implications of finitude, because they are not applied to God univocally (i.e., in the same way they are applied to creatures). They are predicated analogically, meaning neither identically nor in a totally different way.
The Need for Intrinsic Analogy Based on Causality
How is it known that God must be (in an infinitely perfect way) what these terms denote? Because God is the cause of these perfections in a mode appropriate to the effects they cause. An infinitely perfect God communicated perfections to His creatures in a finitely perfect manner. Hence, even though there is an infinite difference in perfection between God and creatures, there is nevertheless not a total lack of similarity. The created sequents are similar to their creative Source, because the creature must bear some similarity to its Creator.
It could be argued that metaphysics, let alone natural theology, is impossible apart from having first established the analogical nature of religious language. After all, such terms as “First Cause” or “Creator of the Universe” must be understood analogically. But then it would appear that we are caught in a vicious circle, since, as we shall see, analogy is dependent on the reality of the metaphysical relationship between God and the world. Thus natural theology works because of analogy, and analogy works because of natural theology. Each grounds the other, which means that neither is grounded.
Can this progression be avoided? Yes, because even though both sides are dependent on each other, the dependencies are of two different kinds. Thus, there is no vicious circularity. In natural theology we establish certain conclusions by using religious language, which then turns out to be analogical. But we did not have to know that analogy was at work. The language was analogical, whether we were ever cognizant of that fact or not. When we’re dealing with analogy, we are in a sense merely discovering what has been true of the nature of our language all along. It is only in explaining how this language works that we need to make reference to metaphysical truths. Niels C. Nielsen Jr. has elaborated the ontological requisites for analogy, particularly in theological contexts (Nielsen, AKG).
The Causal Basis for Analogy Between God and Creatures
Aquinas rested the case for a similarity between God and creatures in the causal relation. Each of the first four ways of proving God’s existence is clearly based on causality. (Causality is also implied in the fifth way.) Even the very platonic appearance of the fourth way imports causality to complete the argument (ST, 1.2.3), and once it is shown by causality that God is, then Aquinas can demonstrate what God is from the analogy implied in this causal relation. Just how often Aquinas makes explicit reference to causality as the basis for analogy will become apparent in the following quotations. The important question here is, “What kind of causality is the basis for the similarity between God and creatures?” The most helpful work on Aquinas’s doctrine at this point is the classic by Battista Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology. The analysis here follows his.
(1) Analogy is based in intrinsic causality. Unlike Maimonides (1135–1204) and the neoplatonists, Aquinas held to an intrinsic causal relationship between God and creation. An extrinsic causal relationship is such that only one thing possesses the characteristic properly—the other thing possesses the characteristic improperly, by virtue of a causal relation to it. To illustrate, food is called healthy only because it causes health in a body, but, properly speaking, only organisms are healthy. And God is called good because He causes goodness, not because He is good. Not so with the causal relation between God and the world; this is an intrinsic relation where both God and creatures possess the perfections properly, only each according to its own mode of being. God must be good because He causes goodness; He must be Existence because He causes things to exist, and so on. There is an intrinsic causal connection and, therefore, analogy between the Cause and its effects (Aquinas, ST, 1.13.5; SCG, 1.29–30).
(2) Analogy is based on efficient causality. God is the producing Cause of all that exists, not merely the purposing (final) Cause of neoplatonic philosophy. For Aquinas, God brought the world into being from nothing. The world did not come about by a creation flowing from it. The theistic God is the Cause of the world’s being, not merely of its form. God created the world; He did not simply make it out of matter that was already there. In brief, creation is ex nihilo, not ex materia. God is the efficient cause of the very being of the world, for, wrote Aquinas,
Everything that, in any way whatever is, must needs be from that to which nothing else is the cause of being.… Therefore, from Him is everything that in any way whatever is. (ST, 2.15.2.)
Elsewhere he wrote,
It belongs to a thing to have an efficient cause according as it has being … the reason why an efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect cannot be, but because the effect would not be if the cause were not. (ST, 1.44.1, 2, and 3.)
(3) Analogy is based on essential causality. It is clear from the foregoing that God is the essential (per se) Cause of creation and not merely an accidental (per accidens) cause of it; that is, God causes the very being of the world and not merely its becoming. Further, essential causes generate their own kind. For instance, musicians give birth to non-musicians (per accidens), but humans generate only humans (per se). Hence, when beings are created, it is by virtue of an essential causal relationship with their Creator. Only Being gives rise to being. Aquinas wrote,
Some likeness must be found between them [i.e., between effects and their cause], since it belongs to the nature of action that an agent produces its like, since each thing acts according as it is in act. The form of the effect, therefore, is certainly found in some measure in a transcending cause, but according to another mode and in another way. (SCG, 1.29.2.)
Only that which exists can communicate existence to another. Nothing cannot cause something, and since all caused existence is communicated to it by its cause, there must be some essential similarity in existence between this existing effect and its cause.
(4) Analogy is based on principal, not instrumental, causality. Effects resemble their primary causes but not necessarily their instrumental causes. To illustrate, the pen is the instrumental cause of the exam, and the student is the principal cause of it. Only the student’s mind resembles the exam; the pen does not. The exam does reflect the thoughts of the student, even though it is not like the pen. In like manner, the perfections of the world resemble their principal Cause (God) but not necessarily their instrumental causes.
In summation, the analogy between creature and Creator, based on causality, is secured only because God is the principal, intrinsic, essential, efficient Cause of the being and perfections of the world. In any other kind of causal relationship an analogical similarity would not necessarily follow, but in an analogy of being similarity must follow, for Being communicates only being, and perfections or kinds of being do not arise from an imperfect being. Existence produces only after its kind, namely, other existences.
ANALOGOUS LANGUAGE IN GOD’S REVELATION
Evangelical theology affirms that God has two great revelations: special revelation in the Bible and general revelation in nature. Both involve an analogous understanding of God.
Analogous Language and Special Revelation (Scripture)
The Bible is emphatic about two things in this connection. First, God is beyond our thoughts and concepts, even the best of them (cf. Rom. 11:33). God is infinite and our concepts are finite, and no finite concept can capture the infinite. It is also clear in Scripture that God goes infinitely beyond the puny ability of human concepts to convey His ineffable essence. Paul said, “Now we see as in a mirror, dimly” (1 Cor. 13:12 nkjv). John said of mortal man in this life, “No one has seen God at any time” (John 1:18 nkjv).
Second, human language is adequate for expressing the attributes of God, for in spite of the infinite difference between God and creatures, there is not a total lack of similarity, since the effect always resembles its efficient Cause in some way.
But if God is both adequately expressed in and yet infinitely more than human language—even inspired language—can express, then at best the language of Scripture is only analogous; i.e., no term taken from human experience—and that is where all biblical terms come from—can do any more than tell us what God is like. None of them can express comprehensively what God really is. Religious language at best can make valid predications of God’s essence, but it can never express His essence fully.
Analogous Language and General Revelation (Nature)
There are two basic reasons that statements made about God on the basis of general revelation are merely analogous. First, we return to the matter of causality already mentioned. The arguments for God’s existence are arguments from effect to the efficient Cause of their being (Aquinas, ST, la.2.3). Since the effects get their actuality from God (who is Pure Actuality), they must be similar to Him, for Act communicates act; Actuality produces actualities (see Mondin, PAPCT, all).
Second, Pure Act (God) cannot create another Pure Act. Pure Act is uncreated, and it is impossible to create an uncreated Being. But if uncreated Act cannot create another Pure Actuality, then it must create an actuality with potentiality (Aquinas, OBE, all). Thus, every created being must be composed of actuality and potentiality. All created beings have actuality because they actually exist, and they have potentiality because they have the potential not to exist.
Anything that comes into existence can pass out of existence. But if all created beings have a potential that limits their existence, then they are limited kinds of existences, and their uncreated Cause is an unlimited kind of existence. Thus, there must be a difference between creatures and their Creator. They have limitations (potency), and He does not. It follows, then, that when making statements about God based on what He has revealed of Himself in His creation, there is one big proviso—God is not like His creation in its potentialities but only in its actuality. This is called the way of negation (via negativa). All adequate God-talk must have this negative element in it, a conclusion that emerges from the very nature of the proofs for His existence.
First, it was demonstrated that He is a Cause. This is the positive element of similarity in the analogy between God and creatures. Whatever actuality (not potentiality) there is in the creatures, is actually like the Actuality that gave it to them.
Second, it was concluded that He was an uncaused kind of Cause (the negative element in the analogy). Uncaused means not-caused; it is a negative term. The same is true of the other attributes of God that emerged from the argument for His existence, for, as Aquinas said, “No creature, being finite, can be adequate to the first agent which is infinite” (SCG, 7.7).
God is the infinite cause of all finite existence. But in-finite means not-finite; it too is a negation. God is the eternal, that is, the not-terminal or not-temporal Cause. Some of the negations are not immediately obvious from the etymology of the term, but they are negative nonetheless. God is the simple Source of all complex being; simple here really means non-complex.
The same is true of the attribute of necessity. We know creatures are contingent, but by “necessary” we simply mean that God is not contingent. We have no positive concepts in our experience that can express the transcendent dimension of God’s unlimited metaphysical characteristics. Therefore, the analogy with which we speak of God will always contain an element of negation. The creature is like God because Act communicates act, but it is unlike God because it has a limiting potentiality that God does not have; He is Pure Actuality.
A RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS AGAINST ANALOGOUS GOD-TALK
Now that we have expounded analogy more completely, we can respond to those objections that are relevant here. Most of these are listed in the works of David Burrell (see APL) and Frederick Ferre (see “A” in Edwards, EP).
(1) Why select some but not all qualities drawn from the world and apply only these to God? Because only some things flow from God’s efficient, essential, principal, and intrinsic causality. As noted above, only these are the perfections found in finite creation that do not necessarily denote what is finite. Hence, since only these concepts do not necessitate a limited application of their meaning, they alone may be appropriately applied to an unlimited Being.
(2) Words divorced from their finite mode or conditions are vacuous or devoid of meaning. This critique ignores the distinction between a concept and its predication. The univocal concept of the words remains the same; only the way in which they are predicated changes. And even in the predication there is a similarity based on the efficient causal relation to God: The meanings of the words goodness, being, and beauty are not emptied when applied to God; the words are merely extended without limits. That is, the perfection indicated by an analogous predication is not negated; rather, it is released from any limiting mode of signification and applied essentially to God. Since the perfection denoted by some terms does not necessarily imply any limitations, there is no reason why perfection cannot be predicated of an unlimited Being.
(3) Analogy rests on the assumption that causality provides a similarity. This is true, but the assumption is justifiable in terms of intrinsic, essential, principal, efficient causality, not in terms of just any kind of causality. Mondin, whose work was not mentioned in Ferre’s criticism of analogy, successfully defends analogy against this charge. Being communicates only being. The Cause of existence cannot produce perfections that it does not “possess.” If God causes goodness, then He must be good. If He causes existence, then He must exist. Otherwise the absurd consequence ensues that God gives what He does not have to give.
Of course, God causes finitude, contingency, and potency, which He does not have. However, these are not perfections, but only the limited conditions under which a creature receives these perfections. After all, an infinite, necessary Being of Pure Actuality cannot make another such Being. Hence, the only kind of beings He can make are finite, contingent beings with potency, and all the actuality and perfections they have, they received from God’s hand—He cannot give any perfection He does not have to give. Hence, there is a solid ontological basis for the similarity between God and creatures in the principle of causality.
(4) Any analogous predication of God as a First Cause involves an infinite regress of meaning to identify the univocal element. This objection holds true for non-univocal concepts, but it is not true of univocal concepts that have analogical predication. It is true that one must have a univocal understanding of what is being predicated of the First Cause, but it does not follow from this that how it is predicated of different kinds of beings must be identical (i.e., univocal). Indeed, if it is known that one Being is infinite and another being is finite, then how a quality is predicated must differ from what is being predicated, for to predicate a perfection in the same way of an infinite Being as it is predicated of a finite being (viz., finitely) is really to predicate it equivocally, since an infinite Being does not have qualities in a finite way. The only way to avoid equivocation when predicating the same perfection of both finite beings and infinite Being is to predicate it differently (i.e., analogously) according to the mode of being that each is.
(5) Even accepting the challengeable metaphysical assumption that there is a similarity among beings, this ontology is not univocally expressible. First, this is not a mere assumption for a theist; it is the only alternative to monism. If there are many beings, there must be an analogical similarity among beings; were this not so, there could be only one being in the universe, for if being means entirely the same thing wherever it is found (univocity), there can be only one being. And if being means something entirely different (equivocality), then once one being is identified, everything else must be totally different, which is nonbeing.
Only if beings are similar but neither totally identical nor totally different, can there be more than one being in the universe. But God is, and I am (and you are); we are all different beings. Hence, there must be an analogy of being that permits all of us to exist (the similarity) and yet allows each of us to exist differently; each of us has being (existence) but each is a different kind of being (essence). In God, existence and essence are identical. Hence, creatures, like God, exist, but the existence of creatures is only analogous to that of God, for God exists essentially, and all else exists dependently.
Second, being is univocally conceived, but it is analogically predicated of God and finite beings. The concept is understood to mean the same thing, namely, being is “that which is or exists.” God exists and a man exists—this they have in common—but God exists infinitely and independently, whereas a man exists only finitely and dependently—this they have in difference. In short, that they both exist is univocally conceived; how they each exist is analogically predicated, for God exists necessarily and creatures exist only contingently; there is a distinct difference in the mode of existence, even though the fact of their existence is the same (i.e., they both exist).
(6) Since Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), the distinction between univocal and equivocal is obsolete, and consequently the notion of analogy is obsolete. To understand this objection we need to remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s proposal for understanding language. Expressions receive their meaning from their use in the context of language games, wherein the chosen rules are used to judge consistency. Each language game is autonomous insofar as there are no universal criteria for meaning. Words that carry over from game to game or words with similar meanings bear family resemblances, but they have no essence, and we can never isolate a core meaning they must share. Thus the rigid designations of language, being univocal or equivocal, break down before this dynamic understanding based on usage.
David Burrell responds to this idea by insisting on equivalence between language in ordinary use on the one hand and univocal language on the other. There may not be any obligatory standard for univocal language, but this fact is irrelevant, since all we mean by “univocal meaning” is language in its ordinary context of meaning. Burrell says, “We can, then, speak of an ordinary or univocal usage so long as we neither insist on its fixity nor count on it as our final norm” (APL, 221). He observes that in this sense even terms such as “disc jockey” or “Girl Friday” may take on a univocal role. Thus the distinction between univocal and equivocal still holds, and analogy is still called for.
(7) A general theory of analogy does not work. Even though Burrell defends a theory of analogy, he is wary of making it too rigid. In particular, he objects to the theory of analogy of proper proportionality as expounded by noted thomistic scholar Cardinal Cajetan (1468–1534). Burrell contends that it simply does not work, no matter how hard we try to fill in all of our parameters. Any formula we try to set up will still leave us with ambiguity and equivocation (ibid., 9–20). The same problem applies to other theories of analogy as well.
First, in response to Burrell, we need to note that the present account does not provide a specific formula for univocal language meaning. Critics of analogy, including Frederick Ferre, usually bring their criticisms down to the conclusion that models of analogy do not ultimately yield only univocal meaning for language as applied to God. Burrell recognizes the nonsense of this, for if correct, there would be no need for analogy at all. Still he faults traditional understandings of analogy for getting involved in complicated systems that do not resolve equivocation.
Second, we can point out that the present account gives no formula for meaning at all. We have stayed away from picking one or more of Cajetan’s categories and locking ourselves into it. One could conceivably argue that what we have in our understanding of Aquinas is the analogy of intrinsic attribution combined with proper proportionality.4 But these are not Aquinas’s categories, and it is well not to be tied to one formal understanding of language mechanisms. Instead, we have presented a primarily metaphysical scheme into which language fits, and this scheme is rooted in reality. As long as analogy is tied to the metaphysics of intrinsic causality, it must work, even if a theoretical language formula does not do the trick. This response should not be far from Burrell’s intentions, either.
The objections to analogous God-talk based on existential causality appear insufficient. Analogy seems to be the only adequate answer to the question of religious language.
All negative God-talk implies some positive knowledge of God. But positive affirmations of God are possible only if there are some univocally understood concepts that can be applied to both creatures and Creator (as Scotus argues). Conversely, since God is infinitely perfect, and creatures are only finitely perfect, no perfection found in the finite world can be applied univocally to both God and creatures (as Aquinas argues). But to apply them equivocally would leave us in skepticism. Hence, whatever perfections found in creation that can be applied to God without limits are predicated analogically. This perfection is understood univocally (in the same manner), but it is predicated analogously (in a similar manner), because to affirm it univocally in a finite way of an infinite Being would not truly be descriptive of the way He is, and to affirm it equivocally in an infinite way would not be descriptive of Him at all. Therefore, a univocal concept drawn from the finite world can be predicated of God only analogically.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The linguistic precondition of evangelical theology is that we do have some positive knowledge of God. Human language, however limited, is capable of making true statements about God and His relation to the world. However, as we have seen, these predications cannot be univocal, since all human concepts (even if univocally understood) cannot apply to an infinite Being without qualification.
With the help of the via negativa, all limitations must be stripped before they are applied to God. Hence, they are affirmed of God in a different (though similar) way from which they are of finite things. John Duns Scotus was right in insisting on univocal concepts, but Thomas Aquinas was correct in insisting that these univocally defined terms must be applied to the transcendent God in an analogical way. In this manner, univocally understood concepts, and their finite connotations, can be applied to (predicated of) God analogically and yield a positive knowledge of God.
SOURCES
Anselm. Monologium.
Burrell, David. Analogy and Philosophical Language.
Ferre, Frederick. “Analogy” in Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Geisler, Norman. Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal.
Geisler, Norman, and W. Corduan. Philosophy of Religion.
Hackett, Stuart. The Resurrection of Theism.
Maurer, Armand. “St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus,” New Scholasticism 29 (April 1955).
McInerny, Ralph. The Logic of Analogy.
Mondin, Battista. The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology.
Nielsen, Niels C. Jr., “Analogy and the Knowledge of God: An Ecumenical Appraisal,” Rice University Studies 60 (1974).
Plotinus. Enneads.
Schaff, Philip. The Creeds of Christendom.
Scotus, John Duns. Philosophical Writings.
Shedd, W. G. T. Dogmatic Theology.
Thomas Aquinas. On Being and Essence.
———. On the Power of God.
———. On Truth.
———. Summa Contra Gentiles.
———. Summa Theologica.
1 Monism holds that all reality is one.
2 This difference between apprehension and judgment is what Aquinas, following Aristotle, referred to as the first and second act of the intellect, respectively.
Aquinas explains the relationship between God and creatures by the analogy of proper proportionality. In this analogy there is a proper relationship between the attribute each thing possesses and their own respective natures. Applied to God, this analogy declares,
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Infinite good |
what |
Finite good |
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Infinite Being |
Finite Being |
4 In other words, the similarity is based on the relation between a cause and its effect, while the difference is depicted by a similarity in relationship.
Geisler, N. L. 2002. Systematic theology, volume one: Introduction, Bible (137). Bethany House Publishers: Minneapolis, MN
