GOD: The Metaphysical Precondition – Geisler, N. L.
THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF METAPHYSICS
The existence of a theistic God is the foundation of Christian theology. If the God of traditional Christian theism does not exist, then logically evangelical theology crumbles. Attempting to construct a systematic evangelical theology without the superstructure of traditional theism is like trying to put together a house without a frame.
The Significance of Metaphysics
Theism is the metaphysical precondition for evangelical theology. It is fundamental to all else, being the framework within which everything else has meaning. It makes no sense to speak about the Bible being the Word of God unless there is a God. Likewise, it is meaningless to talk about Christ as the Son of God unless there is a God who can have a Son. And miracles as special acts of God are not possible unless there is a God who can perform these special acts. In fact everything in evangelical theology is based on this metaphysical foundation of theism.
The Definition of Metaphysics
Metaphysics (lit.: meta, “beyond”; physics, “the physical”) is the study of being or reality. It is the study of being as being, as opposed to studying being as physical (physics) or being as mathematical (mathematics). “Metaphysics” is often used interchangeably with “ontology” (lit.: ontos, “being”; logos, “study of”).
Evangelical Theology Entails Metaphysical Theism
Evangelical theology implies a certain understanding of reality, and there are many views about the world that are incompatible with the claims of evangelical thought. For example, evangelicalism believes that God exists beyond this world (“world” in this case meaning “the whole created universe”) and that He brought this world into existence. It also embraces the belief that this God is one eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect, personal Being.
The name given for this view that God created everything else that exists is theism (God created all), as opposed to atheism (there is no God at all) and pantheism (God is all). All other worldviews (including panentheism, deism, finite godism, and polytheism) are incompatible with theism. If theism is true, all non-theisms are false, since the opposite of true is false (see chapter 8).
THEISM AND THE OPPOSING WORLDVIEWS
There are seven major worldviews, and each one is incompatible with the others. With one exception (pantheism/polytheism), no one can consistently believe in more than one worldview because the central premises of each are opposed by those of the others. Logically, only one worldview can be true; the others must be false. The seven major worldviews are as follows: theism, atheism, pantheism, panentheism, deism, finite godism, and polytheism.1
Theism: An Infinite Personal God Exists Both Beyond and in the Universe
Theism is the worldview that says the physical universe is not all there is. There is an infinite, personal God beyond the universe who created it, sustains it, and can act within it in a supernatural way. He is both “out there” and “in here”; transcendent and immanent.2 This is the view represented by traditional Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
Atheism: No God Exists Beyond or in the Universe
Atheism claims that only the physical universe exists; there is no God anywhere. The universe (or cosmos) is all there is or ever will be, and it is self-sustaining. Some of the more famous atheists were Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Jean-Paul Sartre.
Pantheism: God Is the Universe (the All)
For the pantheist there is no Creator beyond the universe; rather, Creator and creation are two different ways of viewing one reality. God is the universe (or the All) and the universe is God; there is, ultimately, only one reality. Pantheism is represented by certain forms of Hinduism, Zen Buddhism, Christian Science, and most New Age religions.
Before describing the other worldviews, it will be profitable to contrast the three already mentioned: Pantheism affirms God is All, atheism claims there is no God at all, and theism declares that God created all. In pantheism, all is mind. According to atheism, all is matter. But theism asserts that both mind and matter exist. Indeed, while the atheist believes that matter produced mind, the theist believes that Mind (God) made matter.
Pan-en-theism: God Is in the Universe
Panentheism says God is in the universe as a mind is in a body; the universe is God’s “body.” But there is another “pole” to God other than the actual physical universe. (For this reason, panentheism is also called bipolar theism.) This other pole is God’s eternal and infinite potential beyond the actual physical universe. And since panentheism holds that God is in the constant process of changing, it is also known as process theology. This view is represented by Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, Schubert Ogden, John Cobb, and Lewis Ford.
Deism: God Is Beyond the Universe, But Not in It
Deism is like theism minus miracles. It says God is transcendent over the universe but not immanent in the world, certainly not supernaturally. In common with atheism, it holds a naturalistic view of the operation of the world, yet in common with theism, it believes the origin of the world is a Creator. In brief, God made the world, but He does not involve Himself with it. The Creator wound up creation like a clock, and ever since it has run on its own. In contrast to pantheism, which negates God’s transcendence in favor of His immanence, deism negates God’s immanence in favor of His transcendence. Deism is represented by such thinkers as Francois Voltaire, Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Paine.
Finite Godism: A Finite God Exists Beyond and in the Universe
Finite godism is like theism, only the god beyond the universe and active in it is not infinite but is limited in his nature and power. Like the deist, the finite godist generally accepts the creation of the universe but denies any miraculous intervention in it. Often, God’s apparent inability to overcome evil is given as a reason for believing He is limited in power. John Stuart Mill, William James, Peter Bertocci, and Rabbi Kushner are examples of adherents to this worldview.
Polytheism: There Are Many Gods Beyond the World and in It
Polytheism is the belief that there are many finite gods. The polytheist denies any infinite God beyond the physical world, such as in theism; however, the gods are active in the world, in contrast to deism. And in contrast to finite godism, the polytheist believes in a plurality of finite gods, often each having its own domain. The belief that one finite god is chief over all the others (such as Jupiter for the Romans) is a subview of polytheism called henotheism. Chief representatives of polytheism are the ancient Greeks, the Mormons, and the neo-pagans (such as Wiccans).
Clearly, if theism is true, then all six forms of non-theism are false. God cannot be, for instance, both infinite and finite, or personal and impersonal, or beyond the universe and not beyond the universe, or able to perform miracles and not able to perform miracles, or unchanging and changing.
PLURALISM VS. MONISM
Pluralism,3 as opposed to monism, holds that more than one being exists (e.g., God and creatures). While monism asserts that all reality is one—that there is only one being—pluralism, by contrast, believes that there are many beings in existence: God is an infinite Being, and He created many finite beings that are not identical to Him, though they are dependent on Him.
Thus, to be successful, evangelical theology must defend philosophical (or ontological) pluralism against monism. Since theism affirms there is at least one finite being that exists along with only one infinite Being, it follows that if theism is true then so is pluralism. However, it does not follow that theism is true simply because pluralism is true, since there are other forms of pluralism (e.g., deism, finite godism, and polytheism).
The Argument for Monism
If one is to defend pluralism, to say nothing of theism, there is a fundamental argument for monism that must be answered. This argument was stated by the early Greek philosopher Parmenides (b. 515 b.c.), who presented as follows (Parmenides, P): There cannot be more than one thing (absolute monism), for if there were two things, they would have to differ. For things to differ, they must differ either by being or by nonbeing. But since being is that which makes them identical, they cannot differ by being. Nor, on the other hand, can they differ by nonbeing, for nonbeing is nothing, and to differ by nothing is not to differ at all. Hence, there cannot be a plurality of beings but only one single indivisible being—a rigid monism.
The Alternatives to Monism
The alternatives to Parmenides are few and far between for pluralists who wish to escape the clutches of monism. Basically, there are four other options.
The first two forms of pluralism, which we will call atomism and platonism, affirm that the many beings differ by nonbeing. The last two views, called aristotelianism and thomism, hold that the many beings differ in their being.
Atomism: Things Differ by Absolute Nonbeing
The ancient atomists, such as Leucippus (fl. c. fifth century b.c.) and Democritus (c. 460–370 b.c.), contended that the principle separating one being (one atom) from another is absolutely nothing (i.e., nonbeing). They called this the Void. For them, being is full and nonbeing is empty. The atoms, which do not differ at all in their essence, are separated by the different space they occupy in the Void (empty space). This difference, then, is merely extrinsic; there is no intrinsic difference in the atoms (beings).4
In short, the atomists’ response to Parmenides was that there are many beings (atoms) that differ by nonbeing. Each being occupies a different space in the Void that, in itself, is absolutely nothing (empty space).
Of course, this is scarcely an adequate answer to Parmenides, since he would simply point out that to differ by absolutely nothing is to have absolutely no difference at all. And to have absolutely no difference is to be absolutely the same. Monism appears to win the day over atomism.
Platonism: Things Differ by Relative Nonbeing
Plato (c. 427–347 b.c.), with the help of Parmenides, struggled with how “the Forms” could differ if they were absolutely simple.5 Plato believed that all things had an ideal archetype behind them. This Idea (or Form) was the real world. All things in this world of our experience are only “shadows” of the real world by virtue of their participation in this true Form. For example, each individual human being in this world participates in a universal form of humanness in the world of ideas. Plato later adopted the view that the Forms (or Ideas) are not indivisibly and unrelatedly separated by absolute nonbeing but are related by the principle of relative nonbeing.
By this principle of relative nonbeing, also called the “other,” Plato believed he could have many different forms (beings) and thus avoid monism. Each form differed from other forms in that it was not that other form. All determination, in this case, is by negation.
For one example, the sculptor determines what the statue is in relation to the stone by chipping away (negating) what he does not want. Likewise, each form is differentiated from every other form by negation—what it is, is determined by what it is not. For another example, the chair is distinguished from everything else in the room in that it is not the table, it is not the floor, it is not the wall, etc. This does not mean that the chair is absolutely nothing. It is something in itself, but it is nothing in relation to other things. That is, it is not those other things.
Even so, Parmenides would not have been impressed by Plato’s attempt to evade monism. He would simply have asked whether there were any differences in the beings themselves. If there were not, then he would have insisted that all these beings (forms) must be identical. For the monist there are not many beings but only one.
Aristotelianism: Things Differ as Simple Beings
Both Plato and the atomist took one horn (the same horn) of the parmenidean dilemma: They tried to differentiate things by nonbeing. But, as we have seen, to differ by nothing is not to differ at all. Aristotle (384–322 b.c.) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) took the other horn of the dilemma: They sought to find a difference in the beings themselves. Both contend that there are many beings that are essentially different. Aristotle held that these beings are metaphysically simple, and Aquinas (see next page) viewed them as metaphysically composite, having an act/potency distinction on the level of pure forms or beings.
Aristotle argued that there is a plurality of forty-seven or fifty-five beings, or unmoved movers, that are separated from one another in their very being (Aristotle, M, XII). These beings (movers) caused all the motion in the world, each operating in its own separate cosmic domain. Each was a pure form (being) with no matter (which Aristotle used to differentiate things in this world). This plurality of totally separated substantial forms has no commonness or community of being whatsoever. They cannot be related to one another (Eslick, RD, 152–53), and they are completely diverse from one another.
Of course, Parmenides would ask Aristotle just how simple beings can differ in their very being. Things composed of form and matter can differ in that this particular matter is different from that matter, even though they have the same form. But how do pure forms (beings) differ from each other? They have no principle of differentiation. If there is no difference in their being, then their being is identical. Thus, neither does Aristotle’s solution avoid monism.
Thomism: Things Differ As Complex Beings
The fourth pluralistic alternative to parmenidean monism is represented by Thomas Aquinas, who, in common with Aristotle, sought difference within the beings themselves. But unlike Aristotle, who had only simple beings, Aquinas believed that all finite beings are composed in their very beings. Only God is an absolutely simple Being, and there can be only one such Being (God). However, there can be other kinds of beings, namely, composed beings. Beings can differ in their very being because there can be different kinds of beings (Aquinas, ST, la.4.1, 3).
God, for example, is an infinite kind of Being; all creatures are finite kinds of beings. God is Pure Actuality (Act); all creatures are composed of actuality (act) and potentiality (potency). Hence, finite things differ from God in that they have a limiting potentiality; He does not. Finite things can differ from each other in whether their potentiality is completely actualized (as in angels) or whether it is being progressively actualized (as in humans).
In all creatures their essence (what-ness) is really distinct from their existence (is-ness). In God, on the other hand, His essence and existence are identical. Aquinas was not the first to make this distinction, but he was the first to make such extensive use of it.
Aquinas argues in his book On Being and Essence that existence is something other than essence, except in God, whose essence is His existence. Such a being must be one and unique, since multiplication of anything is only possible where there is a difference. But in such a being as God there is no difference. From this it follows necessarily that in everything else, except in this one unique existence, its existence must be one thing and its essence another.
In this way Aquinas provided an answer to the age-old predicament posed by monism. Things do differ in their being because there are different kinds of beings. Parmenides was wrong because he assumed that “being” is always understood univocally (the same way). Aquinas, on the other hand, saw that being is analogous (see chapter 9), being understood in similar but different ways. All beings are the same in that they are all actual; however, finite beings differ from an infinite Being in that they have differing potentialities that have been actualized.
THE SUPERIORITY OF THOMISTIC THEISM6
The value of Aquinas’s view is made manifest by both its own rationality and the implausibility of its alternatives. Parmenides’ position, by contrast, does violence to our experience of a differentiated yet interrelated multiplicity of beings. But again, if a rigid monism is unacceptable, it seems there are only four basic pluralistic alternatives.
The atomist attempts to explain multiplicity by affirming that absolute nonbeing—the Void—is that which separates one being from another. But surely this answer is insufficient, for as Parmenides painstakingly pointed out, to differ by that which is absolutely nonexistent is not to differ at all. And if there is no real distinction, then there is no distinction in reality at all. All is one.
The platonists tried to use relative nonbeing as the principle of differentiation. That is, while admitting that things differ by nonbeing, he argued that nonbeing in some way exists, even though it is “other” than being. That is, differentiation is by negation: One being is distinct from another not by what it is but by what it is not—different not by being but by non-being. In other words, the differentiating factor is not within being but is outside of being—it is not real or actual. But nothing that is external to being can be the principle of differentiation within being. And if there is no actual difference within the nature of things, then there is actually no difference between them at all—the old parmenidean dilemma in a different form.
The aristotelian multiplicity of simple, separated substances has no principle of individuation at all.7 Aristotle calls on neither absolute nonbeing nor relative nonbeing to explain how there can be many simple, separate beings. Not only is this view without a principle of differentiation, but as Plotinus noted (E, VI.5.9), it is also without any principle of unification. That is, there is nothing to coordinate the separate operations of the many prime movers.
Finally, the thomistic (i.e., following Thomas Aquinas) position on plurality is that multiplicity is possible because there are different kinds of being. This is possible because beings have within them a real distinction in their being between their existence and their essence. That is to say, being is not a homogenous, undifferentiated whole. Rather, created being is a dynamic, complex composition of essence and existence. It has the correlative principles of potency and act. The question is not “to be” or “not to be,” but “what kind of being?”
For Thomas Aquinas things differ from one another by the kind of being or actuality they are. Being is not predicated of things univocally,8 for then all would be one. Nor is it predicated of things equivocally,9 for then all would be totally different and isolated. Rather, being is predicated of things analogically—each essence has being in its own distinct way and is related to others only by analogy. Each thing has its one mode of being. In other words, “essence,” the principle of differentiation, is real. It is part of the very being of things; a co-constitutive principle.10
In brief, the real distinction within being (Lat. ens) between essence (essentia) and existence (esse) seems to be the only satisfactory answer to, the parmenidean problem of unity and plurality. Without an analogy of being (see chapter 9) there is no way to account for multiplicity. In univocity of being, things are either unrelated or identical. As we have seen, if being is taken univocally (instead of analogically), then there can only be one being, for if wherever being is found it means entirely the same thing, then all being is identical (entire sameness leaves no room for any difference in being).
What is more, if being is taken equivocally (as entirely different), then there can be no more than one being, for if this is being and everything else is totally different from it, then everything else is nonbeing. (This is true because what is totally different from being would be nonbeing.) Seemingly, the only way to avoid the monistic conclusion that follows from either an equivocal or a univocal view of being is to take an analogical view. And the only way being can be analogical is if there is within being both the principle of unification and the principle of differentiation. Aquinas called these, respectively, esse and essentia: Existence (unification) is to essence (differentiation) what actuality is to potentiality. Since finite beings have different potentialities (essences), these finite beings can be differentiated in reality when these potentialities are actualized (or brought into existence) in different kinds of beings.
What is being? Being is that which is. How many beings are there? Being can be either simple (Pure Actuality—God) or complex (both actuality and potentiality). There cannot be two absolutely simple beings, since there is nothing in a pure Being by which it could differ from another pure Being.
Of course, a simple Being can (indeed, must) differ from complex beings, since it has no potentiality, as they do. Therefore, there can be only one Being purely and simply, but there are many beings with a mixture of act and potency. Only one is Being; everything else has being.
In this way Aquinas seemed to provide the only rational answer to monism. Plotinus did attempt to answer the problem by positing an absolute “One” that goes beyond reason and beyond being, but it is self-defeating to reason about what is beyond reason.
THE RATIONAL BASIS FOR THEISM: THE ALTERNATIVE TO MONISM
Thomas Aquinas’s answer for pluralism makes theism possible, but only sound arguments for God’s existence make theism viable. Many such arguments have been offered, while four of them have dominated discussion over the centuries: the cosmological argument, the teleological argument, the ontological argument, and the moral argument.
The Cosmological Argument for God’s Existence
The cosmological argument comes in two basic forms: horizontal and vertical. The horizontal argument, known as the kalam (Arabic for “eternal”) argument, argues for a Beginner of the universe. The vertical argument reasons to a Sustainer of the universe. One posits an original Cause and the other a current Cause. The horizontal argument was embraced by Bonaventure (c. 1217–1274), who followed certain Arab philosophers. The vertical argument was championed by Thomas Aquinas.
The Horizontal Form of the Cosmological Argument
The essence of this argument is as follows:
(1) Everything that had a beginning had a cause.
(2) The universe had a beginning.
(3) Therefore, the universe had a Cause.
The first premise (“Everything that had a beginning had a cause”) is often taken as self-evident, since to admit otherwise would amount to the ridiculous claim that nothing produces something. Even the infamous skeptic David Hume (1711–1776) confessed, “I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause” (LDH, 1:187).
The second premise (“The universe had a beginning”) is defended both philosophically and scientifically. Philosophically, it is argued that
(1) An infinite number of moments cannot be traversed.
(2) If there were an infinite number of moments before today, then today would never have come, since an infinite number of moments cannot be traversed.
(3) But today has come.
(4) Hence, there were only a finite number of moments before today (i.e., a beginning of time). And everything with a beginning had a Beginner. Therefore, the temporal world had a Beginner (Cause).
The scientific evidence for the world having a beginning comes from the so-called Big Bang view held by most contemporary astronomers. There are several converging lines of evidence that the space-time universe had a beginning. First, the universe is running out of usable energy (Second Law of Thermodynamics), and what is running down cannot be eternal (otherwise it would have run down by now). An entity cannot run out of an infinite amount of energy.
Second, the universe is said to be expanding. Thus, when the motion picture of the universe is put into reverse, logically and mathematically it reaches a point where it is nothing (i.e., no space, no time, and no matter). So the universe literally came into being out of nothing. But nothing cannot produce something.
Third, the radiation echo given off by the universe, discovered by two Nobel Prize-winning scientists, Arno Allan Penzias and Robert Woodrow Wilson (see Jastrow, GA, 14–15), has the identical wavelength of that which would be given off by a gigantic explosion.
Fourth, the large mass of energy resulting from such an explosion and predicted by Big Bang proponents was actually discovered by the Hubble Space Telescope in 1992.
Fifth, Einstein’s own theory of general relativity demanded a beginning of time, a view he resisted for years and even defended by a fudge factor he introduced into his argument to avoid it and for which he was later embarrassed (see Heeren and Smoot, SMG, 109).
The cumulative philosophical and scientific evidence for an origin of the material universe provides a strong reason to conclude that there must have been a nonphysical originating Cause of the physical universe. Agnostic astronomer Robert Jastrow admits that this is a clearly theistic conclusion (“SCBTF” in CT, 17). After reviewing the evidence that the cosmos had a beginning, the British physicist Edmund Whittaker concurred: “It is simpler to postulate creation ex nihilo—divine will constituting nature from nothingness” (cited by Jastrow, GA, 111). Jastrow concludes, “That there are what I or anyone would call supernatural forces at work is now, I think, a scientifically proven fact” (Jastrow, “SCBTF” in CT, 15, 18, emphasis added).
The Vertical Form of the Cosmological Argument
The horizontal form of the cosmological argument argues from the past origin of the cosmos to an Original (First) Cause of it. By contrast, the vertical form of the cosmological argument begins with the present contingent existence of the cosmos and insists there must be a current Necessary Being causing it. Both are causal arguments and both begin with an existing cosmos. However, the horizontal argument starts with a universe that had a beginning (long ago), and the second with a universe that has being (right now). The former stresses originating causality, and the latter focuses on conserving causality. The first argues to a First Cause (back then), and the second argues to a Necessary Cause (at present).
The vertical cosmological argument was stated in several ways by Thomas Aquinas (ST, 1.2.3). Two forms of it will illustrate the point: the argument from contingency and the argument from change.
The argument from contingency begins with the fact that at least one contingent being exists; that is, a being that exists but can not exist. A Necessary Being is one that exists but cannot not exist. The argument goes like this:
(1) Whatever exists but can/could not exist needs a cause for its existence, since the mere possibility of existence does not explain why something exists. The mere possibility for something is nothing (i.e., no-thing).
(2) But nothing cannot produce something.
(3) Therefore, something necessarily exists as the ground for everything that does exist but can not exist. In short, it is a violation of the principle of causality to say that a contingent being can account for its own existence.
Another way to put this form of the vertical argument is to note that if something contingent exists, then a Necessary Being must exist:
(1) If everything were contingent, then it would be possible that nothing existed.
(2) But something does exist (e.g., I do), and its existence is undeniable, for I have to exist in order to be able to affirm that I do not exist.
(3) Thus, if some contingent being now exists, a Necessary Being must now exist, otherwise there would be no ground for the existence of this contingent being.
The argument from change, another form of the vertical cosmological argument, begins with the fact that there are changing beings:
(1) Whatever changes passes from a state of potentiality (potency) for that change to a state of being actualized (act). That is, all changing beings have act(uality) and potency in their very being. If not, then all change would involve annihilation and re-creation, which is impossible without a Cause, since nothing cannot produce something.
(2) But no potentiality can actualize itself, any more than the potential for steel to become a skyscraper can actualize itself into a skyscraper.
(3) If no potency can actualize itself, and yet at least one being is actualized (e.g., me), then ultimately there must be something that is Pure Actuality (with no potentiality), otherwise there would be no ground for why something now exists that has the potential not to exist.
This form of the vertical cosmological argument addresses the impossibility of an infinite regress of beings that are composed of act and potency. It points out that the very first Being beneath a changing being (with act and potency) cannot be another being with act and potency, for what does not account for its own existence certainly cannot account for another’s existence. To say it could is like arguing that one paratrooper whose chute did not open can hold up another whose chute did not open. And adding more paratroopers whose chutes do not open does not help the problem; it compounds it.
Another way to put the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes of the present existence of a changing being (with act and potency) is to point out that in an infinite regress of such causes at least one cause must be causing, since it is admitted that causing is occurring. Yet in an infinite series every cause is being caused, for if one were not being caused, then we have arrived at an Uncaused Cause (which scientists desire to avoid). One cause must be uncaused, for if every cause in an infinite series is being caused and at least one cause is causing, then that cause is self-caused. However, a self-caused being is impossible, since a cause is ontologically (see page 34), if not chronologically, prior to its effect, and something cannot be prior to itself.
Another form of the vertical cosmological argument begins with the present dependence of every part of the universe. Briefly stated:
(1) Every part of the universe is right now dependent for its existence.
(2) If every part is right now dependent for its existence, then the whole universe must also be right now dependent for its existence.
(3) Therefore, the whole universe is dependent right now for its existence on some Independent Being beyond itself.
In response, critics argue that the second premise commits the fallacy of composition. That every piece of a mosaic is square does not mean the whole mosaic is square. Also, putting two triangles together does not necessarily make another triangle; it may make a square. The whole may (and sometimes does) have a characteristic not possessed by the parts.
Defenders of the vertical form of the cosmological argument are quick to note that sometimes there is a necessary connection between the parts and the whole. For example, if every piece of a floor is oak, then the whole floor is oak. If every tile in the kitchen is yellow, then the whole floor is yellow. This is true because it is of the very nature of patches of yellow tile that when you put more like patches of yellow tile together, you still have a patch of yellow. And while putting two triangles together does not necessarily make another triangle, nevertheless, putting two triangles together will necessarily make another geometric figure. Why? Because it is of the very nature of geometric figures that when they are combined they still form a geometric figure.
Likewise, it is of the very nature of dependent beings that when you put more of them together, you still have dependent beings. If one thing is dependent for its being, then another dependent being can no more hold it up than adding more links to a chain will hold it up if there is no peg holding up the whole chain.
In response, some critics argue that the whole is greater than the parts. Therefore, while the parts are dependent, the whole universe is not. However, either the sum of the parts is equal to the whole or it is more than the whole. If the whole universe is equal to its parts, then the whole must be dependent just like the parts are.11 If, on the other hand, the whole universe is more than the parts and would not vanish were the parts all destroyed, then the whole universe is the equivalent of God, for it is an uncaused, independent, eternal, and necessary Being on which everything in the entire universe depends for its existence.
The Teleological Argument for God’s Existence
There are many forms of the teleological argument, the most famous of which derives from William Paley (1743–1805), who used the watchmaker analogy. Since every watch has a maker, and since the universe is exceedingly more complex in its operation than a watch, it follows that there must be a Universe Maker. In brief, the teleological argument reasons from design to an Intelligent Designer:
(1) All designs imply a designer.
(2) There is great design in the universe.
(3) Therefore, there must have been a Great Designer of the universe.
The first premise we know from experience; on any occasion that we see a complex design, we know by previous experience that it came from the mind of a designer. Watches imply watchmakers; buildings imply architects; paintings imply artists; and coded messages imply an intelligent sender. We know this to be true because we observe it happening over and over.
Also, the greater the design, the greater the designer.12 A thousand monkeys sitting at typewriters for millions of years would never produce Hamlet. But Shakespeare did it on the first try. The more complex the design, the greater the intelligence required to produce it.
It is important to note here that by “complex design” is meant specified complexity. A crystal, for example, has specificity but not complexity; like a snowflake, it has the same basic patterns repeated over and over. Random polymers,13 on the other hand, have complexity but not specificity.14 A living cell, however, has both specificity and complexity.
The kind of complexity found in a living cell is the same kind of complexity that is found in a human language; that is to say, the letter sequence in the four-letter genetic alphabet is identical to that in a written language. And the amount of specified complex information in a simple one-celled animal is greater than that found in Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary. As a result, believing that life occurred without an intelligent cause is like believing that Webster’s Unabridged resulted from an explosion in a print shop.
Michael Behe’s excellent book Darwin’s Black Box provides from the nature of a living cell strong evidence that it could not have originated by anything but intelligent design. The cell represents irreducible complexity, and it cannot be accounted for via the incremental changes called for by evolution (Behe, DBB, all). Even Charles Darwin (1809–1882) admitted, “If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down” (Darwin, OOS, 6th ed., 154). Even evolutionist Richard Dawkins agrees:
Evolution is very possibly not, in actual fact, always gradual. But it must be gradual when it is being used to explain the coming into existence of complicated, apparently designed objects, like eyes. For if it is not gradual in these cases, it ceases to have any explanatory power at all. Without gradualness in these cases, we are back to miracle, which is a synonym for the total absence of [naturalistic] explanation. (Dawkins, BW, 83.)
But Behe provides numerous examples of irreducible complexity that cannot evolve in small steps. He concludes,
No one at Harvard University, no one at the National Institutes of Health, no member of the National Academy of Sciences, no Nobel prize winner—no one at all can give a detailed account of how the cilium, or vision, or blood clotting, or any complex biochemical process might have developed in a Darwinian fashion. But we are here. All these things got here somehow; if not in a Darwinian fashion, then how? (Behe, DBB, 187.)
Other examples of irreducible complexity abound, including aspects of DNA reduplication, electron transport, telomere synthesis, photosynthesis, transcription regulation, and more … [Hence,] life on earth at its most fundamental level, in its most critical components, is the product of intelligent activity (ibid., 160, 193).
Behe adds,
The conclusion of intelligent design flows naturally from the data itself—not from sacred books or sectarian beliefs. Inferring that biochemical systems were designed by an intelligent agent is a humdrum process that requires no new principles of logic or science.… [Thus,] the result of these cumulative efforts to investigate the cell—to investigate life at the molecular level—is a loud, clear, piercing cry of “design!” The result is so unambiguous and so significant that it must be ranked as one of the greatest achievements in the history of science. The discovery rivals those of Newton and Einstein (ibid., 232–33).
The late agnostic astronomer Carl Sagan (1934–1996) unwittingly provided a powerful example of incredible design. He notes that the genetic information in the human brain expressed in bits is probably comparable to the total number of connections among neurons—about a hundred trillion, 1014 bits.
If written out in English, say, that information would fill some twenty million volumes, as many as in the world’s largest libraries. The equivalent of twenty million books is inside the head of every one of us. The brain is a very big place in a very small space.
Sagan went on to note that “the neurochemistry of the brain is astonishingly busy, the circuitry of a machine more wonderful than any devised by humans” (Sagan, C, 278). But if this is so, then why does the human brain not need an intelligent Creator, such as those wonderful machines (like computers) devised by humans?
Another support for the teleological argument comes from the anthropic principle, which states that from its very inception the universe was fine-tuned for the emergence of human life (see Barrow, ACP). That is, the universe intricately preadapted for the arrival of human life. If the delicate balance had been off in the least, then life would not have been possible.
For example, oxygen comprises 21 percent of the atmosphere. If it were 25 percent, fires would erupt, and if only 15 percent, humans would suffocate. If the gravitational force were altered by merely one part in ten to the fortieth power (ten followed by forty zeroes), the sun would not exist and the moon would crash into the earth or veer off into space (Heeren, SMG, 196). If the centrifugal force of planetary movement did not precisely balance the gravitational forces, nothing could be held in orbit around the sun. If the universe were expanding at a rate one-millionth more slowly than it is, the temperature on earth would be 10,000 degrees Celsius. If Jupiter were not in its current order, the earth would be bombarded with space material. If the earth’s crust were thicker, too much oxygen would be transmitted to it to support life. If it were thinner, volcanic and tectonic activity would make life untenable. And if the rotation of the earth took longer than twenty-four hours, temperature differences between night and day would be too great (see Ross, FG).
Again, Robert Jastrow sums up the implications: “The anthropic principle … seems to say that science itself has proven as a hard fact, that this universe was made, was designed, for man to live in. It’s a very theistic result” (Jastrow, SCBTF, 17, emphasis added). Former atheistic astronomer Alan Sandage came to the same result:
The world is too complicated in all of its parts to be due to chance alone. I am convinced that the existence of life on earth with all its order in each of its organisms is simply too well put together.… The more one learns of biochemistry, the more unbelievable it becomes unless there is some kind of organizing principle—an architect for believers.… (Sandage, “SRRB” in T, 54.)
The great Albert Einstein (1879–1955) likewise declared that “the harmony of natural law … reveals an intelligence of such superiority that, compared with it, all systematic thinking and acting of human beings is an utterly insignificant reflection” (Einstein, IO—WISI, 40, emphasis added).
The Ontological Argument for God’s Existence
“Ontological” comes from the Greek word ontos (“being”). This is the argument from the idea of a Perfect or Necessary Being to the actual existence of such a Being. The first philosopher known to develop the ontological argument (though Immanuel Kant [1724–1804] was the first to call it this) was Anselm (1033–1109).
There are two forms of the argument. One derives from the idea of a Perfect Being and the other from the idea of a Necessary Being. These are sometimes called Anselm A and Anselm B, respectively.
The First Form of the Ontological Argument
According to this statement of the argument, the mere concept of God as an absolutely perfect Being demands that He exist. Briefly put:
(1) God is by definition an absolutely perfect Being.
(2) Existence is a perfection.
(3) Therefore, God must exist. If God did not exist, then he would be lacking one perfection, namely, existence. But if God lacked any perfection, then He would not be absolutely perfect. And God is by definition an absolutely perfect Being. Therefore, an absolutely perfect Being (God) must exist.
Since the time of Immanuel Kant it has been widely accepted that this form of the ontological argument is invalid because existence is not a perfection. It is argued that existence adds nothing to the concept of a thing; it merely gives a concrete instance of it. The dollar in my mind can have exactly the same properties or characteristics as the one in my wallet. The only difference is that I have a concrete example of the latter.
Kant’s critique of the first form of the ontological argument is penetrating and widely embraced. There is, however, a second form that is not subject to this criticism.
The Second Form of the Ontological Argument
In his response to the monk Gaunilo (fl. c. eleventh century), who opposed the argument, Anselm insisted that the very concept of a Necessary Being demands His existence. It can be stated this way:
(1) If God exists, we must conceive of Him as a Necessary Being;
(2) but by definition, a Necessary Being cannot not exist;
(3) therefore, if a Necessary Being can exist, then it must exist.
Since there appears to be no contradiction to the idea of a Necessary Being, it would seem to follow that one must exist, for the very idea of a Necessary Being demands that it must exist—if it did not exist, then it would not be a necessary existence.
Critics point to a different problem with this form of the ontological syllogism.15 It’s like saying, “If there are triangles, then they must have three sides.” Of course, there may not be any triangles. So the argument never really gets past that initial “if”; it never proves the big question that it claims to answer. It assumes, but does not prove, the existence of a Necessary Being, merely asserting that if a Necessary Being exists—and that is the open question—then it must exist necessarily, for this is the only way a Necessary Being can exist.
Some have further refined the argument by adding that a state of total nothingness is not logically possible, since our own existence is undeniable. And if something exists, then something else must exist (i.e., the Necessary Being). However, in this form it is no longer an ontological argument, since it begins with something that exists and reasons to something that must exist.
Most theists do not believe the ontological argument as such is sufficient in and of itself to prove the existence of God. This is not to say it cannot be useful. While the ontological argument cannot prove God’s existence, it can prove certain things about His nature, if God does exist. For example, it shows that if God exists at all, then He must exist necessarily. He cannot cease to exist, and He cannot exist contingently.
The Moral Argument for God’s Existence
The roots of the moral argument for God are found in Romans 2:12–15, where the apostle Paul speaks of humankind being without excuse because there is “a law written on their hearts.” In the last 250 years this argument has been stated in various ways; the most popular form emanates from C. S. Lewis (1898–1963) in the first part of his popular book Mere Christianity. The heart of the argument follows this basic structure:
(1) Moral law implies a Moral Lawgiver.
(2) There is an objective moral law.
(3) Therefore, there is an objective Moral Lawgiver.
The first premise is self-evident. A moral law is a prescription, and prescriptions come only from prescribers. Unlike the laws of nature (which are only descriptive), moral laws are prescriptive: Moral laws don’t describe what is; they prescribe what ought to be. They are not simply a description of the way people do behave but are imperatives as to how they should behave.
The weight of the moral argument for God’s existence rests on the second premise—that there is an objective moral law. That is, there is a moral law not just prescribed by humans but also prescribed for humans. The question is whether there is evidence that there is a universal, objective prescription that is binding on all humans.
The evidence for an objective moral law is strong; it is implied in moral judgments that we make, such as, “The world is getting better (or worse).” How can we know this unless there is some standard beyond the world by which we can measure it? Likewise, statements like “Hitler was wrong” lose their intended significance if they are merely a matter of opinion or are culturally relative. But if Hitler was really (objectively) wrong, then there is a moral law beyond all of us by which we are all bound. And if there is such an objective moral law beyond all of us, then there is a Moral Lawgiver (God).
- S. Lewis effectively answers typical objections to this moral argument as paraphrased in the following text (see Lewis, MC, part 1).
This Moral Law Is Not Herd Instinct
What we call the moral law cannot be the result of herd instinct16 or else the stronger impulse in us would always win. It does not. Furthermore, we would always act from our instinct rather than for it in order to bolster it (e.g., to help someone in trouble) as we only sometimes do. Finally, if the moral law were only herd instinct, then instincts would always be right, but they are not. Even love and patriotism are sometimes wrong.
This Moral Law Cannot Be Social Convention
Not everything learned through society is based on social convention (e.g., math or logic), so neither is the moral law merely a societal norm. Evidence of this is that the same basic moral laws can be found in virtually every society, past and present. Furthermore, judgments about social progress would not be possible if society were the basis of the judgments.
This Moral Law Is Different From the Laws of Nature
The moral law is not to be identified with the laws of nature because the latter are descriptive (are), not prescriptive (ought) as moral laws are. Indeed, factually convenient situations (the way it is) can be morally wrong and vice versa. For example, someone who tries to trip me and fails is in the wrong, while someone who accidentally trips me is not.
The Moral Law Is Not Human Fancy
Neither can the moral law be mere human fancy, because we cannot get rid of it even when we would sometimes like to do so. We did not create it; it is clearly impressed upon us from without. And if it were fancy, then all value judgments would be meaningless, including “Murder is wrong” and “Racism is wrong.”
But if the moral law is neither a description nor a merely human prescription, then it must be a moral prescription from a Moral Prescriber who is beyond us. As Lewis notes, this Moral Lawgiver is more like mind than nature. He can no more be part of nature than an architect is part of the building he designs.
Injustice Does Not Disprove a Moral Lawgiver
The main objection to an absolutely perfect Moral Lawgiver is the argument from evil in the world. No serious person can fail to recognize that all the murders, rapes, hatred, and cruelty make the world far short of being absolutely perfect. But if the world is imperfect, how can there be an absolutely perfect God? Lewis’s answer is simple and to the point: The only way the world could possibly be known to be imperfect is if there is an absolutely perfect standard by which it can be judged to be imperfect. Injustice makes sense only if there is a standard of justice by which something is known to be not just. And absolute injustice is possible only if there is an absolute standard of justice. In his own words Lewis clarifies:
My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of just and unjust? A man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line.… Thus in the very act of trying to prove that God did not exist—in other words, that the whole of reality was senseless—I found I was forced to assume that one part of reality—namely my idea of justice—was full of sense. Consequently atheism turns out to be too simple. (Lewis, MC, 45–46.)
Rather than disproving a morally perfect Being, then, the evil in the world presupposes an absolutely perfect standard. One could raise the question as to whether this Ultimate Lawgiver is all-powerful, but not as to whether He is perfect.
CONCLUSION ABOUT THE THEISTIC ARGUMENTS
Most theists do not rest their whole case for God on any one argument. Indeed, each argument seems to demonstrate a different attribute of God along with His existence. For example, the cosmological argument shows that an infinitely powerful Being exists; the teleological argument reveals that this Being is also super-intelligent; the moral argument establishes that He is morally perfect. And, granted that Something exists, the ontological argument demonstrates that He is a Necessary Being.
Some theists offer other arguments for the existence of God, such as the argument from religious need (see Geisler, “G, EF” in BECA) or the argument from religious experience (see Trueblood, PR). But the ones detailed above are the standard or classical arguments.
The objection is made that the cosmological argument does not prove a theistic God, such as evangelical Christianity holds. There are many other concepts of God besides theism, but these concepts cannot be identified with a theistic God.
Theism vs. Finite Godism
God must be infinite (in contrast with finite godism), since per the cosmological argument every finite thing needs a cause. Hence, the Cause of all finite things must not be finite.
Further, the finite universe is made of parts, yet there cannot be an infinite number of parts, since no matter how many parts there are, one more could always be added. And the First Uncaused Cause of the universe cannot be a part or have parts, otherwise He would be caused. Hence, He must be infinite, since only finite things have parts. Since nothing can be added to an infinite, but since all parts can be added to other parts, the Creator of the universe is infinite (and without parts).
Theism vs. Polytheism
The Uncaused Cause of theism is distinct from the many polytheistic gods, for there cannot be more than one unlimited existence as such. More than the Most is not possible. Such a Cause is Pure Actuality, and Actuality is unlimited and unique. Only act as conjoined with potency is limited, such as is found in contingent beings (which exist but have the possibility not to exist).
Further, in order to differ, one being would have to lack some characteristic that the other one had. But any being that lacked some characteristic of existence would not be an unlimited perfect existence. In other words, two infinite Beings cannot differ in their potentiality, since they have no potentiality; they are Pure Actuality. And they cannot differ in their actuality, since Actuality as such does not differ from Actuality as such. Hence, they must be identical. So, there is only one Unlimited Cause of all limited existence.
Theism vs. Pantheism
Further, the Uncaused Cause of Theism is not the God of pantheism. Pantheism affirms that an unlimited and necessary being exists but denies the reality of limited and finite beings. Theism begins with real, finite, contingent changing being(s), and from this it reasons to a real, infinite, necessary, unchanging being. So the theistic God is not the same as the god of pantheism.
The denial that a human being is finite and changing is self-defeating. A pantheist did not always believe this way; he came to believe this way by some process of “enlightenment.” But if he went through some changing process, then he is not an unchanging being after all.
Theism vs. Atheism
Nor can the Uncaused Cause of theism be identical with the material universe, as many atheists believe. As ordinarily conceived, the cosmos or material universe is a limited and spatio-temporal system. It is, for example, subject to the Second Law of Thermodynamics and thus is running down. But an Uncaused Cause is unlimited and not running down.
Space and time imply limitations to a here-and-now kind of existence. But an Uncaused Cause is not limited, and so it cannot be identical to the space-time world. The theistic God is in the temporal world as its ground of continuing existence, but He is not of the world in that it is limited and He is not.
If, in response, one claimed that the whole of the material universe is not temporal and limited as are the parts, he would only demonstrate what theism claims, for his conclusion is that there exists beyond the contingent world of limited spatio-temporality a whole reality that is eternal, unlimited, and necessary. In other words, it agrees with theism that there is a God beyond the limited, changing world of experience. It is a substitute for God that admits that there is a whole reality that is more than the experienced part of reality and that has all the essential metaphysical attributes of the theistic God.
Theism vs. Panentheism
Neither can the Uncaused Cause of theism be identical with the God of panentheism, also known as bipolar theism or process theology. Again, panentheism affirms that God has two poles: an actual pole (which is identified with the changing temporal world) and a potential pole (which is eternal and unchanging). Such a conception of God must be rejected for the following reasons:
For one thing, the conclusion of the cosmological argument demonstrates the need for a God of pure actuality with no potentiality (pole) at all. Further, God cannot be subject to limitations, composition, or spatiotemporality, since He is unlimited in His being. Moreover, the theistic God cannot have poles or aspects, since He is absolutely simple (i.e., uncomposed) and has no duality at all. As Pure Actuality, He is a simple and unlimited existence as such, with no limited pole. A partly limited unlimited existence is a contradiction.
In addition, God cannot be subject to change, for anything that changes must be composed of actuality and potentiality for change. Change is a passing from potentiality to actuality, from what it can be to what it actually becomes. But since existence has no potentiality, it follows that it cannot change. If something changes, it proves thereby that it was not Pure Actuality but possessed some potentiality for the change it underwent. A pure and unlimited actuality cannot change.
Theism vs. Deism
Finally, the conclusion of the cosmological argument, at least the vertical form of it, cannot be a deistic God, for a deistic God is not the here-and-now Cause of the universe, as is the theistic God. Since the universe is dependent in its being, it needs something independent on which to depend—at all times. The universe never ceases to be dependent or contingent. Once contingent, always contingent; a contingent being cannot become a Necessary Being, for a Necessary Being cannot come to be or cease to be as a contingent being can. Hence, the God of theism is different from the deistic conception of God. This is to say nothing of the fact that the God of theism can and does perform miracles, and the God of deism does not (see chapter 3).
Further, deism denies that miracles can or do occur. But a God who has created the universe from nothing has already performed the greatest miracle. Hence, such a God cannot be the God of deism.
CONCLUSION
The God of theism can be established by sound reasoning. Further, He is distinct from all other views of God, since there can only be one indivisible, infinite, necessary, absolutely perfect Uncaused Cause of everything else that exists. And since metaphysical theism is a precondition of evangelical theology, the viability of this precondition of evangelicalism is well supported by numerous lines of evidence. To be sure, objections can and have been raised, but none have been successful (see appendix 1).
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———. “Worldviews” in BECA (see also individual entries on each worldview).
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1 For a further discussion of each worldview, see Norman Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (BECA).
2 Transcendence is here defined as God’s presence beyond the universe; immanence is here defined as the indwelling presence of God in the universe.
3 Actually, there are two basic metaphysical preconditions entailed in evangelical theology: theism and pluralism.
4 For our purposes here, extrinsic means “lying outside, not properly belonging to” the nature of a thing, while intrinsic is defined as “belonging to the inmost constitution or essential nature of a thing” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).
5 On this whole question of Plato’s later view of the Forms (Teske, PLD), his Parmenides and Theaeteus seem rather to represent a break away from his early theory. He apparently saw the fallacy of the atomistic position (with which his own earlier view of indivisible forms [ideas] behind all things was akin).
6 Thomistic theism is also called classical theism, a view shared among Augustine, Anselm, the Reformers, and many modern thinkers, including C. S. Lewis.
7 In the physical world Aristotle used matter as the principle of individuation, but these pure Forms have no matter. Hence, in the metaphysical realm Aristotle had no way to distinguish one being from another.
8 In this case, univocal means “characteristic of or restricted to things of the same nature” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).
9 Equivocal here means “called by the same name but differing in nature or function” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).
10 This is not to say that essence is real prior to its connection to existence or independent of it (a position not held by Aquinas but by Giles of Rome). The reality of essence is in its correlation with existence. Thus an existing essence is real.
11 Proof of this is that if all the parts are taken away, the whole would vanish too. Thus, the whole universe must be contingent also.
12 It begs the question to point out that beavers make dams, since this is taken by creationists as evidence that an intelligent Creator programmed this ability into beavers. Computers can produce amazing order and design but only because they were programmed by an intelligent being to do so.
13 Polymers are chemical compounds or mixtures of compounds that generally consist of repeating structural units.
14 For something to have specificity is for it to have characteristics that are peculiar only to itself or to its group of organisms.
15 Properly speaking, a syllogism is a deductive scheme (see chapter 5) of a formal arrangement consisting of a major and a minor premise and a conclusion (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).
16 Herd instinct is “an inherent tendency to congregate or to react in unison; a theoretical human instinct toward gregariousness and conformity” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).
Geisler, N. L. 2002. Systematic theology, volume one: Introduction, Bible (18). Bethany House Publishers: Minneapolis, MN
