Naturalism and the Supernatural

In Part One the various types of apologetic systems were discussed. The conclusion was twofold: first, the only adequate test for the truth of a world view is the principle of actual undeniability; second, the only adequate test for the falsity of a world view is the principle of unaffirmability.

Part Two followed with a survey of the major world views and concluded that only theism is affirmable and is based on undeniable premises; all other positions are self-defeating. Now in this final section we will argue for the truth of Christian theism vis-à-vis the other possibilities within a theistic universe. That is, there are several types of theism (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, e.g.); and we must now discuss how to choose between these.

The decision among the truth claims of various world views (as pantheism, atheism, and theism) could not be to remain agnostic, for this position falsifies itself by claiming that we know we cannot know anything about reality (AGNOSTICISM – All you want to know). Neither can it be based on rationalism, because there were no rationally inescapable arguments and the law of noncontradiction is only a test for falsity but not a test for truth (RATIONALISM – All you want to know).

Neither could that decision be based simply on fideistic belief nor on a claim to divine revelation, since that simply begs the question and is a claim open equally to all conflicting systems (FIDEISM – All you want to know). Furthermore, the conflicting truth claims among the various world views could not be adjudicated by an appeal to bare facts since all facts gain their meaning in the context of the world view. Hence, it begs the question to use a fact as interpreted by a given world view as an evidence for the truth of that world view.

That same fact as interpreted by another world view would be an evidence for the truth of that other world view, and so on (EVIDENTIALISM – All you want to know). The same problems are implicit within experientialism (EXPERIENTIALISM – All you want to know), and pragmatism is simply an experientialism with reference to future experience (PRAGMATISM – All you want to know).

Finally, no form of combinationalism is a sufficient test for the truth of a world view because opposing views can fare equally well using the combinational method. Simply adding inadequate tests for truth does not equal an adequate one (COMBINATIONALISM – All you want to know). The only adequate test for a world view is what is actually undeniable. For what is unaffirmable is false and what is undeniable is true (DEISM – All you want to know).

However, once we have decided among the conflicting world views, we are faced with a quite different question as to how to decide conflicting truth claims within an overall world view. The answer to this latter question will be found in a different test for truth. Within a world view or system, truth must always be decided on the basis of systematic consistency (i.e., combinationalism). Whatever explains most facts (comprehensiveness), in the best fashion (adequacy), in a noncontradictory way (consistency), and in a manner that fits with the overall system (coherence) will be true.¹

It is the claim of Part Three in this book that Christianity is the most systematically consistent of the theistic world views; that is, that Christianity is true. Of course, systematic consistency is not a knock-down argument; its conclusions are not incorrigible. The argument for the truth of Christianity, then, will not be based on undeniability as was the argument for theism. Rather, it will be based on a degree of probability.

Further, it will be open to both verification and falsification. That is, if it could be shown that another form of theism had a better explanation for more facts, and so on, then this other form of theism should be accepted as true. On the other hand, if the Christian interpretation of the facts of our world is the most systematically consistent, then it ought to be accepted as true. For a further elaboration of what is meant by systematic consistency, a review should be made of the positions of Ferré and Carnell in Chapter 7 above.

The first step in establishing the truth of the Christian interpretation of the facts of history is a discussion of the possibility of supernatural events. Historical Christianity is inseparable from claims of the miraculous. Indeed, the central premise in the Christian apologetic is the miraculous and historical incarnation of God in Jesus of Nazareth. The argument takes on the following form:

1. Undeniability is the only adequate test for the truth of a world view (Chapters 1–9).
2. Theism is the only world view that meets the test of undeniability (Chapters 10–13).
3. Therefore, theism is true.
4. In a theistic universe miracles are possible (Chapter 14).
5. Historical events are knowable in a theistic universe (Chapter 15).
6. Systematic consistency is the test for the truth of claims within a world view (see Chapter 7).
7. The claim that Christ’s coming was a miracle is the most systematically consistent position (Chapter 16).
8. Therefore, it is true that Christ’s coming was a miracle.
9. The claim that Christ is God is the most systematically consistent view (Chapter 17).
10. Therefore, Christ is God.
11. Christ verified that the Bible is the Word of God (Chapter 18).

An Examination of the Claims of Naturalism Over Against Supernaturalism

If this is a theistic universe, it follows that miracles are possible. For if there is a God who can act in the world, then it is possible that there can be acts of God (i.e., miracles). Since we have already established on reasonable grounds that God exists (Chapter 13), the possibility of miracles follows naturally. In short, the objections to miracles are really at root objections to the existence of a theistic God.

This fact notwithstanding, the persistent attacks of naturalism and antisupernaturalism must be answered. The discussion that follows will be an attempt to both understand and refute the claims that miracles are impossible in principle and in practice. This refutation is necessary for two reasons: first, if the Christian view can be shown to be contradictory, then it cannot be held to be true.

Second, the Christian must establish the possibility of miracles, or else his case for the truth of Christianity, based on the unique and confirming miracles of Christ, will fail.

Hume: Miracles Are a Violation of the Laws of Nature

The basic objections to miracles emanate from the pen of David Hume.² The first objection of Hume is based on the nature of natural law. According to Hume the laws of nature are based on the highest degree of probability. Even though one cannot be absolutely certain about any matter of fact, nonetheless, if an event occurs over and over again with no known exception, we may have a kind of practical certainty about it.

Hume is even willing to use the word “proof” of events in this category. By “proof” he means something known from experience that is so probable that it leaves no room for doubt, although it is always logically possible that one is wrong about it. With this in mind Hume’s argument against miracles may be summarized as follows:

1. A miracle by definition is a violation of (or exception to) a law of nature;
2. But the laws of nature are built upon the highest degree of probability;
3. Hence, a miracle by definition (as an exception) is based on the lowest degree of probability;
4. Now the wise man should always base his belief on the highest degree of probability;
5. Therefore, the wise man should never believe in miracles.

Let us examine Hume’s argument in more detail. The first premise could be defended as follows: If a miracle is an event within the purview of natural law, then it would not be a miracle but simply an unusual natural happening. Hence, to sustain the claim that miracles are really super-natural, they must be viewed as exceptions to natural law. If this is what Hume means by “violation” then there is no objection to this premise.

However, if “violation” means breaking some inviolable law on which the natural order depends, then the theist would object that “violation” begs the question by defining miracles as impossible.

First, a theist would want to examine more carefully what is meant by “natural law.” If it is meant in the prescriptive sense as a kind of immutable way things must operate, then the possibility of miracles is already precluded in the question-begging definition. If, on the other hand, “natural law” is meant only as a description of the way things do happen, then the theist can readily agree.

Second, it does not necessarily follow that an unusual natural event rules out the possibility of the miraculous. The unusual natural process may be the means by which God performs what as a total event is miraculous. Science may be able to describe the process but not able to explain the total meaning of the product of that process in completely naturalistic terms.

Certainly the theist does not want to contest Hume’s second and third premises. A miracle would not even be possible unless there was a regular established pattern of events to which it was the exception. Whatever else is meant by natural law, it is minimal to the definition to understand that a miracle is a highly unusual event. If it happened in a regular and predictable way, then it would no longer qualify as a miracle.

Hence, the theist must agree with Hume that by their very nature, natural events must be based on high probability and miracles must be highly exceptional.

Hume’s fourth premise is the one with which the theist must disagree. Why should a wise (critical, thinking) man always adjust his belief to the highest degree of probability based on past experience? Even Hume argued that we cannot be sure the sun will rise tomorrow simply because it has always risen in the past.

There is no necessary connection between the past and the present, as Hume would be the first to admit.³ That being the case, then there is no logical way that Hume can exclude the possibility of a miracle occurring today as an exception to the universally established pattern of the past. In contradistinction to Hume, we would argue that the wise (critical, thinking) man is the one who judges the truth or falsity of a miracle on the basis of the available evidence for its happening.

However great the odds against something happening, it is always possible that it will happen anyway. This is true of both factual and theoretical probability. As nontheists are the first to point out in criticizing the teleological argument, the odds against the universe happening by chance may be great; but it still could have happened by chance. The odds of rolling three dice and getting 3 sixes are 1/216, but a person could get them on the first toss.

Allowing theoretical mathematical probability to outweigh the actual evidence of the present is a very unwise thing to do. The chances for one person being dealt a perfect hand of bridge are computed at 1 in 635,-013,559,600.

Now a wise man ought not allow those mathematical odds against its happening to take precedence over the testimony of four sane, sober, honest, and intelligent eyewitnesses who saw the perfect hand. In like manner the wise man does not allow antecedent regularity in nature to outweigh consequent evidence for an irregular event. The probability based on the past should never take precedence over the evidence of the present.

By defining a wise man as one who would always take past regularity over the evidence for a violation of that pattern in the present, Hume has in effect set up an invincible naturalism. He has said that in practice he would never allow an exception to the laws of nature.

Hence, on this account, natural law has become practically inviolable. But this begs the whole question, since it assumes miracles will never happen in order to prove that they never occur. Such is the circular nature of a strict naturalism. Without assuming the practical impossibility of belief in miracles, Hume’s argument against the possibility of miracles fails.

Antony Flew: Unrepeatability of Miracles Shows Their Impossibility

Hume’s argument has been updated by Antony Flew.⁴ It takes the following form:

1. Miracles are by nature particular and unrepeatable events.
2. Scientific laws by nature describe general and repeatable events.
3. But the evidence for the repeatable and general is always greater than the evidence for particular and unrepeatable events.
4. And the scientific or critical man will never base his belief on the lesser or weaker evidence.
5. Therefore, the critical man will never believe in miracles.

Technically speaking, neither this nor Hume’s argument rules out the possibility of miracles; they simply argue against their believability. Miracles are still possible even if the evidence for believing in them is weak. Nonetheless, the Christian theist wishes to challenge Flew’s contention that the evidence for miracles will always be the weaker evidence.

First, let us examine the other premises. There is no reason why a theist could not accept the truth of the first two premises. For if miracles were not particular and unrepeatable by natural means, then they would not be miracles. Once one can control or repeat an event over and over it becomes a general event. And once it is repeatable and general it is indistinguishable from a natural event. Hence, in order for miracles to maintain distinguishability from natural events they must be particular and unrepeatable in the natural course of events.

Properly understood, the Christian theist may accept the truth of the fourth premise. Certainly the Christian, too, should always accept the position based on the stronger evidence. This is precisely what systematic consistency means as a test for truth. The view that best explains the most evidence in a consistent and coherent way is held to be true; the opposing views are believed to be false.

Christian theism challenges the third premise of Flew’s naturalism, which asserts that the evidence for the repeatable and general is always greater than that for the particular and unrepeatable. We may reply to Flew in two ways: first, by pointing out his unfalsifiable naturalistic assumption. It begs the question to assume in advance of looking at the facts that the evidence will always be greater against miracles than for it. Indeed, Flew of all people should not be making such an unfalsifiable assertion.

It was he who put the challenge to theism to allow something that could actually falsify theism as a ground for the meaningfulness of the theistic position. He asked, “What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof … [of] the existence of God?”⁵ If the believer will not allow anything to count against his belief in God, charged Flew, then neither may he allow anything to count for it. Now we would like to ask Mr. Flew the same thing with respect to his unfalsifiable naturalistic presupposition, namely, how can your naturalism be falsified?

Flew has entertained the question and his answer is insufficient. He claims that his position is falsifiable in principle but not in practice. He argues that the possibility of miracles is a matter of evidence and not simply of dogmatism, but that the evidence is always against miracles happening since by nature they are particular and unrepeatable, as opposed to a natural event which is general and repeatable.

The evidence for the latter is always stronger because, argued Flew, it can be tested any time and any place. A miracle, on the other hand, cannot be tested so easily. Further, even if the evidence for an event contrary to the laws of nature did occur, “that event could now no longer be described as truly miraculous.”⁶ Now this latter comment, even more so than the former, reveals Flew’s invincible naturalistic bias. The argument implied may be put this way:

1. Whatever happens in the natural world is a natural event.
2. Once an alleged miracle occurs in the natural world it is a natural event.
3. Hence, once an alleged miracle occurs it is ipso facto a natural event.

In short, this argument reduces to “everything that happens in the natural world is caused by the natural world.” But this clearly begs the question; for if there are some events caused from beyond the world, they will nevertheless have to occur in the world in order for us to experience them.

It means that if one could show convincing evidence that the resurrection of Christ actually occurred in the space-time world, then the naturalist would simply shrug his shoulder and say, “Well, now we know that resurrections are not miraculous!” Whether unfalsifiable in principle or in practice makes no difference, his naturalistic unbelief is invincible. Flew has what Hare called a “blik.”⁷

No amount of evidence of actual happenings will ever convince him that a miracle has indeed occurred. Whenever what was previously believed to be impossible comes to pass, the naturalist promptly concludes it was not miraculous after all. Why cannot the theist argue similarly that in principle the existence of God can be falsified but in actual practice it cannot?

Why cannot the theist insist in like manner that in principle some events may be caused by nature but that in actual practice once an event occurs in the world (God’s world) it is ipso facto a God-caused event? What right does a naturalist have to claim all events as naturally caused any more than a theist has to claim that all events are divinely caused (some in a regular way and some on special occasions)?

If one position can beg the question, then the other should have the same privilege. At any rate, Flew’s argument is an almost classic case of an unfalsifiable position which in the process of justification begs the whole question in favor of naturalism.

The Descriptive Nature of Natural Law Eliminates Miracles

Since Hume’s time the discussion on miracles has taken on some modern sophistication. The following argument against miracles from the descriptive nature of scientific law is an example of this point.⁸ The argument can be summarized like this:

1. Scientific laws are merely descriptions of events and not prescriptive norms.
2. But descriptions cannot be violated; they can merely be revised.
3. However, a miracle by nature must be a violation of a law of nature.
4. Therefore, miracles by nature cannot occur.

The Christian theist has no need to disagree with the first premise. Indeed, viewing natural laws as descriptive is both an answer to Hume’s first objection and the way to show that miracles are possible in an “open universe.” For a closed system of prescriptive norms presents a much more formidable obstacle to showing that exceptions occur.

But if “natural law” is nothing but an open system of human description, based on statistical probability, then a miraculous exception to this is not really violating any immutable law of the universe.

In support of the second premise the antisupernaturalist urges the following argument. Scientific descriptions are like maps; namely, when they are found to be inaccurate one does not violate the map but simply revises it. If the landscape is found not to conform to a topographical map, what one does is draw a more accurate map. Nothing has been violated; the description is simply changed to conform to reality.

In like manner, the naturalist argues, once a new and unusual event is known to have occurred we do not scream “miracle!” The scientific mind simply finds ways to include this event in a broader, more accurate description of the world in which this event is known to have occurred. Hence, the very descriptive nature of scientific law rules out the miraculous; for any exception or inaccuracy in previous laws or “maps” is simply a reason to revise the map to include the so-called miraculous event under the overall natural umbrella.

It is precisely at this point that the theist objects. For this argument, too, is based on the unjustified presupposition that “whatever happens in nature is caused by nature.”⁹ It assumes that all events in the world are natural events. Of course if this is so, then miraculous events in the world are impossible.

Further, there is confusion on the use of the word violate. A miracle would “violate” a previous description only in the sense that the law as a general description did not apply in this particular case. For example, if a man were found walking on water this would be a “violation” of the general principle that men cannot walk on water. Perhaps “violation” is too technical a term and we should speak rather of the general rule and the particular exception, of the regular and the irregular, or of the usual and the unusual.

At any rate, the naturalist makes an unjustified jump from “violation” to the need for “revision.” Why revise the topographical map unless change in the landscape can be repeatedly observed? Would the map need revision if a mountain suddenly appeared, was verified, and then disappeared again? Why revise the belief that one’s wife loves him because of a single contrary outburst of anger?

Revision is only necessary when there is (or can be) a repetition of the observation. Not all exceptions call for revision. Even scientists do not revise their theories because of unexplainable and unrepeated anomalies. If anomalous situations do not demand a new law then neither do supernatural occurrences. For in neither case does one have a natural law (nomos) to explain the event.

Guy Robinson: Nature of the Scientific Method Eliminates Miracles

The contemporary scientific naturalist sometimes replies to the above solution with the argument that the scientific method as such eliminates belief in the miraculous.¹⁰ The argument runs like this:

1. Science qua science must assume that all events are naturally explainable.
2. But if all events are scientifically explainable then no events are supernatural or miraculous.
3. Therefore, science as science eliminates the supernatural.

The Christian theist may object to both premises of this argument. The naturalist defends the first premise by pointing out that if a scientist gave up looking for an explanation to an event he would be giving up science as such. Science is predicated on the belief that events have natural explanations, and to forfeit this would be to forsake the cause of science.

Exceptions never bring science to a screeching halt. On the contrary, exceptions (whether they claim to be miraculous or not) are goads to more research. For an exception is often the tip that the present law is inadequate. The scientist as scientist must assume there are natural explanations. So goes the argument of scientific naturalism.

As sound as this argument may appear, there is within it a subtle but essential naturalistic presupposition. Actually there is no reason why science must assume naturalism. It is more scientific to recognize the limits of the scientific domain. Scientific methodology as such should not make metaphysical claims. It may be that there is not a naturalistic explanation for every event.

In this case, it is not wise to seek explanations where none can be found. Simply to assume, as the argument does, that there must be a naturalistic explanation for every event begs the whole question in favor of naturalism. Furthermore, the theist may make a distinction between a pragmatic working assumption and a metaphysical or ontological presupposition. Why could not the theist agree as a matter of working procedure to push the scientific method as far as it will go?

Why could he not continue to look for a natural explanation—not because he believes there is one, but in order to show that it is highly unlikely that one will ever be found? For example, a Christian in science could try to discover how to make living things from nonliving things.

This he could do not because he will thereby show that the original formation of life was a natural event, but, on the contrary, that in the process of discovering how life was formed in the beginning he might provide scientific evidence that life did not occur spontaneously or accidentally.

In any event, adopting the working procedure of always looking for a natural explanation need not be extended into a rigid naturalistic metaphysical position that there are no nonnatural explanations. The scientific frame of mind should not legislate what kind of explanations there can be. Rather, it should look for the best explanation possible.

And if the best explanation is a supernatural one, then it would be entirely unreasonable to reject it on the grounds of the practical benefits that come from adopting a scientific working procedure that continues to look for natural explanations. Science can be adopted as a practical procedure without buying into naturalism as a metaphysical view.

In short, this objection to miracles confuses science and naturalism. It assumes that one cannot be a scientist without being a naturalist. But this begs the question as to the meaning of “science.” Science as such is not a metaphysic but a methodology. Science as science should be neutral to metaphysical presuppositions. There is no necessity flowing from the scientific method as such that forces one to adopt a naturalistic world view.

The Christian theist will object to the second premise of Robinson’s argument as well. It may be that the same events have both scientific and theological explanations. Even if science could explain how an event occurred, it does not follow that it can explain why it occurred or even why it occurred when. it occurred. Showing that there was a strong wind blowing all night on the Red Sea does not thereby explain why this wind blew precisely when it did in order to enable Israel to escape from Egypt (see Exod. 12).

Even if science can reduplicate in a laboratory the means of producing certain events that have happened only rarely in history (say, a virgin birth), it does not follow that the occurrence of such an event in history was not a miraculous event. There is no reason why God cannot use some natural processes in producing a supernatural event.¹¹

Indeed, in the case of Biblical miracles there is usually, if not always, a natural process employed as part of the miraculous event. The virgin birth employed the natural process of pregnancy along with the unusual occurrence of having no male sperm implantation. Jesus is not represented as creating the loaves and fishes to feed the multitude; he simply multiplied some natural loaves that already existed.

Further, one has no right to claim that miracles cannot happen unless he can show that the scientific explanation is the only explanation of the event. For there may be multileveled explanations of the same event—one in the natural world and another in a spiritual world. The only way one can eliminate the possibility of there being a spiritual world or spiritual explanation is to offer some disproof of God.

But such attempted disproofs have already been examined and found self-defeating (see Chapter 12). And apart from disproving God, there is no way to eliminate the possibility that God may be using exceptional natural events in order to perform supernatural acts.

Finally, science has no right to claim an event is natural simply because it can describe the how, or the process, by which it occurred. An event does not qualify as “natural” unless it can be repeated, predicted, or controlled by scientific means. Description of a process is not the guarantee that an event is natural. The scientist may be merely describing the supernatural process by which God caused the event.

Only if the scientist gains control of the process so that he can repeat it regularly and predictably would he have the right to claim it as a natural event. And even then the theist may claim that in some cases events whose process can be explained naturally are not purely natural events. There may be other aspects of the event such as its timing, purpose, or results that are best explained supernaturally. In any event, the scientific method in no way demands a naturalistic explanation.

Alastair McKinnon: Miracles Are Impossible in the Natural Course of Events

The extent to which the naturalistic bias has penetrated modern thought is very evident in the following argument against miracles:¹²

1. A natural happening is what occurs in the actual course of events.
2. A miracle by definition would be contrary to the actual course of events.
3. But nothing can be contrary to the actual course of events; what is, is.
4. Therefore, miracles cannot occur.

In support of the first premise the naturalist could argue that all natural events must occur in the actual course of events in the natural world. To this the theist need not object. However, the converse of this is not true, namely, that everything that happens in the natural world is ipso facto a natural event. “All events that are natural occur in 0the natural world” cannot be logically converted into “all events that occur in the natural world are natural events.” Again, this would beg the whole question.

Furthermore, the Christian theist would definitely object to the naturalistic understanding of the second premise. A miracle is not “contrary” to the natural course of events in the sense that it cannot happen within a natural sequence but simply because it cannot be explained as a result of the natural sequence. Not everything that occurs in a natural sequence is a necessary part of that natural order. Human freedom can occur within a natural order without being a necessary part of that order.

For example, I can choose to jump out of the way of a speeding car without acting contrary to (or violating) any physical law. Likewise, in the moral realm I may choose not to do what comes naturally. I may, for example, choose not to retaliate against one who injures me—a natural reaction—without acting contrary to anything in the actual course of events. In like manner miracles can happen within the natural order without being a necessary part of that natural order.

Finally, the Christian theist must scrutinize the use of the third premise as well. Of course, what is, is. This is a tautology. But in the sense in which the naturalist intends this, it is a naturalistic truism that begs the whole question. He must mean it in the sense that whatever happens in the actual course of events is ipso facto not a miracle. But if we already know in advance that whenever anything occurs that is proof positive that it is not a miracle, then it follows that we can forever give up looking for any miracle to occur.

Here again, the antisupernaturalist prejudice is legislating against the possibility of miracles; it is not looking at the evidence for or against an actual event being a miracle. “What is, is; nothing happens contrary to the actual course of events.” In one sense this is true. But it is also true that a miracle could occur within the natural course of events. It may be that one or more of the events in the midst of the ongoing process of history have been supernatural events. That is, they may have been events that occurred in nature but were neither caused by nature nor contrary to nature.

The antisupernaturalist must do more than point to the actual happening and claim its occurrence as proof positive that it is not a miracle. The actual is not automatically the natural. What actually occurs may just as well be a supernatural event. What the naturalist must do in order to prove that an actual event is a natural event is to show that the event is naturally connected with antecedent and consequent events.

Or, at least he must show that the event is part of a natural chain of events that are repeatable and predictable. For unless the event fits into a general and regular pattern on which predictions can be made, the naturalist has no right claiming that it is an event explainable by natural law. Naturalism grossly begs the question in its own favor by claiming that everything that does happen is unquestioned proof that it was not miraculous.

Hume’s Other Objections to Miracles

David Hume offered two other objections against miracles.¹³ The first is based on the self-canceling nature of conflicting miracle claims, and the second is based on the untrustworthiness of the testimony in favor of a miracle. The first objection may be stated like this:

1. No truth claim can be supported by miracles if any contrary truth claim is also supported by like miracles; contrary truth claims are mutually self-canceling.
2. But all religious systems claim miracles in support of their truth claim.
3. Therefore, no miracles can be used in support of a religious truth claim.

The Christian theist need not object to the first premise. It is not only true, but later it will be helpful to Christianity. In the final analysis, it will serve to eliminate all truth claims based on like “miracles.” Contraries are indeed mutually self-canceling when they are each supported by the same kind of “evidence.” Equipollence of evidence does lead to skepticism. If these claims are all based on the same kind of evidence, no one of these claims has any more right to truth than the others.

As a matter of fact, this situation can lead to a strong argument in favor of Christianity as follows:

1. All theistic truth claims supported by like “miracles” are mutually self-canceling; that is, none of them can lay rightful claim to truth.
2. But Christianity alone is supported by unique miraculous events.
3. Therefore, Christianity alone can lay rightful claim to truth.

It is not our purpose here to support the minor premise; this will be done later (in Chapters 15–17). It is sufficient to point out here that if evidence can be provided that Christianity has unique and supporting miracles the like of which are not found in any other theistic system, then Hume’s argument does not apply against the Christian truth claims. At least the question of miracles is open to factual verification. Hume’s objection is not only unsuccessful but it can be turned into a proof for the uniqueness of the Christian truth claim.

For if all other religious claims are supported by like “miracles” of a self-canceling nature and if only Christianity has a unique miraculous support, then only Christianity is verified as true. At least at this point we may conclude that it is possible that unique miraculous events are supportive of the truth of Christianity vis-à-vis other positions.

Hume’s second argument against miracles is based on the untrustworthy nature of eyewitnesses. It runs like this:

1. No miracle can be established without sufficient evidence in its favor.
2. Sufficient evidence must include a sufficient number of witnesses, with sufficient education and with unquestioned integrity.
3. But there never has been sufficient evidence to support the claim that any miraculous event has occurred.
4. Therefore, no miracle has ever been established.

The merit of this argument is that it is de facto and not de jure; that is, it is open to factual confirmation or discontinuation. Again, not only is the major premise true, but it is also to the advantage of Christian theism to acknowledge the truth of that premise. For unless there is sufficient evidence for miraculous truth claims, then many conflicting truth claims could be established. But if sufficient evidence is demanded, then it narrows down considerably the claimants to truth.

Our objection is to the second step in the argument. Hume must go in one of two directions in supporting the claim that there never has been “sufficient” evidence. Either he may make the definition of sufficient evidence so narrow that practically nothing historical could be believed including the existence of Napoleon or maybe even the existence of Hume himself.

Or else he may make a sensible definition of what “sufficient” evidence would be and thereby open the door for the substantial historical evidence in favor of the eyewitnesses of the resurrection of Christ (see Chapter 16). In any event, Hume’s argument does not eliminate the possibility of miracles, which is all we are concerned with at this point.

Some Conclusions About the Natural
and the Supernatural

With the preceding discussion in mind, we are now in a position to draw certain conclusions regarding the nature of miracles. First, we will consider the difference between what may be two different kinds of miraculous events.

The Difference Between First and Second Class Miracles

Antony Flew offered an objection to miracles that forces a clarification within the Christian theistic position.¹⁴ His argument may be summarized as follows:

1. A miracle must be identifiable before it can be used as evidence.
2. Now there are only two ways to identify (or define) a miracle:

• As an unusual event within nature, or —
• As an exception to nature.

1. But an unusual event within nature is not a miracle; it is simply a rare but natural event.
2. And there is no natural way to know that an exception to nature has occurred.
3. Therefore, there is no way to identify (or define) a miracle.
4. But what is unidentifiable has no evidential value.
5. Therefore, no miracle can have any evidential value.

There are two responses to this from a theistic point of view. First, even as an unusual event within nature a miracle can have evidential value. For simply explaining how something occurred does not thereby explain why it happened nor why it happened when it happened. Even unusual natural events can have evidential value when viewed in their total context.

It may be that some things are so highly unusual and coincidental that, when viewed in connection with the moral or theological context in which they occurred, the label “miracle” is the most appropriate one for the happening. Let us call this kind of supernaturally guided event a second class miracle, that is, one whose natural process can be described scientifically (and perhaps even reduplicated by humanly controlled natural means) but whose end product in the total picture is best explained by invoking the supernatural.

Providing that the theist can offer some good reasons (by virtue of the moral or theological context of the event) for not accepting a purely natural explanation, then there is no reason to rule out the evidential value of such unusual natural events.

Second, the theist may argue for the possibility of what may be called first class miracles by taking Flew’s other definition of a miracle, namely, an exception to the natural process. How would one know an exception to the natural process has occurred? Of course he could not know it on any supernatural grounds (such as that God told him or that the Bible says so, etc.) for this would beg the whole question.

But what natural grounds could there be for identifying a supernatural event? This question poses a problem that can only be answered by a defense of the possibility of a supernatural realm (e.g.. God). If it is possible to argue from the natural world to something beyond the natural world (as was done in the case for theism. Chapter 13), then the problem is resolved.

That is to say, if by examining nature we find that nature cannot adequately explain its own existence, and if it becomes necessary to conclude that there is something (or Someone) beyond nature, then the ontological ground is thereby established for making a distinction between the natural and the supernatural without begging the question.

The remaining question is this: What are the epistemological conditions by which one can distinguish a supernatural event in the natural world from an event of the natural world? The answer to this question emerges from an earlier discussion. We proposed that a natural event is one that occurs generally or regularly and that can be repeated or predicted by natural means.

In order to even qualify as a first class supernatural event, on the other hand, an event must be one which does not generally or regularly occur in the natural course of events and which cannot be repeated or predicted by natural means. In addition to these minimal conditions, a miracle also possesses some moral or theological characteristics (see below). It suffices here to note that there are recognizable earmarks for the distinction of the miraculous from the natural.

There remains another problem to be discussed. If a first class miracle is one where the natural process is not known and, hence, cannot be repeated or predicted by natural means, then what if the natural means are subsequently discovered?

Does this mean that future scientific research is a threat to the belief that some event is miraculous? How can one claim that there is any such thing as a first class miracle unless he knows for sure the process by which it occurred is not only undiscovered but also undiscoverable? For once the scientific how is known, then by definition it ceases to be a first class miracle.

The theist may make two responses to these questions. First, he may admit the possibility that the modus operandi of all miracles is discoverable by science. He may admit that science can know how virgin births and resurrections occur and that science may even be able to repeat the process. Even so, this admission amounts to no more than the acknowledging that all first class miracles may be reducible to second class miracles.

So it would not destroy the miraculous altogether nor eliminate its evidential value to admit that science may one day discover how these miracles took place. Second, the theist may wish to make a distinction between what can happen by controlled repeating of scientific process and what does happen in the actual course of events without outside interference.

The theist may claim that outside interference (by a mind) in the natural process (in order to bring about unusual results) is really an argument in favor of the miraculous. If nature left to itself did not (or could not) produce the unusual effect except by controlled interjection from an outside intelligence, then this may be precisely the case with a first class miracle. Perhaps a miracle is the interjection of factors into the natural process by an outside Mind (i.e., God) that produces the highly unusual results that would otherwise not have occurred.

If this is so, then a theist may claim that there are first class miracles and that they are known by the fact that nature has not or does not produce them on its own without the intelligent manipulation of factors in the natural world. In this case only what nature can and does do generally or repeatedly without outside intelligent interference is known to be a natural event.¹⁵ Therefore, anything that does not occur generally or repeatedly in the natural course of events could be a miraculous event.

Whether it is a miracle or an anomaly will depend on the other distinguishable characteristics of a miracle to be discussed later. But even if there were no way to identify first class miracles on the basis of the distinction between what does happen in nature without the outside interference of mind and what can happen with such interference, nevertheless first class miracles are still possible on another ground. A theist might simply hold that a first-class miracle is one where science has not yet shown (and may never show) the natural means of repeating it.

If this is so, then a Christian might believe that the resurrection of Christ is a first-class miracle which science does not as yet know how to repeat. The epistemological status of belief in this kind of first-class miracle would be that it is a thus-far unfalsified belief. Taken one way, a first-class miracle is that which cannot be produced by natural processes.

Taken the other way, a first-class miracle is what nature does not produce. In either case, miracles of both classes are possible; naturalism has failed to eliminate them.

The Possibility of Miracles Follows from Theism

Actually, there is a much simpler way to argue for the possibility of miracles than by way of the foregoing discussion. Miracles follow naturally from the nature of the theistic God. The argument takes the following shape:

1. An omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent theistic God exists.
2. Now an omnipotent intelligence can do anything that is possible.
3. Miracles are not impossibilities.
4. Therefore, miracles can occur.

The first premise has already been established (Chapter 13). The second premise follows from the nature of omnipotence. An omnipotent God is one who has enough power to do anything that is not either logically or actually impossible. The only limits on omnipotence are what is either logically or actually impossible. For example, an omnipotent God cannot make square circles; this is logically impossible. Nor can an omnipotent God cease to be God; this is actually impossible.

The third premise can be established as follows: first, there is no logical contradiction in the concept of a miracle. A miracle is not an antinatural event; it is supernatural. Only an antinatural event would be contradictory to nature. Hence, a miracle is not a logical contradiction. Or, to put it another way, in a theistic universe, where everything is dependent on God’s continual sustaining causality, there is no contradiction in affirming that by “natural” we mean the way God operates generally and by “miracle” we mean the way he operates on special occasions.

Conceived this way there is no logical contradiction in the concept of the miraculous. Modern scientific understanding of the universe as an “open system” of which laws are merely descriptions and not a “closed system” of immutable, prescriptive laws is certainly in accord with this conclusion.

Second, there is no actual contradiction or impossibility with some miracle(s) occurring. Some miracles may be actually impossible, for example, a miracle performed to counteract a miracle or event which God willed to perform. God cannot actually will to annul what he has willed to do. But there is no more contradiction involved in affirming that some natural events do not actually contradict some other natural events than to say that some miraculous events do not contradict some natural events.

All such events are acts of God, and once it is granted that there are acts of God there is no actual contradiction in saying some acts (i.e., miracles) are performed only rarely and others are performed regularly. But if a miracle is neither a logical nor actual impossibility for a theistic God, then it follows that miracles are both logically and actually possible.

The Distinguishing Earmarks of a Miracle

It is not enough to define a miracle as an exception to the general pattern of events. This characteristic merely indicates that the event is a nonnatural one; that is, it is not known to come under any scientific law. But there are at least two other possibilities within the category of nonnatural events: anomalies and satanic signs. It is possible there are evil spirits in the universe and that they perform rare events which are not explainable by known scientific laws.

Miracles vs. Satanic Signs

First of all, let us distinguish a divine miracle from a satanic sign.¹⁶ Granting the possibility of evil spiritual powers in the universe working in opposition to God, then whatever intervention they may be able to make in the natural world would be in accord with their purposes. Hence, satanic signs would, by their very nature, have the following characteristics:

1. They would not be associated with truth about God but with error; they would not be used to confirm truth but to confirm error.
2. Satanic signs would not bring about moral good but evil; they would not stimulate conduct in accord with God’s will but in opposition to it.
3. Finally, satanic signs would not help fulfill God’s purposes but would work to destroy them; they would not glorify God but would magnify evil men or the evil spirits behind them.

Miracles vs. Magic

What is commonly known as “magic,” but which is really only trickery, is not miraculous at all. It is simply built on natural laws (such as “the hand is quicker than the eye”) which can be repeated and predicted. That is, magic is under the control of man. Then too, magic as such does not bring glory to God nor moral good to man. Neither does magic have theological meaning. A magic trick is amoral and nontheological by nature. Magic does not bring glory to God but to the magician who performs it.

It is man-centered not God-centered. There is nothing supernatural or anomalous about magic tricks; all the laws involved are natural and knowable. Of course, what is known as “black magic” is, for the Christian, another matter. It is not trickery by natural physical laws; rather, it involves spiritual forces which go beyond the normal happenings in the physical world. But ordinary magic is simply a natural phenomenon that is explainable or repeatable by natural means.

Miracles vs. Anomalies

An anomaly is also a nonnatural event in the sense that there is no known natural explanation for it. There is a natural explanation for it, but the explanation is not known. How then does an anomaly differ from a miracle? An anomaly is amoral and atheological. There are no truth claims associated with it nor moral consequences flowing from it. All it shares with a miracle is the fact that it is unusual and unrepeatable, or at least it is unrepeatable at the present by those to whom it is an anomaly.

We may differentiate an anomaly from a miracle by the following illustration. If one were to observe a fish rise out of the water, hover for thirty seconds in midair and splash back into the pond, that would be an anomaly. There is no apparent or known scientific explanation as to how a wingless fish should seemingly defy the law of gravity.

Furthermore, the event has no theological truth claims connected with it, nor any moral consequences following from it. On the other hand, if a man claiming to be a prophet of God challenges believers in idols to a duel in which, upon his prayer, fire comes from the sky and consumes soaking wet wood, this would be a miracle. This event is not only scientifically unusual but it is accompanied also by truth claims and has definite moral implications and consequences.

We may now summarize the characteristics of a miracle.

(1) A miraculous event must be nonnatural or scientifically unusual, that is, an exception to the normal pattern of events. It may be unusual because natural events rarely turn up that way (called a second class miracle) or because they never turn out that way (called a first class miracle).

They may never turn out in that unusual way either because they cannot (because the process cannot be understood or repeated by scientific means) or because they simply will not (because it takes outside interference of a mind manipulating natural processes in order to accomplish that kind of event).

(2) A miracle entails some theological truth claim. Acts of God involve some truth about God. Signs come with sermons and miracles come with messages to interpret them.

(3) A miracle must have a good moral impact. That is, it must not only help confirm some truth about God, but it must be fitting of the moral nature of God. Acts of God cannot be contrary to the attributes of God.

(4) Miracles are not anti-natural. They fit into nature. They are exceptions but not contradictions; they suspend normal patterns but do not really violate or break natural processes. Even a miraculous virgin birth will be subject to the normal laws of pregnancy, and water turned to wine can still intoxicate.

In short, miracles get man’s gaze because they are unusual; they present God’s Word; they make some claim for God; they bring glory to God by manifesting his moral nature. Finally, miracles must bring good into the creation of God.

Miracles may have the first named characteristic in common with satanic signs, magic, or anomalies; but the last named characteristics clearly distinguish miracles. Of all these, only a miracle befits God, benefits creation, and fits into the natural order without being a natural product of it.

Summary and Conclusion

The arguments against miracles beg the question. They presuppose that miracles are impossible either in principle or in practice. Rather than looking at the evidence for or against miracles, they end up legislating in advance the impossibility of the miraculous. They say in effect: “whatever happens in the natural world is a natural event.” But some things that happen in the natural world may have a supernatural origin.

In point of fact, if there is a God who can act (viz., a theistic God), then acts of God (i.e., miracles) are automatically possible.

There is, of course, the problem of identifying a miracle. Here the theist may argue that a miracle is a highly unusual event within nature, either what rarely (second class miracles) or never (first class miracles) occurs by known natural causes. Further, a miracle is an event that is morally and theologically compatible with a theistic God. In short, a miracle as an act of God would be performed in confirmation of the truth and will of God.

Whether or not a miracle has ever occurred cannot be settled by philosophy alone; that is a matter of history. It can be shown philosophically that miracles are possible, but whether or not miracles have actually happened can be known only experientially and historically. It is to this experiential and historical point we will turn our attention in the next chapters.

SELECT READINGS FOR Miracles

Exposition of Miracles

• Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles III, 98–107.
• Augustine. City of God, Book X.
• Lewis, C. S. Miracles.
• Swinburne, Richard. The Concept of Miracles.
• Tennant, F. R. Miracle and Its Philosophical Presuppositions.
• Warfield, B. B. Counterfeit Miracles.

Evaluation of Miracles

• Diamond, Malcolm. “Miracles,” in Religious Studies9 (Sept. 1973).
• Flew, Antony. “Miracles,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5.
• Grant, R. M. Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought.
• Hume, David. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, secs. X and XI.
• Robinson, Guy. “Miracles,” in Ratio 9 (Dec. 1967).

¹ In this context the work of Edward J. Carnell is most helpful. See Introduction to Christian Apologetics, chaps. 3, 6.

² David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sec. X, pt. I.

³ Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

⁴ See Antony Flew, “Miracles,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Paul Edwards, ed., vol. 5, pp. 346–53.

⁵ Flew, “Theology and Falsification,” in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, Antony Flew, ed., p. 99.

⁶ See Flew, “Miracles,” Encyclopedia, p. 352.

⁷ See R. M. Hare, “Theology and Falsification,” in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, Antony Flew, ed., p. 100.

⁸ Flew, “Miracles,” Encyclopedia, p. 349.

⁹ As a matter of fact, a naturalist would be hard pressed to prove that any event in nature is caused by natural law. If “laws” are merely descriptions then laws can’t cause anything any more than arithmetic causes ten pennies in one’s pocket because he can add up the number accurately. See C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock, p. 77.

¹⁰ Guy Robinson, “Miracles,” in Ratio 9 (December 1967), pp. 155–66.

¹¹ See C. S. Lewis, Miracles, p. 61.

¹² Alastair McKinnon, “ ‘Miracle’ and ‘Paradox’ ” in American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (October 1967), pp. 308–14.

¹³ Hume, Enquiry, sec. X, pt. II.

¹⁴ Flew, “Miracles,” Encyclopedia, p. 348 f.

¹⁵ See Lewis, Miracles, p. 58 f.

¹⁶ See Kurt Koch, Between Christ and Satan, p. 96 f.

Geisler, N. L. (1976). Christian apologetics. Includes index. (263). Grand Rapids: Baker Book House.

Naturalism and the Supernatural