DEISM – All you want to know

There are a limited number of mutually exclusive ways to view the whole of reality. The ensuing chapters will review these different metaphysical systems. The purpose will be to show that all the major alternate world views are self-defeating and inadequate and that only theism stands the test for truth laid down in the last chapter of Part One (Chapter 8).

Theism is the belief that there is a God both beyond and within the world, a Creator and Sustainer who sovereignly controls the world and supernaturally intervenes in it. Deism holds with theism that God created the world but denies his supernatural intervention in it on the grounds that the world operates by natural and self-sustaining laws of the Creator. In short. God is beyond the world but he is not active in the world in a supernatural way. Pantheism holds that God is identical with the real world. God is all and all is God.

God does not transcend reality but is immanent in reality, or rather, all reality is in God. Beyond him is only illusion or nonreality. Panentheism or finite godism (or bipolar theism) contends that God is in all the world; the world is the “body” of God. God in his actuality is commensurate with the changing world of our experience; only God’s potentiality transcends the world. In brief, God is to the world as the mind is to the body.

Atheism, of course, denies that there is a God in any of the above senses either in or beyond the world. Polytheism, the belief that there are many gods beyond the world, is not a major philosophical world view and will be treated only in passing under the theistic argument that there is only one God (see Chapter 13).

Exposition of the Deistic World View

Deism is not presently a major world view but its significance is both historic and lasting. The deistic movement arose during the seventeenth century and flourished in the eighteenth but largely died out by the nineteenth century. It represents, however, one of the major metaphysical positions about reality that conflicts with theism.

The Roots of Deism

Insofar as deism involved a negative destructive criticism of both supernatural revelations and miracles, it sprang from the ancient pagan writers like Celsus and Porphyry. Insofar as it was hostile to Christianity it was a reaction against an overemphasis on doctrine and ritual at the expense of ethical considerations. But as a philosophical movement, deism borrowed the theistic concept of God and understood it in terms of the mechanistic model (e.g., watchmaker) of the new scientific outlook springing from Bacon and others.

Many other roots of deism have been noted by historians, for example, the Renaissance, the study of comparative religions, the discovery of non-Christian tribes, the increase of human inventions, a resurgence of gnostic pride of intellect, the revival of the allegorical method of interpreting the Bible (from Origen), and the influence of ancient naturalism and skepticism from the stoics and skeptics.

Along the way there were many philosophical figures who may not technically qualify as deists but who nonetheless gave impetus to and provided arguments for the movement. Bacon’s scientific approach, John Locke’s empiricism, and David Hume’s skepticism about miracles definitively aided the deistic cause. The specific contributions of these influences will be pinpointed in subsequent analysis.

In short, the strains in philosophy that tended either to naturalism or antisupernaturalism, that stressed the scientific processes, and that glorified the natural creation without vilifying the Creator were influential or helpful to deism.

The Rise of Deism

There are numerous theological antecedents of deism including pelagianism, socinianism, and arianism. In these systems man’s perfectibility was stressed, the Trinity denied for God’s unity, and Christ’s deity diminished or denied completely.

Herbert of Cherbury (1583–1648):

“The Father of English Deism.” Incongruously, deism, a movement that denies supernatural acts of God in the world, originated in England with a man who claimed that a supernatural sound convinced him that he should publish his work. His subsequent book (1624) De Veritate (On Truth) signaled the beginning of deism in England.¹

Herbert set forth five principles of religion he believed were common to all men:

• That there is one Supreme God.
• That he ought to be worshipped.
• That Virtue and Piety are the chief parts of Divine Worship.
• That we ought to be sorry for our sins and repent of them.
• That Divine goodness doth dispense rewards and punishments both in this life and after it.”²

Herbert maintained that these five principles are innate truths that are both universal and certain and are obtained by reflection. He declared himself happier than Archimedes upon discovering these principles. Later deists expanded this list while some omitted number V or sometimes number IV, but in general these five became a kind of creed for deism.³

In maintaining the first article, Herbert denied that there were any atheists, although he readily admitted that many men held unworthy concepts of deity. Since most men of his day would grant the truth of principle II, Herbert did not labor the point. In connection with the third point, Herbert stressed the ethical character of natural religion vis-à-vis the sacramental and ritualistic modes of the established church.

Here the deistic anticlerical emphasis was marked. The fourth principle presented Herbert an opportunity to stress the universality of salvation against the narrow ceremonial way provided in the church. The fifth and last point implied a belief in the immortality of the soul, the providence of God, and the final day of reckoning after death. Of these principles he wrote:

Yet the five above-mentioned truths ever were, and always will be, of that divine nature, that like sunbeams, which no weight can depress, nor any wind blow out, they have darted their glorious rays into the minds of men in all parts of the earth, where they did but exercise their natural use of reason.⁴

Herbert, like other deists to follow, had a definitely negative side to his deism. But since he lived in a time that lacked religious toleration, his criticisms of the Bible were couched in attacks on heathen religious books, sacrifices, and miracles. He made it plain that special supernatural revelation is unnecessary and that the five articles are sufficient for universal salvation as well as for the harmony and peace of mankind.

His conditions for believing that any book was inspired were worded in such a way as to lead one to believe that he felt no book would qualify as a revelation.⁵

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679): Deistic Materialism.

It is difficult to determine whether Hobbes was a deist, a theist, or even an atheist. Like others in that day of religious intolerance, his true views may be concealed beneath his overt claims. But despite the fact he claimed to be a Christian, he was a sensationalist in his epistemology and a materialist in his metaphysic. In his famous Leviathan (1668) Hobbes reduces all ideas to sensation; and since everything man imagines is finite, he contends that there is no positive knowledge of an infinite God. In this the schoolmen deceive us, argues Hobbes, for we cannot conceive God. The name of God is only invoked to induce worship, not because we can conceive him.⁶

Religion, according to Hobbes, is peculiar to man because he is the only animal who seeks the causes of things. Since anxiety follows from not knowing the cause of what man cannot control, man posits an invincible power he calls God. Those who press for causes of natural bodies arrive finally at one God. This God is not understood dogmatically; he is only named or designated for pious purposes.

Men worship this invincible Power as an expression of their thanks for the gifts he gives to them. In brief, there are four natural seeds of religion. The belief in God arises (1) out of opinions about ghosts, (2) ignorance of the cause of things in the natural world, (3) the tendency of men for devotion toward what they fear, and (4) belief in conjectures made about the future based on the opinion of others.⁷

Besides these natural causes of religion Hobbes recognizes the use of religion as a political force for inducing obedience, laws, peace, charity, and social justice. Kings stand in need of religion to rule their subjects. Hence, religion is a political instrument of the king to secure the monarchy against the beastly tendencies of man in a state of nature. In this regard, Hobbes, apparently with tongue in cheek, proceeds to make an exception for revealed religion over natural religion. Supernatural religion is confirmed by miracles whereas natural religion is not.

Hence, in theory at least, Christianity is superior to paganism. However, in actual practice Hobbes contends that when a supposedly revealed religion propounds contradictions, fakes miracles, permits injustice and cruelty, enjoys luxury, and reaps self-benefit, then it cannot be believed. In fact, Hobbes goes so far as to say that miracles even weaken one’s faith; for when the miracles fail so does the faith, as is evident in the life of Moses. Roman Catholicism is definitely suspect to Hobbes since it requires for salvation many things that work to its own favor.⁸

In effect, therefore, what Hobbes gives with his right hand he takes away with his left. In view of this it would not seem unfair to interpret him as a nominal Christian but an actual deist or even a covert atheist. At any rate, his arguments gave support to the overall deistic cause.

John Locke (1632–1704): Empirical Influence on Deism.

Locke was not a deist. In one respect his work is an answer to the deistic challenge of his day. However, Locke displayed some deistic affinities and—more important—laid down some empirical principles that changed the course of deism. In his Reasonableness of Christianity (1695) Locke affirmed his belief in the supernatural over against deism, but he agreed with the deist’s unitarian view of God as opposed to the orthodox trinitarian view. Likewise, Locke denied the deity of Christ as did the deists.

More important, however, to the future of deism was Locke’s empiricism. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) Locke argued that all men are born a tabula rasa, a blank slate.

There are no innate ideas, as both rationalists and deists had been saying. The proofs for this are: (1) children are born without a storehouse of ideas and learn from experience; (2) where there is no experience of something there is a corresponding lack of ideas (e.g., those born blind do not have any visual ideas); (3) where there are different experiences, there are correspondingly different ideas; (4) finally, we have ideas in our mind of things that fit only one or more of our five senses, indicating that all these ideas come via the senses.⁹ Both Bishop Berkeley and David Hume also agreed with this empiricism.

So strong was this movement among the practically minded English that it came to dominate the epistemological scene, influencing even the deists whose predecessors had held to innate ideas.

Charles Blount (1654–1693): Rationalistic Antisupernaturalism.

Blount was clearly a deist. He quotes freely from ancient and modern nontheists including Porphyry, Seneca, Montaigne, Spinoza, and Hobbes. His Religio Laici (Religion of the Laity) suggests a heavy dependence on Herbert of Cherbury. He presents his deism in seven articles by adding two subdivisions to Herbert’s five points. Revealing the influence of Locke, Blount wavers between holding these articles of faith to be innate or acquired, saying, “I know not whether the idea of a God be innate or no, but I’m sure that it is very soon imprinted in the minds of men.”¹⁰

Blount has a more pronounced negativism than his predecessors. His attacks on the Bible indicate the influence of both Hobbes and Spinoza. He casts serious doubt on the virgin birth of Christ and aspersions on the integrity of many Biblical characters. He speaks of the fables of the Old Testament, ridicules the story of the Fall of Adam, and satirizes the story of the Flood.

Likewise, Blount criticizes the man-centered creation story in Genesis. In short, by stressing the parallel of Biblical material to pagan literature he manages to cast substantial doubt on the divine authority and authenticity of Scripture, thus denying its supernatural claim.

The Flourishing of English Deism

Historians cite many reasons for the flowering of English deism. Undoubtedly freedom of the press (granted 1695) and the growth of Biblical criticism (via Hobbes and Spinoza) were two major factors contributing to its rapid growth. And the empiricism of Locke as well as the new scientific spirit following Bacon also contributed to the deistic movement. The first notable deist to manifest Locke’s influence was John Toland.

John Toland (1670–1722)

Toland’s Christianity Not Mysterious (1696) is one of the most important works of the deistic movement. The first edition was published anonymously, and was burned by the Irish parliament. Toland affixed both his name and an apology to the second edition published in London (1702).

Most of Toland’s work was of a negative character, but he found occasion to state some positive religious beliefs which agreed in essence with Herbert’s list. He affirmed his belief in God, in the immortality of the soul, and in the doctrine of future rewards and punishment. He also implied agreement with the article that made religion essentially ethical.

Toland primarily exerted his energy in anticlerical, anti-Scriptural, and antimiraculous attacks on traditional Christianity. With regard to miracles he manifested the influence of Locke, who had defined miracles “a sensible operation, which, being above the comprehension of the spectator, and in his opinion contrary to the established course of nature, is taken by him to be divine.”¹¹ Miracles are the main proof of revelation, but revelations attested by miracles were limited to Christ and Moses.

Toland’s definition of miracles is even less supernaturalistic than Locke’s. Miracles for Toland are events “exceeding all human Power” but which nevertheless are “produced according to the laws of nature, though above its ordinary operations.”¹² In like manner, Toland rejected as part of the nature of true Christianity anything that was mysterious, that is, that went beyond human reason. Hence, it was necessary for him to charge that numerous corruptions have occurred in Christianity and the Scriptures down through the centuries.

He hints that Scripture should be allegorically interpreted to avoid these problems, but it was later deists who developed this position. Toland did, however, discredit the Christian canon of Scripture in his Amyntor (1699), implying that there were additional books attributed to Christ, that there was no fixed and accepted number of canonical books, and that no distinction was made between apocryphal and canonical books.

Another lasting effect of Toland was that made by way of Locke’s empiricism. Mystery was rejected because it has no empirical basis. All knowledge is based on ideas which come from the senses. Nothing is to be accepted as true unless there is exact correspondence between ideas and sensation. “Whatever is evidently repugnant to clear and distinct ideas, or to our common notions, is contrary to reason.”¹³

Anything mysterious or “beyond reason” is thereby eliminated, including the doctrine of the Trinity and the two natures of Christ involved in his deity. In short, Toland’s contributions to deism were building it on the foundation of a Lockian empiricism, criticizing the canon of Scripture, and emphasizing antisupernatural and antimystery rationalism. Successors developed these strains of deism.

Anthony Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713)

Shaftesbury claimed to hold orthodox views, but it is believed that he hid his real views for fear of persecution. He criticized the deists and spoke of himself as a Christian, but this is understood by many to be a part of his characteristic method of satire and irony. Shortly after his death a work on the Cure of Deism (1736) listed Shaftesbury and Tindal as the “oracles of Deism.”¹⁴ In view of his extensive criticism of the Bible it seems likely that Shaftesbury should be classified among the deists.

Most of the basic tenets of deism laid down by Herbert are reflected by Shaftesbury in his work entitled Characteristics. He believed in God, a natural sense of right and wrong, the worship of God, the possibility of a future life, and the essential moral character of religion. His main contributions to deism, however, were not on the side of his positive beliefs.

On the negative side, Shaftesbury’s attitude manifested a hostility to supernaturalism. He expressed an unfavorable attitude toward using miracles in support of Christianity. He rejected modern miracles, accepted Biblical miracles in principle but accorded Biblical miracles very little difference from other miracles. The Bible was subjected to ridicule, especially Old Testament stories about Moses, Joshua, and Jonah. New Testament stories such as those of the birth of Christ and Pentecost were also subjected to ridicule and doubt.¹⁵

Anthony Collins (1676–1729)

Deists abounded in eighteenth-century England when Collins published A Discourse of Free-Thinking (1713) and A Discourse on the Ground and Reason of the Christian Religion (1724). In the former work, he added a number of new arguments against Christianity as a revealed religion. He reasoned that a book that came from God would be expected to be more exact and better written than the Bible is.

He capitalized on different interpretations and differing canons of Scripture among the Christian sects. He cast doubt on the reliability of the Bible by paralleling its miracles to pagan wonder stories.

Collins’s other important work sought to weaken the credibility of Scripture by dwelling on the charge of pious frauds and the gullibility of early Christians. He maintained that the Old Testament text is badly corrupted. He denied that the prophecies of the Old Testament were literal. Hence they could not be used as a supernatural confirmation of Christianity. This he maintained by means of an allegorical interpretation of Scripture adopted from Origen.¹⁶

In support of his position Collins pointed out that both Celsus and Porphyry accused the early Christians of so interpreting Scripture as to make it appear as though the Old Testament is fulfilled in the New Testament. Collins likewise cast doubt on the actions of Jesus and the New Testament apostles by suggesting that they were merely following pagan practices in claiming fulfilment of prophecy. The doctrine of the virgin birth was given special treatment in this regard.

Collins also argued against atheism. In fact he agreed with some of Herbert’s five principles, dropping only the one on the immortality of the soul. Others were not mentioned at all but may be implied to some degree in his discussion. Collins’s work does manifest a more intense criticism of Christianity and a tendency toward even greater skepticism. His works stirred dozens of replies by Christian apologists, including the notable rebuttal by Richard Bentley.

William Wollaston (1659–1724)

Other deists like Bernard de Mandeville (1670–1733) continued the negative attack.¹⁷ But one of the more popular books to come from a deist was Wollaston’s Religion of Nature Delineated (1722). By 1746 the book had gone through seven editions. Wollaston worked out a naturalistic system of ethics that included belief in God, the immortality of the soul, and rewards and punishment whereby everyone can receive his due for this life.

He also argued that since not all creatures get more pleasure than pain in this life there must be another life to rectify this situation, for a just God must certainly give his creatures more pleasure than pain. In contrast with the more optimistic tone of other deists, Wollaston indicated a rather gloomy and pessimistic view of man’s life on earth.

Thomas Woolston (1669–1731)

Woolston was perhaps the most prolific and piercing of deistic writers. His attacks were vigorous and coarse. The deistic critic Leland charged him with “scurrilous buffoonery and gross raillery.”¹⁸ His attacks on the clergy were relentless, as is manifest in The Moderator Between an Infidel and an Apostate (1721) and his Free Gifts to the Clergy (1723–24).

He speaks of them as being “hired” and full of “greed” in their defense of Christianity. Woolston’s primary contribution to deism was his discussion of miracles in six Discourses on Miracles (1727–1730). In this work he charged that there were pagan parallels and even pagan origins of Biblical miracles. In the course of criticizing Christ’s miracles Woolston found occasion to declare that Christ was not even a good man.

Matthew Tindal (1656–1733)

Tindal is probably the most representative example of English deism. His major work, entitled Christianity as Old as the Creation; or, The Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature, has been called the “deistic Bible” and its author the “apostle of deism.” It called forth one hundred and fifty replies including Bishop Butler’s classic critique of deism. Analogy of Religion (1736). The central argument of Tindal’s work is based in the nature of God. God is perfect, and therefore the religion he gives to mankind must be perfect and incapable of being improved.

Creation alone and not the Bible fits this description. Hence, no later revelation such as the Bible can possibly improve on God’s natural revelation. And since God is immutable he cannot change the religion he gave in the first place. Further, because God is impartial he would not have specially favored one people over another by a special revelation to them.

From God’s justice Tindal argued that God “at all times has given mankind sufficient means of knowing what he requires of them.”¹⁹ The perfection of the first revelation in creation necessitates the conclusion that any later revelation can be at best a republication of this original revelation and must be identical with it in content.

Anticipating the question “Why republish the creative revelation in a book?” Tindal replied as follows. Revealed religion is given only to liberate men from the load of superstition that has been mixed with natural religion. But since the Bible is untrustworthy and full of errors, it is obvious that it would not qualify under Tindal’s criteria as special revelation. In this regard the title of Tindal’s book has been criticized as misleading.

The articles of natural religion given by Tindal are: (1) belief in God, (2) the worship of God, (3) doing what is for one’s own good or happiness, and (4) promoting the common happiness. Elsewhere Tindal indicates his belief in a future life.²⁰ But with regard to belief in the Bible as a special revelation of God, Tindal left little hope. For him the gospel could not be more plain than reason, and even so it must be interpreted by reason and not vice versa. Furthermore, a written revelation depends on the uncertain meaning of words, and there is the further problem of the uncertain transmission of the Bible with the consequent corruption of the text.

Tindal’s attack on miracles was based on the many parallels found in pagan stories. He quotes with apparent approval the old statement, “Miracles for fools, the reasons for wise men.”²¹ The Fall of man, many Old Testament stories, the doctrine of original sin, and the integrity of the Biblical prophets are all challenged by Tindal.

He vigorously presented the disagreement between science and Scripture, using the former to discredit the latter. His work represents the high tide of deism and called forth Christianity’s most able defenders. There were other deists after Tindal, such as Thomas Morgan (d. 1743), but none were able to reach his stature.

The Decline of Deism (1742)

Numerous factors contributed to the demise of deism, including the apologetic defense of Christianity provided by men like Bentley, Paley, and Butler. There were also the internal conflicts within the deistic movement and the tendency of English empiricism toward skepticism. No doubt England’s political preoccupation with issues of national importance and the exhaustion of the subject also added to the death of deism. But whatever the factors, the period of decline produced the most negative and skeptical forms of deism in its history.

Peter Annet (1693–1760)

One of the strongest cases against miracles was presented by Peter Annet in The Resurrection of Jesus Considered (1744). In this work the author attacked the trustworthiness of the records as well as the character of the evidence presented in the Biblical records of the resurrection. Miracles are not only unnecessary but the changeless character of God and the uniformity of natural law rule out miracles. He wrote, “Natural powers are fit to answer all the ends of virtue and religion; therefore supernatural powers are needless.”²²

From the very moment of creation God instituted the law of nature to operate in a uniform way. And since no improvement can be made on God’s creation and no change can occur in his nature, miracles are both unnecessary and actually impossible. His argument in this regard foreshadows Hume’s extreme skepticism on miracles.

Annet also attacked the canon of Scripture and the lives of Biblical figures, as had other deists before him. But his most significant contribution was in the direction of the rigidifying naturalism that had developed within the logic of deism.

Thomas Chubb (1649–1747)

Chubb had little education but possessed some natural ability which he used to present deism in laymen’s language. His work, The True Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted (1739), is largely repetition of what his predecessors had already said. The author believed in God, in a moral law according to which men live acceptably before God, and that repentance and reformation are the way back to God. But he acknowledged that the content of natural revelation was more scant. Most of the rest of Chubb’s writings are negative.

He bitterly criticized parts of the Old Testament such as the slaughter of the Canaanites and what he called “malevolent” psalms.²³ He accused the apostles of being hypocrites and spoke contemptuously of Christ and his miracles. He rejected both prophecy and miracles as proof of divine revelation. Chubb not only confessed himself to be a deist but claimed Jesus as an ally. Chubb’s writing was both clever and forceful, and it was influential among the unlettered populace.

Henry Bolingbroke (1672–1751)

Lord Bolingbroke, like the other later deists, was not original. But his brilliant mind and literary ability added to the influence of his works. While some deists were already tending to skepticism, Bolingbroke created a late splash in the English deistic movement. His use of mockery was extensive and his outlook was generally gloomy. Other than his belief in God based on reason and occasional reference to some other deistic tenets, his work is mostly negative. He doubted a future life and denied any future punishment.²⁴

Bolingbroke accused the authors and transmitters of the Bible of being selfish frauds and declared the Biblical history to be untrustworthy. Based on the new scientific outlook of men like Kepler, Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton, he rejected the Biblical picture of the world. He attacked the stories of creation, the flood, and the doctrine of inspiration. Men who thought themselves inspired were called mad and irrational.

Bolingbroke attacked Christianity on philosophical as well as historical grounds. He considered the patronizing of Christianity particularly distasteful. And contrary to traditional Christian belief he argued for the materiality of the soul.²⁵ Bolingbroke quoted widely from the church Fathers (mostly negatively) and often from skeptics and other deists.

Conyers Middleton (1683–1750)

Middleton’s contribution to deism was largely in the realm of the antisupernatural argumentation. His Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers, Which Are Supposed to Have Subsisted in the Christian Church (1749) rejects all miracles after the time of the apostles. Apostolic miracles, however, Middleton considered authentic. For these were “delivered to us by eye-witnesses, whose honest characters exclude the suspicion of fraud, and whose knowledge of the facts, which they relate, scarce admits the probability of a mistake.”

In much the same vein as Locke’s Third Letter on Toleration, Middleton contrasted with great scholarship the apostolic and postapostolic miracles. He strongly maintained the incredibility of the church Fathers’ witness to supposed miraculous events in much the same way that Hume and others cast doubt on all testimony to miracles. Middleton summarized his view saying, “The History of the Gospel, I hope may be true, though the History of the Church be fabulous.”²⁶ In this sense Middleton was only a limited deist or a qualified theist.

Henry Dodwell, Jr., (d. 1784). In Dodwell, skepticism forced deism to a fideistic stance. In his book, Christianity Not Founded on Argument; and the True Principle of Gospel-Evidence Assigned (1742), Dodwell states, “I am fully persuaded, that the judging at all of religious matters is not the proper province of reason, or indeed an affair where she has any concern.” Reason by its very nature cannot be the faculty of religion; faith is essential to religion. Religion requires men to think alike; whereas men differ in their thinking.

Religion teaches to pray for an increase of faith; whereas reason calls for an increase in evidence. Reason calls for neutrality and withholding decision; whereas religion demands faith. Indeed most men are capable of little reasoning but all have faith readily available. The command to believe makes no time allowance for the reasoning process. The Bible itself does not teach men to reason but to believe. Not even miracles can be appealed to as reasons for belief because counterfeit miracles are possible.

And even if some apostolic miracles be regarded as reason for faith, they have lost their value by increasing antiquity. In fact faith and reason are contrary in nature and effect. “The foundation of philosophy is all doubt and suspicion, as the foundation of religion is all acquiescence and belief.”²⁷ The world failed by wisdom to know God. According to Dodwell, philosophical skepticism and religious deism go hand in hand, one complementing the other.

David Hume (1711–1776)

Taken at face value, Hume claimed to side more with the deist Cleanthes in his famous Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion. Many interpret him, however, as a tongue-in-cheek skeptic. Whatever the case, Hume’s anti-Bible, anti-established religion, and especially anti-miracles emphasis make it easy to see why many people of Hume’s day thought him to be a deist.

Hume did make statements to the effect that he believed in God apart from any divine revelation. In the introduction to his Dialogues Hume wrote, “What truth is so obvious, so certain, as the being of a God, which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged, for which the most refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and arguments?” What Hume did claim to dispute was “the nature of that divine being; his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence.”

In the Dialogues, Demea is the mystic, Philo the skeptic, and Cleanthes the believer in God. Hume concludes in the last lines, “I confess that, upon a serious review of the whole, I cannot but think that Philo’s principles are more probable than Demea’s; but that those of Cleanthes approach still nearer to the truth.” Prima facie, then, Hume would appear to be a deist.

Whether this was a covert literary way of hiding his true skepticism is moot. Hume did say a few lines earlier, “To be a philosophical skeptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian.”²⁸ This sounds like fideism.

However one interprets Hume’s own personal views concerning God, there are two definite ways Hume is associated with the deistic movement, especially in its period of decline. First, the deism of Hume’s day had become increasingly skeptical about rational demonstrations of religious truths. Second, Hume’s extremely naturalistic stand against miracles is the climax of a characteristic tendency in the deistic movement.

Hume argued strongly that the wise man should not believe in miracles because the probability for the uniformity of nature was always higher than the probability of an exception to the laws of nature. Since the wise man bases his beliefs on the highest probability, he will always believe a miracle to be highly improbable. In short, the testimony for the uniformity of nature is built on the highest probability; hence, a miraculous event must always be most highly suspect (see Chapter 14 on Naturalism).

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

Kant confesses to have been awakened from his dogmatic slumbers by reading David Hume. This awakening turned him from rational theism to philosophical skepticism. Kant retained his personal piety and interest in religion but strictly on moral grounds. He believed, as the title of his deistic classic reveals, in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1792). By “reason” Kant means practical or moral reason, since theoretical or philosophical reason was given up in his famous Critique of Pure Reason (1781).

Not only did Kant reject all rational proofs for the existence of God in favor of his moral postulate, but he also rejected the need for historical evidence, especially by way of the miraculous. Miracles are superfluous to true religion. Miracles may be appropriate to man’s ordinary way of thought to serve as an introduction to moral religion, but they are not strictly necessary to religion. Although a man cannot deny the theoretical possibility of a miracle occurring, it is senseless deceit on a man’s part to believe that he has the gift of performing them.

Kant admits that Christ’s life and death may “all be nothing but miracles.… But it is essential that, in the use of these historical accounts, we do not make it a tenet of religion that the knowing, believing, and professing of them are themselves means whereby we can render ourselves well-pleasing to God.” The account of Christ’s resurrection, however, is clearly rejected by Kant. These “more secret records, added as a sequel, of his resurrection and ascension, which took place before the eyes only of his intimates, cannot be used in the interest of religion within the limits of reason alone.…”²⁹

Kant defined miracles as “events in the world the operating laws of whose causes are, and must remain, absolutely unknown to us.” Hence, “we have not, and can never hope to have, the slightest conception of the law according to which God then brings about such an event.…” In fact, “we cannot know anything at all about supernatural aid.…” One thing we do know about a miracle is that “if it flatly contradicts morality, it cannot, despite all appearances, be of God (for example, were a father ordered to kill his son …).”

In contrast to Hume, for Kant it was uniform accord with the moral law rather than natural law that was the criterion by which alleged miraculous events were to be judged. Kant did accept, nonetheless, that all the species and events of the plant and animal kingdoms are “nothing but natural effects and ought never to be adjudged otherwise.” Only the rash and immodest would venture beyond natural explanation in support of miracles.³⁰

Although Kant admits the theoretical possibility of miracles he both denies their moral relevance to religion and offers this practical argument against them: Either miracles occur daily hidden under the guise of natural events, or else they occur seldom, or else they never occur.If they occur regularly then it could not be accounted as a miracle but simply as a natural event.

On the other hand, if miracles occur only seldom, then the objective question can be transformed into a frivolous subjective question by asking, “How seldom? Once in a hundred years? Or in ancient times but never now?” But since practical reason must operate by objective principles, we must conclude that miracles must occur either daily or never. And since they cannot occur daily, “nothing remains but to adopt the latter maxim—for this principle remains ever a mere maxim for making judgments, not a theoretical assertion.”

In short, Kant admits that miracles are theoretically possible but he will live as though they never occur. Since miracles are morally unnecessary, it will be morally assumed that religion can be lived within the limits of reason alone without appeal to the supernatural. The supernatural may be there and miracles may even occur, but they are unknowable by nature and impractical—even embarrassing—for religion. Hence, it is morally best to simply eliminate the miraculous from religion. Our practical reason demands this nonsupernatural approach.³¹

Other Deistic Influence of Note

English deism strongly influenced later French deism and skepticism, of which Diderot and Voltaire are notable examples. In America deism flourished after it had declined in England. Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Paine are classed as deists. Jefferson cut all the miraculous stories out of the Gospels and put the rest together in a form that was published posthumously. His “Bible” ends this way: “there laid they Jesus, and rolled a great stone to the door of the sepulchre, and departed.”³²

Since the rest of the story is the miracle of the resurrection, Jefferson omitted it. Thomas Paine is notorious for his attack on the Bible in The Age of Reason. Perhaps more than anywhere else in the United States, deistic tendencies of naturalism and Biblical criticism have lived on in modernistic or liberal Protestantism.

Harry Emerson Fosdick is no doubt the classic representative of this position; but other modern exponents, such as Nels Ferré, have carried on the spirit of the movement. And in many respects contemporary process theology (see Chapter 11) carries on the naturalistic deistic tradition.

Historians have listed many reasons for the decline and fall of deism. The high scholarship of its opponents, the internal problems of the deistic view, the increasing skepticism of the period, its mechanistic model of God, its lopsided criticism of Biblical characters, and even the shifting political scene have been given as reasons for the demise of deism. But before we provide a philosophical critique of deism it is necessary to outline the central tenets of the deistic world view.

The Central Tenets of Deism

The foregoing survey of deism amply indicates the diversity within the deistic movement. There are few if any hard and fast lines of demarcation. The movement fades off on a continuum from qualified theists (e.g., Locke) to those whom some consider to be outright skeptics (e.g., Hume). In between, the grounds for holding to deism vary from rationalism to fideism. Likewise, the degree of and basis for skepticism on miracles ranges from accepting only apostolic miracles to the rejection of all miracles, from rejecting miracles in practice to rejecting all miracles in principle.

For systematic purposes we will have to ignore the historical shades and overlappings with theism and skepticism, and describe a deistic position that is mutually exclusive to both supernatural theism and to pure naturalism. In this regard, a deist will be defined as one who believes there is a God beyond the world who created the world but that the world runs by natural law without supernatural interference.

Deists will differ as to why they reject miracles. Some will say God cannot perform them because it would be contrary either to his own nature or to the nature of natural law. Others will simply point out that God does not perform miracles, at least that we have no convincing evidence that he has done so. They agree that miracles are not needed to support religion; a natural basis is sufficient for a natural religion.

The first premise of a deistic world view is that there is a God who created the universe. In contrast to dualism, which holds that matter is eternal, the deists believe that the material universe was created by God. God alone is eternal. And in contrast with pure naturalism or atheism, a deist believes that it is necessary to posit a God as the author and architect of the universe. There is a First Cause beyond the natural world who originated all of the natural processes.

Likewise, in distinction from pantheism, a deist believes that God is not identical with the real world. All is not God and God is not all for a deist. The world is as different from God as the painting is from the painter or the watch from the watchmaker. Of course, the mind of the Maker is revealed and manifest in what is made, but there is nonetheless a real difference between Creator and creation.

The second major premise of deism is antisupernaturalism. Miracles do not occur. Some argue that a perfect God could not make an imperfect universe which would demand miraculous interruption and repair. This would be contrary to the nature of God. Others stress the unchanging nature of God. If miracles were unnecessary from the beginning of natural creation, then there is no reason to believe that a changeless God would change his mind about their subsequent usefulness.

Other deists stress the uniformity of natural law. God set up the laws of the natural world and he cannot (or, will not) violate the law he established in the natural world. A miracle would be a violation of an inviolable law. But the inviolable cannot be violated. Hence, miracles cannot happen. In the weaker form of deistic anti-supernaturalism, extreme skepticism is expressed about the actuality of any miracle occurring.

Doubt arises either because of the unreliability of the witnesses, the inutility of miracles, the lack of authenticity of the documents, or the general antiquity and inaccessibility of the evidence.

And even some limited supernatural theists, who admitted some miracles (usually apostolic ones), so undermined belief in other miracles that if their arguments were applied to apostolic miracles the grounds for believing in all miracles would be eliminated. Antisupernaturalism is a distinguishing characteristic of deism.

The third major tenet of deism is a unitarian concept of God that involves a denial of the orthodox doctrines of the Trinity and the deity of Christ. In this respect even John Locke was a deist, although he admitted the validity of apostolic miracles. This third tenet is consistent with the first premise and flows necessarily from the second. If no supernatural event occurs then assuredly Christ was not a supernatural being and definitely not Deity incarnate.

And a denial of the deity of Christ involves a denial of the doctrine of the Trinity, which holds that there are more persons than one who are God by nature, one of whom is Jesus of Nazareth. Deists, then, are unitarian in the doctrine of God.There were of course many other associated tenets of deism. Being a natural religion it scoffed at all supposed revelation as well as at established religions whose demands went beyond the natural revelation of God.

And the minimal content of the natural revelation most often included a belief in a moral law, the good life in accord with this natural moral law, and a future life of rewards or punishments to follow. The three tenets of deism expounded above, however, are the major ones and will be the basis of our evaluation here.

An Evaluation of Deism

There are some positive values that emerge from a deistic emphasis, some directly and others as by-products. Let us briefly note the more important ones here.

Some Positive Contributions or Consequences of Deism

Deists emphasized natural revelation. In accord with traditional Christian theism, deists believed in a natural revelation of God to all men. From Old Testament times (Ps. 19) to the New Testament (Rom. 1:19–20), from Augustine to Aquinas to Calvin there has always been an acknowledgment among theists that God is revealed in his creation. All men know God via conscience and creation and are held responsible for this knowledge. No rational moral creature is beyond this natural revelation.

Man may and does distort and suppress it, but he is nonetheless aware of it. And indeed, the natural revelation is logically prior to any supernatural revelation; for how could one know something to be a special revelation of God if he has no general context in which to place it? How could one even know that it is God giving the special revelation unless he has some prior knowledge as to who God is?

The God of creation (Gen. 1:1) comes logically and actually prior to the God of supernatural revelation (Heb. 1:1, 2).2. Another important contribution of deism is the stress on reason in matters of religious belief. Most deists were not fideists; they believed that supposed miracles and revelations should be brought before the bar of reason to separate the false from the true. In this they should not be faulted. As many orthodox theologians have rightly argued, reason must be used to judge whether indeed the Scriptures are a revelation of God.

This does not mean that reason is superior to God, for God is the source of reason and of the principles of reason—such as the law of noncontradiction. And if a supposed revelation is logically contradictory, then there is no way it can be the object of a reasonable belief such as the Scriptures command Christians to have (I Peter 3:15). Deists should not be faulted, then, for using reason to judge revelation or miracles, but for misusing reason and for being unreasonable in its use.

Further, the deistic attitude toward miracles is not without some justification, even though it is not entirely in accord with an authentic supernaturalism. The theist can readily admit that reason should be used to sort out the false and spurious claims to the supernatural. Even Scripture commands believers to “test the spirits” and to beware of “false prophets” (I John 4:1; Matt. 7:15). Indeed, if many miracles are found to be without justification because of lack of supporting evidence, then a true miracle is in a better position to be vindicated by its justifiable support.

And if conflicting religious claims are supported by pseudomiracles, and if it is possible to support unique miracles without competitors, then such miracles would have a valid apologetic use. In short, deism’s attack on spurious miracles is a helpful prelude to establishing Christian theism on authentic miracles.4. Finally, an important by-product emerged from the strong and sustained attack on traditional Christianity. The deistic siege called forth some of the most scholarly and stout defenses of orthodox Christianity in modern times.

Bishop Berkeley, Bishop Butler, and William Paley all contributed masterful works to this apologetic cause. Even skeptics like Lord Lytleton and Frank Morison were converted and became ardent defenders of Christianity. Deistic criticism gave impetus to the study of archaeology which yielded not only the conversion of such notable men as Sir William Ramsay, but hundreds of thousands of archaeological confirmations of the Biblical world view. For all of this the bitter and sustained attack of deism on Biblical Christianity is to be indirectly thanked.

A Negative Critique of the Deistic World View

As a world view deism suffers some insurmountable internal and even external difficulties. Let us now summarize the most significant problems.

First of all, the deists’ understanding of God is incompatible with their stand against miracles. Since God performed the miracle of creation ex nihilo (from nothing), it follows from the very nature and power of this kind of God that other lesser miracles are possible. Walking on water is little problem for a God who created water to begin with.

To make a human being through a female ovum (virgin birth) is not difficult for a God who made a world from nothing. And multiplying loaves is surely not a greater feat than creating matter in the first place. In short, it is self-defeating to admit the miracle of creation and to deny that other miracles are possible.

Second, the deistic concept of God is built on an invalid mechanistic model rather than on a personal model. God is not a mere Master machine-maker. On this model it is no wonder deists conclude that a “perfect” creation would be one that does not demand personal attention and miraculous intercommunication. For the more perfect the mechanic the more perfect the machine, and the most perfect mechanic could create the most perfect machine that should need no subsequent “tune-ups.”

However, if God is personal, as even the deistic concept of God would admit, then there is no reason why a “perfect” universe for a personal God would not be one which involves personal attention. Miraculous commerce between the personal Creator and the persons created would not only be possible, it would seem to be most probable.

If the desire to have personal communication between the supernatural and the natural realm flows from God as personal, then not to perform miracles of personal communication (viz., revelation) would show God to be something less than perfectly personal. It is inconsistent to disallow a personal communication from the supernatural realm to the natural realm once one has admitted God is personal.

A God concerned enough to create men, in the beginning, should be concerned enough to intervene on their behalf, men who have fallen into grave difficulties. “You have made your own bed, lie in it” is something less than the attitude a good Creator ought to have. If he had enough love and concern for man to create him, then it would seem to be most compatible with such a nature to believe that God would miraculously intervene to help him if he were in need. And surely a God strong enough to create the world is strong enough to help it.

The laws of creation are not inviolable; they are created and contingent. And what is created and contingent can be laid aside if need be for the moral good of man. Hence, the nature of God, even as conceived by deists, would be compatible with miraculous intervention into the natural world when the situation calls for it.

The deistic arguments intended to eliminate the basis for belief in a supernatural revelation apply equally as well to elimination of the deistic belief in creation. The deist has no more right to believe that God created the world from nothing than the supematuralist does that God has performed miracles. If the Bible cannot be trusted to teach one doctrine then there is no grounds for believing the other one is true.

Both creation and revelation are miracles, and a miracle as such cannot be discovered by purely scientific or natural means. One cannot prove by reason the doctrine of ex nihilo creation, the attempts by some theists notwithstanding. That the originating Cause of the universe produced this world out of nothing is a supernatural act, and supernatural acts are not scientifically observable or demonstrable.

One can see certain observable results of a supernatural act (e.g., a human body that results from a virgin birth) but one cannot observe the modus operandi by which the miracle occurred. Hence, the deist defeats his own case against revelation when he accepts from revelation the doctrine of creation.

Further, the deistic criticism of the trustworthiness of the Biblical documents and writers is definitely lacking. Archaeological confirmation of the authenticity of Scripture has been overwhelming since the heyday of deism. Over twenty-five thousand finds have confirmed the picture of the Biblical world presented in Scripture. The integrity of the eyewitnesses and writers of the documents of the New Testament has been sufficiently established.

The alleged contradictions within the Bible have been answered. No scientific errors have been proven in the Bible.³³ In short, deism has failed to cast sufficient doubt on the supernatural either in principle or in fact.

Summary and Conclusion

A deist believes that God made the world but does not “monkey” with it. God created the natural world but never interrupts it with supernatural events. God is beyond the world but does not operate within it in a miraculous way. But despite the many helpful emphases and prods to Biblical theism, the deistic position is decidedly inadequate.

For once the miracle of creation is admitted, the possibility of other miracles follows. Indeed, the very concept of a deistic God is one that is not reducible to a purely mechanistic model that would allow for no personal intervention in the world. A personal God shows his perfection by his miraculous personal commerce with his creatures. To hold otherwise is inconsistent.

And if God was concerned enough about man to create him, it would seem to follow that he would be concerned enough to intervene on his behalf. Indeed, there is ample evidence to believe that God has miraculously interposed himself in the world. Deism is defunct both historically and philosophically.

SELECT READINGS FOR Deism

Exposition of Deism

• Herbert of Cherbury. De Veritate.
• Kant, Immanuel. Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.
• Paine, Thomas. The Age of Reason.
• Tindal, Matthew. Christianity as Old as Creation.
• Toland, John. Christianity Not Mysterious.
• Woolston, Thomas. Discourses on Miracles.

Evaluation of Deism

• Bentley, Richard. Remarks upon Late Discourses of Free-Thinking.
• Butler, Bishop. Analogy in Religion.
• “Infidelity.” New York, American Tract Society (no date).
• LeLand, John. A View of the Principal Deistic Writers.…
• Orr, John. English Deism.

^[1]

¹ See John Orr, English Deism, p. 61.

² Orr, p. 62.

³ Orr, p. 63.

⁴ Orr, p. 67.

⁵ Orr, p. 68.

⁶ Hobbes, Leviathan, chaps. 1, 3.

⁷ Hobbes, chap. 12.

⁸ Hobbs, chap. 12.

⁹ Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. II, chap. 1.

¹⁰ Orr, English Deism, p. 111.

¹¹ John Locke, Discourse of Miracles, p. 256.

¹² Orr, English Deism, p. 121.

¹³ Orr, p. 120.

¹⁴ Orr, p. 123.

¹⁵ Orr, pp. 124–25.

¹⁶ Orr, p. 132.

¹⁷ Orr, p. 135.

¹⁸ John Leland, A View of the Principal Deistical Writers.…, vol. I, p. 113.

¹⁹ Orr, English Deism, p. 141.

²⁰ Orr, p. 143.

²¹ Orr, p. 144.

²² Orr, p. 515.

²³ Orr, p. 153.

²⁴ Orr, p. 156.

²⁵ Orr, p. 157.

²⁶ Orr, pp. 159–60.

²⁷ Orr, pp. 163–64.

²⁸ David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Introduction and Conclusion.

²⁹ Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, pp. 79, 80, 83, 119.

³⁰ Kant, pp. 81, 179, 81–82, 84.

³¹ Kant, pp. 83, 84.

³² The Jefferson Bible, ed. Douglas Lurton.

³³ See pt. III below, chaps. 17 and 18.

^[1]Geisler, N. L. (1976). Christian apologetics. Includes index. (151). Grand Rapids: Baker Book House.

DEISM – All you want to know