EXCLUSIVISM: THE OPPOSITIONAL PRECONDITION
SOME IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS
Several terms related to religions need to be distinguished: pluralism, relativism, inclusivism, and exclusivism.
Pluralism is the belief that every religion is true, that each provides a genuine encounter with the Ultimate. One may be better than the others, but all are adequate.
Relativism is similar to pluralism, claiming each religion is true to the individual who holds it. Relativists believe that since there is no objective truth in religion, there are no criteria by which one can tell which religion is true or which religions are false.
Inclusivism claims that one religion is explicitly true, and all others are implicitly true.
Exclusivism is the belief that only one religion is true, and all others opposed to it are false.
Since Christianity claims to be the true religion, it is at odds with the dominant trend in modern comparative religions. Alister McGrath set the stage properly: “How can Christianity’s claims to truth be taken seriously when there are so many rival alternatives and when ‘truth’ itself has become a devalued notion?” He adds that according to current popular belief “no one can lay claim to possession of the truth. It is all a question of perspective. All claims to truth are equally valid. There is no universal or privileged vantage point that allows anyone to decide what is right and what is wrong” (McGrath, “CPCCC” in JETS 365).
THE ALLEGED MORAL AND SPIRITUAL EQUALITY OF ALL WORLD RELIGIONS
A Statement of the Argument for Pluralism
Pluralist John Hick argues, “I have not found that the people of the other world religions are, in general, on a different moral and spiritual level from Christians,” for “the basic ideal of love and concern for others and of treating them as you would wish them to treat you is, in fact, taught by all the great religious traditions” (“PV,” 39). Hick offers as proof that statements similar to Christianity’s Golden Rule can be found in other religions (ibid., 39–40).
A Response to the Argument for Pluralism
Hick’s conclusion can be challenged at several levels. First, it is debatable whether “the fruit of the Spirit” (Gal. 5:22–23) can be found in non-Christian religions. While no one denies there are good people in other religions, this is not to say they are manifesting the widely recognized highest moral standard, agape love. One can lead a philanthropic life and even die for his beliefs without having true love (see 1 Cor. 13:3). While God’s common grace enables even evil men to do good (see Matt. 7:11), nonetheless, only the supernatural love of God can motivate a person to express agape (cf. John 15:13; Rom. 5:6–8; 1 John 4:7).
Before people too quickly conclude that William James (1842–1910) demonstrated the equality of all forms of saintliness in his famous Varieties of Religious Experience, they should read carefully Jonathan Edwards’ Religious Affections. Edwards (1703–1758) argues forcefully that there are unique manifestations of Christian godliness. A careful half-century study of the matter confirms to this writer that there is a difference in the highest level of Christian and non-Christian piety in favor of the former.
Second, even if one could demonstrate a kind of moral equality of practice among most adherents of the great religions, this would not in itself prove there was no moral superiority in the teachings of Christianity over the other religions. There are several reasons for this.
For one thing, a person perfectly practicing a lesser moral code may appear to be better than a person imperfectly living according to a higher ethical standard. In order to make a fair comparison one must do two things: Compare the highest moral teachings of the various religions, and compare the best examples of the adherents to each. A close comparison between Mother Teresa and Mahatma Gandhi demonstrates the superiority of Christian compassion for the needy.
What is more, one must sort out what was inherent to another religion before the advent of Christian influence and what was incorporated into it as the result of Christian missionary activity. For example, Hinduism as a system did not generate social compassion. The social compassion found in some forms of current Hinduism is not indigenous; it is a foreign import from Christianity. Indeed, the degree to which Gandhi manifested such compassion comes from his training in Christianity and his self-confessed admiration for the teaching of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount.
Finally, finding a moral principle akin to the Golden Rule of Judeo-Christian belief (cf. Matt. 7:12) would not be enough to show equality of all religions. This is a manifestation of general revelation—the law written in the hearts of all men (Rom. 2:12–15) by God. This is not the same as the supernatural manifestations of love, joy, and peace (Gal. 5:22–23). Indeed, while applied Christian morality has produced dynamic social compassion, Eastern religions have produced stagnant societies and Islam intolerant ones (Pinnock, WGM, 61).
Third, Hick’s analysis begs the question, for only by assuming that the moral common denominator of all religions is the standard by which they should all be judged does he arrive at the not too surprising conclusion that they are all equal. One has to negate the superior aspects of Christian morality or teaching in order to show that Christianity is not superior. Hick seems to acknowledge this tacitly in confessing that the “acceptance of some form of the pluralistic view prompts each to de-emphasize and eventually winnow out that aspect of its self-understanding that entails a claim to unique superiority among the religions of the world” (Hick, “PV” in Okholm, MTOW, 51).
Fourth, the moral manifestation of a belief does not settle the truth question. For example, that there are good Mormons does not prove that Joseph Smith (1805–1844) was a true prophet. In fact, there is strong evidence that he was not a true prophet, since he gave demonstrably false prophecies (see Tanner, CWM, chapters 5,11, 14). In addition, there is evidence for whether something is true apart from the way its adherents live. Truth is what corresponds to reality (see chapter 7) and, hence, a religion is true if its central tenets correspond to the real world, not merely whether its followers live a good life or even a better one than adherents of another religion.
Fifth, in the final analysis, the moral superiority of Christianity does not rest on our imperfection as Christians but on Christ’s unique perfection (see volume 2, part 1). It is not based on our fallible moral character but on His impeccable moral character (John 8:46; 2 Cor. 5:21; Heb. 4:15; 1 John 3:3). In this context, Christianity is clearly morally superior to all other religions.
THE ALLEGED REDEMPTIVE EQUALITY OF ALL RELIGIONS
The Statement of the Argument for Redemptive Equality
As for the Christian claim to a superior mode of salvation, Hick believes this either begs the question or is not evident in practice:
If we define salvation as being forgiven and accepted by God because of Jesus’ death on the cross, then it becomes a tautology1 that Christianity alone knows and is able to preach the source of salvation.
And,
If we define salvation as an actual human change, a gradual transformation from natural self-centeredness (with all the human evils that flow from this) to a radically new orientation centered in God and manifest in the “fruit of the Spirit,” then it seems clear that salvation is taking place within all of the world religions—and taking place, so far as we can tell, to more or less the same extent. (Hick, “PV” in Okholm, MTOW, 43.)
Further, what is common to all world religions is for Hick an adequate response to the Ultimate: “But they seem to constitute more or less equally authentic human awareness of and response to the Ultimate, the Real, the final ground and source of everything” (ibid., 45). There are, of course, “a plurality of religious traditions constituting different, but apparently more or less equally salvific, human responses to the Ultimate. These are the great world faiths” (ibid., 47).
A Response to the Argument for Redemptive Equality
There appear to be a net of problems in this analysis. First, it’s based on the assumption that all religions have a proper relation to what is truly Ultimate. This begs the question; maybe some are not connected at all to what is truly Ultimate. Or, perhaps they are not rightly related to what is truly Ultimate. After all, as Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) pointed out in his famous Future of an Illusion, deception is possible.
Second, Hick wrongly assumes that all religions are merely a human response to the Ultimate. But this begs the question in favor of antisupernatural views of religion (see chapter 3). In fact, it assumes a pantheistic view of the Ultimate as what transcends all particular cultural manifestations of the Ultimate in the various world religions.
Third, this denial of the truth of any particular religion is itself a form of exclusivism, for it favors the worldview known as pantheism in order to deny the particularity of the worldview known as Christian theism. That is to say, even the pantheist is making a particular truth claim, one that is opposed to all nonpantheistic views. But to assume a pantheistic position as a basis for one’s analysis of all religions, including nonpantheistic ones, again begs the question. Or, to put it another way, when the pluralist denies any particular religion is true as opposed to others, he thereby makes a particular truth claim.
Fourth, the pluralist view often degenerates to the position that whatever is sincerely believed is true. But this would mean that it matters not whether one is a passionate Nazi, Satanist, or Flat-Earth adherent, for in any event the holder’s view would be truth. This is patently incorrect; sincerity is clearly not a test of truth. The road to destruction is paved with good intentions, and many sincere people have been sincerely wrong about many things.
Fifth, the argument for redemptive equality implies that all truth claims are a matter of both/and and not either/or. But on this ground, there could be touted such absurdities as triangular squares and educated illiterates. Whether we like it or not, opposites cannot both be true, for the opposite of true is false. Hence, opposing truth claims of various religions cannot be mutually inclusive. For example, Hindu pantheism and Christian theism cannot both be true, since they affirm mutually exclusive worldviews. Likewise, Islam, which denies that Jesus died on the cross and rose from the dead three days later, and Christianity, which affirms this fact about Jesus, cannot both be true.
THE ALLEGATION THAT CHRIST IS NOT UNIQUE
A Statement of the Argument Against Christ’s Uniqueness
As for the Christian dogma about the uniqueness of Christ (see volume 2, part 1) as God incarnate in human flesh, John Hick contends that there are two main problems. He is misinformed on both points.
A Statement of the First Allegation
The first problem is that the historical Jesus did not teach this doctrine.… Among mainline New Testament scholars today there is a general consensus that these are not pronouncements of the historical Jesus but words put in his mouth some sixty or seventy years later by a Christian writer expressing the theology that had developed in his part of the expanding church. (Hick, “PV” in Okholm, MTOW, 52–53.)
Hick then cites a list of biblical scholars who allegedly agreed that “Jesus did not claim deity for himself” (ibid.).
A Response to the First Allegation
The New Testament documents are historically reliable, and their historicity has been abundantly attested (see part 2). The New Testament books that are crucial to this issue were not written after the eyewitnesses were dead, but while they were still alive. Indeed, the gospel of John claims to have been written by an eyewitness apostle (John 21:24), and Luke was written by a contemporary disciple who knew the eyewitnesses (Luke 1:1–4). First Corinthians, which even biblical critics admit was written about a.d. 55–56, speaks of five hundred eyewitnesses (1 Cor. 15:5–7), most of whom were still alive when Paul wrote it only twenty-two years after Jesus’ death. Even the late Bishop John A. T. Robinson, a liberal New Testament scholar, dated Gospels as early as a.d. 40–60, much too early to support Hick’s view of books written by a later generation who had already formulated a view contrary to that of the historical Jesus. Therefore, since the Gospels are reporting, not creating, the words and deeds of Jesus, they are firm support for His unique claims to be God incarnate (see volume 2, part 1).
A Statement of the Second Allegation
The second problem is that it has not proved possible, after some fifteen centuries of intermittent effort, to give any clear meaning to the idea that Jesus had two complete natures, one human and the other divine.… Is it really possible for infinite knowledge to be housed in a finite human brain? … Do we really want to claim that Jesus was literally omnipotent but pretended not to be, as in Mark 6:5? … While he was good, loving, wise, just, and merciful, there is an obvious problem about how a finite human being could have these qualities in an infinite degree.… A finite being cannot have infinite attributes (ibid., 55–56).
A Response to the Second Allegation
First, Hick falls short of claiming that the Incarnation involves an outright logical contradiction, though his language could be taken to imply the same. If the Incarnation is not, however, a logical contradiction, then there is no demonstrated incoherence in the view. Indeed, Hick himself admits, “It is logically permissible to believe anything that is not self-contradictory” (MGI, 104). As for the claim that it is difficult to show just how the Incarnation is true, on the same grounds one would have to reject much of our common experience as well as modern science (which, for instance, has difficulty explaining how light can be both waves and particles).
Second, Hick appears to be misinformed about the view of the two natures of Christ. Indeed, his objections assume the unorthodox Monophysite view, which confuses Christ’s two natures. His question as to whether it’s “really possible for infinite knowledge to be housed in a finite human brain” reveals such a confusion, for the orthodox view does not claim that there was infinite knowledge in the finite brain of Christ. Rather, it affirms that Christ had two distinct natures, one infinite and the other finite. So the person of Christ did not have infinite knowledge in his finite brain, but infinite knowledge in His infinite nature. As God, He knew all things; as man, Jesus grew in knowledge (Luke 2:52). The same thing applies to Jesus’ other attributes—as God, He was omnipotent; as man, He was not (see volume 2, part 1).
THE ALLEGATION OF INTOLERANCE
A Statement of the Objection From Intolerance
Another charge laid at the feet of exclusivism is that of intolerance, which is directed at the exclusivist’s view that one religious view is true and those opposed to it are false. This, to pluralists, seems to be bigotry; after all, why should only one view have a franchise on the truth and all the others be disenfranchised?
A Response to the Objection From Intolerance
A number of observations are relevant in this connection. First, if holding an exclusivist view makes one intolerant, then pluralists are also intolerant, for they claim their view is true to the exclusion of opposing views (like exclusivism); they certainly would not tolerate the position that their pluralistic view and the opposing nonpluralistic views were both true.
Second, if the charge of intolerance is leveled because of the manner in which one holds his view, then nonpluralists have no monopoly on the market, for if consistent with the nature of his position against nonpluralism, a pluralist is as “intolerant” as anyone else.
Third, the very concept of tolerance implies a real disagreement. One does not tolerate that with which he agrees, he embraces it. Hence, the concept of tolerance presupposes a nonpluralist view of truth.
THE ALLEGATION OF NARROW-MINDEDNESS
One of the favorite allegations of pluralists is that nonpluralists are narrow-minded, for nonpluralists claim that their view is true while everyone else is in error. This seems utterly presumptuous on the face of it. Why should only exclusivists be in possession of the truth?
The response to this is clear: Both the pluralists (P) and the exclusivists (E) make an equal claim to truth and error. Both claim that their view is true and that whatever opposes it is false. For example, if E is true, then all non-E is false. Likewise, if P is true, then all non-P is false. What the facts reveal is that exclusivism and pluralism are equally “narrow.” In point of fact, all truth is narrow. Remember what we saw in the last chapter—2 plus 3 is not 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 or any other number on to infinity. There is only one true answer, and while this is narrow, that is the very nature of truth.
THE ALLEGATION OF INTELLECTUAL IMPERIALISM
Another charge against exclusivism is that of intellectual imperialism; pluralists claim exclusivists are totalitarian with regard to truth, and that they should be more open to input from many sources, not just to one. Indeed, some postmodern pluralists go so far as to claim that not only truth but the very idea of meaning smacks of fascism (cited by Alister McGrath, “RJH” in Okholm, MTOW, 364).
While this allegation has a certain appeal, especially to those of a particular political mindset, it is without merit in determining what is true and what is false with regard to religions. First, the frequent intention of this allegation is a form of the ad hominem logical fallacy—it attacks the person rather than the position.
Second, this objection has an unjustified presumption, namely, that truth should be more democratic. But truth does not hinge on the percentage of its adherents. Truth is what corresponds to reality (see chapter 7), whether the majority believes it or not.
Third, do pluralists really believe that all views are equally true and good? Is fascism or communism as good as democracy? Was Nazism as good as any other form of government? Should one have tolerated the burning of widows in the Hindu funerals of their husbands? No, we see thereby that pluralists don’t truly believe in pluralism.
SOME CHALLENGEABLE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF PLURALISM
The Claim That There Are Universally Agreed-Upon TransReligious Moral Criteria
In order to make effective the argument for moral equality, one must assume a set of moral criteria not unique to any particular religion by which all can be evaluated. But pluralists generally deny any universally binding moral law. If there were such absolute moral laws, then there would need to be an absolute Moral Lawgiver. At best, however, only broadly theistic-type religions accept these criteria, and even then some reject the absolute perfect nature of God, e.g., some finite godists. Further, if there is a moral law common to all religions, then it is not unique to one, and by the tenets of pluralism no religion can be judged inferior for lacking it. Finally, if there are no such universal moral laws, then there is no way to morally judge all religions from any standard beyond them, and it is not fair to take the standards of one religion and apply them to another, claiming that the other falls short.
The Claim That All Religious Phenomena Can Be Explained Naturalistically
Beneath the pluralist’s attack on exclusivism is a naturalistic presupposition: All religious phenomena can be explained naturalistically; no supernatural explanations are allowed. But this presumptive naturalism is without justification; miracles cannot be ruled out a priori (see chapter 3). Neither, as David Hume claimed, are miracles incredible, nor are miracles without evidence. Indeed, there is substantial support for the greatest miracle of all, the ex nihilo (“out of nothing”) creation of the world (see chapter 3). Also, there is abundant evidence that the miracle of the resurrection of Christ has occurred (see volume 2, part 1).
The Claim That the World Is “Religiously Ambiguous”
Hick believes “the universe, as presently accessible to us, is capable of being interpreted intellectually and experientially in both religious and naturalistic ways” (Hick, IR, 129). Meaning, “The Real is perfectly undifferentiated; that is, it has no properties to which our concepts veridically [truly] apply” (Geivett, in MTOW, 77).
In response, some important observations should be made. First, it is self-defeating to claim that we know that we cannot know the Real (see Geisler, BECA, “Agnosticism”).
Second, that we do not know reality exhaustively does not mean we cannot know it truly. As Geivett notes, “To the extent that God is known at all, he is known truly” (ibid.).
Third, the very notion of an undifferentiated Real is implausible, if not self-defeating. Hick’s claim that the Real can be symbolized by the concept of Sunyata in Buddhism is a case in point, for if the Real is so undifferentiated, then how can any symbol represent it?
Fourth, neither can the Real be manifested in various traditions, as Hick claims. In order for something to be manifested, at least some of its characteristics must be revealed (ibid.). But the Real as totally undifferentiated has no discernible characteristics. Hence, it could not be manifested in our experience in any meaningful way.
Fifth, there is a kind of mystical epistemology presumed in this “God is unknowable” approach. It has a rather imperialist degree on how God can and cannot reveal Himself. But one wonders what pipeline to metaphysical truth could have supplied this absolute information (ibid.).
The Claim That Pluralistic Dialogue Is the Only Way to Truth
Another seriously flawed presupposition is the position that pluralistic interreligious dialogue is the only valid way to discover truth. No genuine religious dialogue, supposedly, is possible if one assumes his religion is true in advance of the dialogue. This is sure proof that he is not open to truth. True dialogue assumes one is tolerant, open, humble, willing to listen and learn, engage in a shared search for truth in a self-sacrificing, other-oriented love (ibid., 239).
In response, a number of things are necessary to point out. First, true dialogue is possible without adopting a pluralistic position on truth. One can have the attitude of humility, openness, and willingness to listen and learn without sacrificing his convictions about truth.
Second, the pluralist is not willing to relinquish his commitment to pluralism as a condition for such dialogue; hence, he violates his own imperative.
Third, the very idea of tolerance implies that some views are in error, for it makes no more sense to say one tolerates truth than one tolerates good. It is error and evil that are tolerated, not truth and good.
The Claim That Hick’s View Is Religiously Neutral
John Hick feigns religious neutrality, but no such thing exists. His alleged pluralism is not religiously neutral at all; it is patterned after Hinduism’s conception of the Ultimate, and it is antagonistic to the core principles of Christianity.
Furthermore, it does not truly encourage genuine dialogue between the traditions; indeed, it renders vacuous the concept of being “in a given religious tradition.” After all, according to pluralists, every tradition is essentially the same. So to accept pluralism is to reject one’s own tradition for another—the pluralist’s tradition.
The Claim That a Relativistic View of Truth Is Correct
Beneath the pluralist’s assertion that all major religions have equal claim to the truth is a relativistic view of truth. But as we have seen (in chapter 7), the denial of absolute truth is self-defeating. It claims that relativism is true for everyone, everywhere, always. But what is true for everyone, everywhere, and always is an absolute truth. Therefore, it claims that relativism is absolutely true. The relativist is well advised to exercise a healthy hermeneutic of suspicion with regard to his own platform.
CONCLUSION
As a challenge to the evangelical claim to truth, pluralism is impotent. In fact, it is self-defeating, since the claim that pluralism is true as opposed to nonpluralism is itself exclusivistic—the view that insists it is inherently wrong to make exclusive truth claims is filled with exclusive truth claims of its own. So the evangelical claim to objective truth (see chapter 7) as opposed to all views that are contradictory is left standing.
SOURCES
Clark, David, and Norman Geisler. Apologetics in the New Age.
Clarke, Andrew D., and Bruce Hunter, eds. One God, One Lord: Christianity in a World of Religious Pluralism.
Freud, Sigmund. The Future of an Illusion.
Geisler, Norman. Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics.
Geivett, Doug, et al., in Dennis Okholm, et al. More Than One Way: Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World.
Gnanakan, Ken. The Pluralistic Predicament.
Hick, John. An Interpretation of Religion.
———. The Metaphor of God Incarnate: Christology in a Pluralistic Age.
———. “A Pluralist’s View” in Dennis Okholm, MTOW.
James, William. Varieties of Religious Experience.
McGrath, Alister. “The Challenge of Pluralism for the Contemporary Christian Church” in The Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (September 1992).
———. “Response to John Hick” in Okholm, MTOW.
Nash, Ronald. Is Jesus the Only Savior?
Netland, Harold. Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Question of Truth.
Okholm, Dennis, et al. More than One Way: Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World.
Pinnock, Clark. “Response to John Hick” in Okholm, MTOW.
———. A Wideness in God’s Mercy.
Tanner, Jerald, and Sandra Tanner. The Changing World of Mormonism.
1 “A tautology is a contentless statement, something true by definition and uninformative of the real world” (Geisler, BECA, “Tautology”).
Geisler, N. L. 2002. Systematic theology, volume one: Introduction, Bible (126). Bethany House Publishers: Minneapolis, MN
